ILLUSION AND ITS CORRECTIONS

A comparative and critical Study of some Indian theories of illusion and of the meaning of falsity

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Ambika Datta Sharma

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PREFACE

The present work was submitted for the degree of the Doctorate in Literature of the Calcutta University in 1959 and on the recommendation of the board of adjudicators I was admitted to it in 1962.

The topic of my research was suggested to me as early as 1950 by my revered father, Professor Satkari Mookerjee, Asutosh professor of Sanskrit in the post-graduate arts department of the Calcutta University at the time, and I started reading various Sanskrit texts under the competent guidance of the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Yogendranath Bagchi, the then professor of Indian philosophy at the University. I was proceeding steadily in my work. But in the mean time on retirement from his University Service my father went abroad and my teacher also left the University and joined the newly started research department of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta, where he had to busy himself in connexion with his new station and duties. My difficulties were further aggravated by the conditions of my service as Government college teacher and my consequent transfers from one *mofussil* college to another. But I carried on as best as I could in the mean time, and it was in 1958 when I was transferred to Calcutta that I could renew my contact with the Mahāmahopādhyāya, who in spite of his old age and failing health, gave me abundant materials relevant to my topic and I made considerable progress in my work. It was also my good fortune that I received very substantial guidance from my revered teacher the late Professor Susil Kumar Maitra, M.A., Ph.D., who supervised my work from beginning to end and pronounced it fit for the highest degree of the University.

It was at his suggestion that the concluding portion on *falsity* has been added to my work, and I was immensely benefited by his illuminating criticism and ungrudging help in this regard. These two teachers gave me unstinted encouragement for finishing the work and were eager to see it in print. Alas they are no more in the land of the living and my work could not be published during their lifetime. Today I remember them with a heavy heart and assert without reservation that whatever merit there may be in my work I owe it wholly to them.

The problem of illusion is a vast subject and every school of Indian philosophy has dealt with it in details quite in consonance with its ontology. Consideration of space constrained me to leave out the minor theories which seem to have small logical value. I have, however, tried to do justice to all the relevant issues with their ramifications with as much care and concentration as possible. Dr S. K. Maitra, Professor Hiriyanna, and Dr A. K. Ray Chaudhury wrote some illuminating papers on the subject, but a more intensive study of it as set forth and expounded by the Prābhākara, the Naiyāyika and the Advaita schools was a desideratum. If this humble work goes a little way in removing this long-felt want and is of any use to any student of philosophy, I shall consider my labour rewarded. The work is based throughout on original sources, Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic* being perhaps the only exception.

The book was selected for publication by the Calcutta University and committed to the Pooran Press for printing in 1965. Owing to my transfer to Darjeeling Government College where I had to pass long six years, the work of printing had been slow and could not progress satisfactorily. However, the authorities of the Calcutta University, the proprietor and the compositors of the Press have taken care in successfully executing their tasks, and I am, of course, indebted to all of them.

My aged father despite his bad health has seen the book through the press, corrected all the proofs and made some alterations. I must acknowledge my irrepayable debt to the learned Mahāmahopādhyāya, special obligation to Professor Maitra, and offer loving regards to my dear father. I have to express further my most grateful thanks to Principal Pramathanath Banerjee, M.A., LL.B., Bar-at-Law, LL.D., D.Litt., quondam Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta, a great patron of learning and an unfailing friend of the generations of scholars, for the help and encouragement I have received from him with regard to the publication of my present work.

In fine, I regret that in spite of my scrupulous carefulness there have occurred a number of misprints which unfortunately escaped my vigilance. I take full responsibility for all such defects, and only appeal to my readers to bear with me and generously take the trouble of correcting them—*prasādam ādhāya viśoahayantu.*

PRESIDENCY COLLEGE
CALCUTTA
1969

J. M.

In memory
of
my teacher
Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Yogendranath Bagchi,
D. Litt. (*honoris causa*), Tarka-Sāṃkhya-Vedāntatirtha,
a transcendent genius and ocean of learning

Tameva bhāntam anubhāti sarvaṃ
Tasya bhāsā sarvamidaṃ vibhāti

Jaya jaya karuṇabdhe mokṣa-seto smarāre
Jaya jaya jagadīśa jñānasindho svayambhūh
Jaya jaya paramātmaṇ trāhi māṃ bhaktihīnaṃ
Jaya jaya bhavahārin Rāmakṛṣṇo dvibāho.

Girigairika maṇḍitāṃ jyotirmayaṃ
Nityām ānanda mūrtiṃ
Karuṇāvatāraṃ premapuruṣaṃ
Satyānandarūpaṃ niyataṃ namāmi.

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INTRODUCTION

Yathā na devo bhagavān brahmā lokapitāmahaḥ
Tvāṃ parityajya santiṣṭhet tathā bhava varapradā
Vedāḥ śāstrāṇi sarvāṇi nṛtyagītādikañca yat
Na vihīnaṃ tvayā devi tathā me santu siddhayaḥ.
Lakṣmīrmedhādharāpuṣṭirgaurī-tuṣṭiḥ prabhā dhṛtiḥ
Etābhiḥ pāhi tanubhiraṣṭābhirmāṃ sarasvatī[1]

The instinctive tendency of human mind to accept the deliverance of experience as valid receives a setback when it finds that reality is not as it appeared in experience to have been. The discovery of the liability to error naturally engenders an attitude of caution and doubt. The doubt, however, may result in a pathological attitude of scepticism and may prevent a man from further pursuit of enquiry into truth or may lead to a sadistic tendency which finds satisfaction in demonstrating the incapacity of human intellect. Scepticism is a welcome attitude when it acts as a check on the naive self-confidence of the child and generates a sense of the necessity of self-

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1. "May'st thou favour me with the boon that I may not lose thy constant association just in the same way as god Brahmā the supreme and the grandparent of our living creatures does not exist dissociated from thee.

"May the accomplishment come to me without any hitch in the Vedas, Sciences and disciplines one and all, the Sciences of music and dance, other arts which live and function only when they are not deserted by thee.

"May'st thou protect me, O Goddess of Learning (Sarasvatī), with all thy eightfold embodiment manifested in Lakṣmī (Goddess of fortune), intellect, earth, principle of nourishment, the divine mother Gaurī (the Consort of Siva), contentment, the divine light and the divinity of endurance."

examination. Had there been no such check and setback the child would have developed an attitude of complacency and a feeling of unwarranted belief in its powers. It is the resistance to its will that makes it realise that its powers have their limitations. In fact, the notorious proclivity to error has given rise to the adage 'To err is human'. The child as also the uneducated man, who is on the same level of intellectual development, believes in many things, which the progress of knowledge has shown to be hopelessly erroneous. Such beliefs as that the Sun rises in the East and sets in the West, and that the Earth is a flat body at rest are notorious instances of human error which can be corrected by an elaborate course of training and education. Errors are in these cases due to hasty generalisations on insufficient data. Apart from errors of reasoning, the frequent occurrences of perceptual illusions rudely remind one of the impotency of one's resources and the unwisdom of placing implicit faith in the *prima facie* deliverances of experience.

But error is never natural. It is always an accident or an aberration unless one is an out and out sceptic. Scepticism, however, is self-refuting. It lays down as its fundamental principle that certainty is nowhere to be arrived at, that truth is not attainable. Scepticism, in fact, is an outright affirmation of the certainty that no certainty is attainable by the human mind. Being doubtful of the deliverance of experience René Descartes started with a sceptical attitude. But it was only a method, and not the last word of his philosophy. It was adopted with the ulterior motive of making philosophy free from the corrosive influence of idols of the time and to get at something indubitable and certain. Again, doubt is always a tension and struggle and cannot be the resting place of the mind. It must end in a positive finding. This being so, error must have a condition, i.e., some defect, either subjective or objective. But a pathology of error only touches the fringe of the problem and does not concern the epistemological side of the question. The analysis of the psychological process and condition of perceptual error is no doubt a preliminary to the assessment of the logical value of the resulting cognition. Truth and error are matters of experience and therefore lend themselves to psychological analysis. But they have also logical value and disvalue and so far are problems of epistemology and logic. Indian philosophers of the past, therefore, did not keep psychology on the one hand and logic and epistemology on the other in water-tight compartments. The discussions of the conditions of error should not be regarded as irrelevant in epistemological enquiry. This is the apology for the rather elaborate discussion of psychological issues, particularly in the examination of the Nyāya view of error.

The present work is concerned only with erroneous perception or what ordinarily passes as illusion of sense. The problem has enormous interest for the philosopher in that sceptics, realists and idealists have all exploited the possibility of error in the service of their respective theories. If error be once concedcd to be a fact, it will necessarily undermine one's faith in the value and validity of cognition in general. The problem boils down to the question, what is the status of the object of illusory perception ? Does error give us an unreal datum, or a monster which has no place in the nature of existence ? The realists and the idealists have waged a relentless war against one another on this issue. The object of an erroneous experience may be a pure unfounded datum or it may be an unreal monster, a mere word and a name, or it may be a real, stubborn, objective fact. The Naiyāyika and their *confréres* are the advocates of this last theory, which is the theory of *anyathākhyāti* or wrong reference. Even in error we are conversant with a real datum as far as its ontological status is concerned. The falsity rather lies in the subjective reference of one real datum to another to which it does not belong. The datum is real on its own account, but does not belong to the context. Obviously the theory is not quite smooth-sailing, and some schools thus prefer the easier way of cutting the Gordian knot by denying the very facthood of error. According to this view, error is just a case of omission and not a case of commission or of positive judgement. It is called *vivekākhyāti* or non-discrimination, or the theory of neglected difference, as Stcherbatsky puts it. It is mainly negative in its interpretation in that the subject and the predicate are two distinct data, but the fact of their respective distinction is not apprehended. The Buddhist nihilist maintains the diametrically opposite view, holding that in error what is apprehended is an unreal fiction. The Buddhist subjectivist, however, interprets it as consisting in a trans-subjective reference of a subjective idea. Lastly, the Advaitin admits the objective status of the datum, but puts it in a class of its own. It is *sui generis* and cannot be characterised either as real or as unreal.

In the present work we have discussed the theories as conceived by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, the Naiyāyika realist and the Advaitin of the Saṃkarite school. The Prābhākara's ingenious interpretation of illusory experiences as being purely negative marks a novelty of approach. The Prābhākara realist thinks that the admission of error as a fact of experienee is inconsistent with strict realism. Realism, as we all know, here as well as elsewhere, cannot explain the problem of error satisfactorily in conformity to its basic principles. And the merit of this school of Mīmāmsā lies in the recognition of this cardinal truth and in denying errant experiences altogether. Neither Locke nor the common-sense realist, as we all know, gives a satisfactory account of error and the problem is also a veritable Achilles' heel both to the new and the critical realism of to-day. And the same remarks apply to the realism of the Sautrāntika Buddhists and the realism of the Nyāya. The Mīmāṃsaka is alive to this basic weakness in realism and tries to get over it by the denial of error itself as a fact of experience. We have, in fact, some modern counterparts of the Mīmāṃsaka amongst the neo-realists, for example, Holt. The theory is thus a denial of error. And this is the most criticised theory in the history of Indian philosophy. An advocate of error before establishing his view must refute this theory and show it to be untenable. We have in the Nyāya philosophy an elaborate criticism of the Mīmāṃsā theory of error as neglected difference or non-discrimination. In Advaita philosophy almost every author has devoted himself to the task of its refutation. The most famous criticism one finds in the *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra. The points raised by Maṇḍana have been summarised by Vācaspati Miśra both in the *Tātparya* and the *Bhāmatī.* Vācaspati is supposed to be a very close follower of Maṇḍana and, for reason of brevity, a faithful representation of Vācaspati's critique of the theory of neglected difference, has been attempted in the present work. The reasons which induced Prabhākara and the followers of the school he founded to deny erroneous experience have also been shown. These are fear of scepticism, the absurdity of the admission of an utter unreality, and of knowledge as a three-term affair, etc. In this we claim no originality of our own. This was pointed out long ago by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, pioneer in the field of the neo-logical movement, and, long before him, by Vācaspati Miśra, an arch-Naiyāyika of the old school.

The Nyāya theory of *anyathākhayāti* or wrong reference has been examined in all its details. The perceptual character of the illusory perception has been shown by the Naiyāyika by hypothesis of some sort of contact between the sense and the distant object, the datum of illusory perception. It is generally held that the Naiyāyika proves contact with such an elsewhere existent object with the help of the previous cognition as the connecting link. Previous cognition existing in its latent form is thought to be the link between the sense in action and the elsewhere object. But the idea is found to be fraught with difficulties and the Naiyāyika changes his position and postulates defect as the connecting link between the sense and the distant object of illusory experience. There are defects and defects, and the power of these defects cannot be fully gauged. The hypothesis of defect which the Naiyāyika trots out is never to be supposed to be a mere guess unsupported by objective facts. The absence of other counter hypotheses to explain the alleged contact between the sense and the distant predicate makes the hypothesis of defect a plausible and as such an acceptable one. The Nyāya view of the appearance of an elsewhere existent object in illusion is inspired by the realistic metaphysics which the Naiyāyika sponsors. The Nyāya thesis is that whatever is knowable is amenable to proof. It nowhere happens that a pure blank, a non-existent fiction, ever becomes the object of our experience, veridical or non-veridical. Since an utter non-entity lacks the very capacity of appearing in a tangible form, can there be any sense in saying that in error one apperhends it? And quite consistently with its realistic metaphysics the Naiyāyika declares that the object of an erroneous experience is a real objective fact. From the psychological point of view also error as a psychical mental state is real and not false. The falsity of the experience lies in its logical aspect as wrong reference discovered by contradiction. The view of Vācaspti Miśra in regard to this point is however worth considering. The points urged against Vācaspati Miśra by Vardhamāna Upādhyāya have also been examined is this context. It has been shown that Vācaspati in all his works, the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, the *Nyāyakaṇikā*, etc., follows the Nyāya tradition and has sought to maintain that what appears in illusion is real elsewhere, and what nowhere ever is real can never become the object of any experience whatsoever. We have also discussed that contradiction or correction is the proof of error, and have borrowed the terminology of the late Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya, and named the section 'Correction as a logical process.' In this section we have followed the procedure adopted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in the *Nyāyamañjarī* has analysed the possible meanings of cantradiction in the fashion of a Prābhākara Mīmaṃsaka, and criticised the Mīmāṃsaka interpretation from the Nyāya point of view. Contradiction or correction being possible erroneous or illusory experiences are not impossible fictions.

But the Nyāya theory does violence to the obvious verdict of experience. Experience tells us that when an illusion is corrected what is corrected is an object present here and now. The rejection of a there-and-then silver is never endorsed by the experience of correction. Silver may be real elsewhere, but in the situation of illusion it is undoubtedly absent. And this absence is evident from the fact of its rejection by a subsequent negative judgement. In short what the rejection rejects is an object which appeared here and now in the locus in question. The Naiyāyika being inspired by his realistic metaphysics and for the sake of a preconceived theory denies this testimony of plain experience. The Advaitin recognises this side of the issue and posits the appearance of a real object, a real silver, in the situation of illusion. This appearance of real silver or real object in illusion may however appear strange. And, in fact, the Mādhva and other realists point out that once a thing appears or presents itself in a substrate it cannot be negated in that very substrate. If silver be conceded to present itself in the substrate of the mother-of-pearl, the same silver cannot be negated in the same substrate by a subsequent act of negation. And if this absurd position be upheld by the Advaitin, the Mādhva goes on, then the Advaitin will easily reduce the presentational fact of experience to a non-presentational absurdity. But the objection of the realist is based on a wrong analysis of experience. The experience of illusion and that of its subsequent rejection presuppose the origination of an objective datum in the substrate of the illusion in question. The fact that silver appears in illusion cannot be gainsaid. But this silver cannot maintain itself, for it is rejected by the correct knowledge of the substrate. Thus it is other than unreal, as it appears in experience, and it is other than real, as it cannot continue maintaining its appearance. It is thus other than real and other than unreal, and yet it is an objective fact. The Advaitin recognises this and thus does justice to experience and also its deliverance. So the rejection of an illusory object in the very substrate, wherein it appears does not mean the reduction of a presentational fact to a non-presentational no-fact. This is also endorsed by the Advaita theory of the three types of reality. The ultimate Reality is non-sublated pure presentation, and it is the Absolute or Brahman. The second type of reality is the empirical reality which belongs to the world of practical experience. It maintains itself till it is superseded by the realisation of the ultimate truth. The third type of reality belongs to the illusory object which presents itself but does not last beyond its presentation. This is called the apparent reality. The illusory silver is an apparently real silver. And this apparently real silver is a function of the nescience or ignorance in respect of the specific feature of the mother-of-pearl. This nescience with the help of other accessories develops itself into a false silver and an illusory experience of it. When a cognition cognises this false silver it is branded a false cognition. There has been a controversy amongst the Advaitins themselves, i.e., between Padmapāda, the author of the *Pañcapādikā*, and Prakāśātmayati, the author of the *Vivaraṇa*. The former upholds that cognition by itself cannot be false. It is always real. What is false is its content. The latter, i.e., the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, on the contrary, maintains that a cognition having a false object for its content cannot but be false. In an illusion both the cognition and the object it cognises are equally false.

As far as the world of practical life is concerned, the Advaitin is a thorough-going realist in epistemology. He does not leave any room for subjectivism even in its most diluted form. The problem of error has produced curious reactions in the minds of philosophers. As will be shown in the Prābhākara theory the safest course for the realist is to deny the possibility of error. But this position only explains away and does not explain the problem to the satisfaction of the unsophisticated man. Even the Naiyāyika, who is an ultra-realist both in metaphysics and epistemology, has not been able to get rid of subjectivism altogether. Though, element per element, every content of erroneous judgement has an objective foundation, yet the judgement as a whole does not find a corresponding objective situation. Thus, for instance, the notorious example of error, viz., the proposition 'This is silver' is sought to be realistically defended by appeal to the objective counterpart of the constituent elements. 'This' stands for a real datum. Though it is a mother-of-pearl which is referred to, it is not falsely presented. 'This' refers to the felt datum lying ahead. The mother-of-pearl has the character of 'thisness' although it is not experienced with all its specific qualities. 'Silver' is also a fact and not a subjective concept. The relation of predicate to the subject is also real as found in every veridical experience of silver. But the crux of the problem lies in the fact that the predicate, silver, is apprehended as an adjective of the subject, the mother-of-pearl. This identification of two unrelated facts is slurred over by the Naiyāyika realist. He evades the question whether the illusory judgement corresponds to a real situation in the objective world. The Naiyāyika in answer insists on the objective correspondence of the subject, the predicate and the relation *in abstracto*. The relation is real so far as it subsists between a real substratum and a real predicate as envisaged in the veridical judgement 'This is silver'. Relation is not intelligible in abstraction from the real terms. It is not capable of being gainsaid that the relation between the false silver and the subject has a concrete objective fact corresponding to it, for example, in the case of silver in the silversmith's shop. The Naiyāyika ultimately admits that all the elements of the judgement are objectively real, only the ordering of the subject and predicate is not correct. The predicate which belongs to another subject is affirmed of one to which it does not belong. There is admittedly an element of subjectivity which is not supported by any objective counterpart. Paradoxical though it may sound it is only the Advaitin who explains error in a thoroughly realistic manner. In epistemology the Advaita idealist adopts a hyper-realistic attitude. There can be no experience of a fact which does not exist in the very context in which it is experienced. As is the case with experience of a veridical silver in which the subject, the predicate and the relation are objectively present, so also with regard to the false experience. If a true judgement must have a true objective situation and the truth of the former is determined by the truth of the latter, by parity of reasoning it must be conceded that the so-called false judgement also must have reference to an objective situation corresponding to it. The judgement is false because the predicate is false. In other words, the false predicate in the judgement which is subjective must have an objective counterpart which is described as false, because it does not, like the true judgement, receive support from subsequent experience. The subsequent contradiction does not set aside the objectivity of silver. It only shows that its objectivity is false objectivity, i.e., objectivity without strict reality. The false is not to be confounded with the unreal as has been done by the realist. The word 'false' has got an unsavoury association with the unreal. But the Advaitin emphatically demarcates the false from the unreal. When the Advaitin declares the world to be a false experience, he does not mean that the world does not exist. Existence, and casual efficiency, which has been made the criterion of existence by the Buddhists, are not incompatible with the false. In point of fact, the Advaitin allows the realist the full gamut of reality that he claims as the character of the objective world. The existence of the phenomenal world and its reality are not denied in so far as it is experienced by us. All the amount of reality which the scientist and the realist in philosophy claim is conceded, but subject to the proviso that it has not the ultimacy of the Absolute. It comes to an end and has not the plenum of reality which the Absolute as the spiritual principle and the prius of the world-order possesses. It is ever present, and space-time does not set limitations to it. The temporal determinations, as past, present and future, and spatial determinations are absolutely irrelevant to ultimate Reality. The space-time determination is, rather, the criterion of the provisional character of the reality which the world of plurality seems to possess.

In illusion the false predicate is not an unreal naught. But the reality is not intrinsic to it. It appears as real because it is an adjective of Reality. The world-order, too, appears as an adjective. It has not the substantial reality of the Absolute. As an adjective the reality claimed by it is only borrowed from the substantive in which it appears. In ordinary cases of error, the Advaitin contends, the predicate appears in the borrowed reality of the subject. The ultimate subject is the Absolute. In this there seems to be perfect agreement between the Advaitin and Bradley. It must, however, be noted that the realistic attitude of the Avaitin is not a pose or pretence. The world will have reality so long as the unity of it is not envisaged in full. The division of reality into three types is not a sop to Cerberus. It is necessitated by the appraisal of experience. The world is not an unmitigated illusion as the Buddhist nihilist seems to believe. There is a central core of reality which is inescapable. Even the most blatant case of illusion is centred round reality as its substratum which is the subject. Śaṃkarācāryya lays emphasis upon this fact by declaring all error to be a case of coupling the true and the false together. The false will have no *raison d' être* unless there be the truth underlying and sustaining it. The distinction between true and false will be meaningless unless the truth be there defying all attempts to repudiate it. The definition of reality is that it is what remains uncancelled by all acts of denial. The denial of the predicate in error ends in asserting the undeniable reality of the subject. The false predicate is real though provisionally. The false is thus equable with the provisional and non-ultimate. The Advaitin is realist in epistemology, and also in ontology he concedes as much realism as is claimed by the realist for the justification of his theoretical and practical pursuits. The Advaitin only asserts that all these activities and pursuits must have a goal and, when the goal is reached, they lose their *raison d' étre*. Uufortunately the negative connotation of falsity has produced a hostile reaction which is due to the failure of proper appraisal of the ultimate truth and its provisional counterparts.

Last of all, we have added a separate discourse on falsity. Since the dissertation, without an exposition of the concept of falsity, was thought to be incomplete, we have addressed ourselves to the task of explicating the various definitions of falsity as recorded by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi*. The different definitions of falsity were collected at first by Vyāsatīrtha, the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. The *Nyāyāmṛta* is a ruthless critique of Advaita Vedānta. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Advaitasiddhi* vindicates the Advaita position after subjecting the arguments of the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta* to thorough examination and searching criticism. The *Advaitasiddhi* is a highly polemical work remarkable for its abstruse analysis and involved language. But happily we are in possession of an elaborate commentary and a Bengali exposition of only a part of this big work by the late Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr Yogendranath Bagchi, Tarka-Sāmkhya-Vedāntatīrtha, D.Litt. The Commentary, named *Bālabodhinī*, is marked by its racy style, wonderful details, and lucid exposition, and even a tyro with some training and grounding in philosophy can easily follow the dialectic.

In course of our treatment of the definition of falsity we have reproduced scriptural texts which have been laid under contribution by orthodox commentators. We have done this to show our fidelity to the original presentation in Sanskrit. This may give an impression of a scholastic approach. It must, however, be noticed by a critical student of Indian philosophical method that the appeal to scriptural text is not a gesture of despair. The views expressed have been justified by powerful logic and the appeal to authority is made by way of confirmation. Even if all the arguments based on textual evidence be omitted, the views will command consideration on the strength of their logic alone. Furthermore, it should also be borne in mind that the rival schools pay their tribute to the same authority, and yet give different interpretations suitable to their theories. The *ipsissima verba* of the Upaniṣadic Scriptures naturally lend themselves to a variety of interpretations sharply in conflict with one another. The textual authorities quoted by one philosopher in support have not succeeded in winning over his rival to his way of thinking though both of them profess common allegience to it.

Before we conclude, we should express another apology for some omissions. We have not dwelt on some minor theories of illusion such as the *Satkhyāti* of Rāmānuja, *asatkhyāti* of the Mādhyamikas, and *ātmakhyāti* of the Buddhist *Vijñānavādin*. The Buddhist theories have been criticised in the treatment of major theories and there seems nothing new to be added. As regards Rāmānuja's *satkhyāti*, it does not possess much philosophical value and it has been regarded as an ingenious theory based on the physico-chemical doctrine of compounding of different elements in every physical object. This is called triplication or quintuplication. It is at most a theory of physical Chemistry. It loses all value to a thinker who does not believe in the physico-chemical view in question. It has been observed by Venkaṭeśvara in his

Nyāyapariśuddhi that even in this theory the quantum of silver believed to be present in the mother-of-pearl and supposed to be envisaged in error is of no practical value. It is the confusion of the real pragmatic silver with the presented silver which deceives a man. The quantum of silver in a mother-of-pearl is for all practical purposes of no use. The essence of error lies in the deluded belief that it is a real marketable silver that is before the percipient. The followers of Rāmānuja have all opted for the theory of the Naiyāyika. As regards the Buddhist theory, that the illusory silver is merely a subjective idea, which is falsely believed to be an external fact, it is argued that this is influenced by metaphysical consideration. Apart from this question whether it be a subjective idea or not, the belief in an external silver is not properly accounted for by subjectivism. The subjective idea is believed to be a trans-subjective fact which it is not. Thus it endorses the fundamental position of the Naiyāyika realist that the object of illusion is believed to be something other than the immediately presented datum. It is also noteworthy that there is no exposition of this theory in any accredited work available to us. So also is the so-called *asatkhyāti* of the Śūnyavādin. They are not very much interested in the elaboration of these theories. Since according to the Buddhist subjectivists the external world is a pure illusion, and according to the Mādhyamikas there is no truth at all, the criticism of these theories is implied in the exposition of the Nyāya theory and also in the exposition of falsity. The Advaitin has persistently denied the possibility of a non-entity appearing in illusion. The Advaitin, as has already been said, is an out and out realist in epistemology and the Advaita theory of *anirvacanīyakhyāti*, which posits an objective existence of the content of error, gives an explanation, satisfying our realistic bias and also our logical sense.

CHAPTER I

THE THEORY OF NEGLECTED DIFFERENCE

Errors and illusions are familiar facts. Two railway lines seem to meet at a distance, a stick thrust into water seems bent, etc. Although these experiences may be matters of daily occurrence, they need not be brushed aside as trivialities. Realism which advocates the reality of everything seems to have fumbled at this elusive problem of error. The object of an erroneous experience cannot be said to be real, because our later experience gives a lie direct to it, and so to call it unreal is tantamount to parting with the fundamental tenet of realism. But the admission of error has some far-reaching consequences. If a man can have cognisance of a thing which is not existent, there would be no ground for believing in external reality. In point of fact, some idealists have made enormous capital out of abnormal cognitions. They assert that, when in error and in dream we have experiences of objects which do not exist, we have no grounds for believing in the existence of external objects on the authority of our so-called normal, veridical experience. The so-called normal experience, the idealists argue, may be as unreliable as dreams and erroneous experiences. It would follow from this that from the idealistic standpoint there would be left no criterion of truth and falsehood, for, as realists point out, truth is the quality of judgements with independent objective reference. This reference to objective reality is necessary for determining the truth and falsity of our knowledge. But if the objective plane be demolished the result will be only unrelieved scepticism. The problem of error is thus a vital problem to realists and even to idealists who must give an intelligible account of the distinction between the true and the false or the objective and the subjective as it reveals itself in experience.

Prabhākara Miśra approaches the problem from a new point of view. He flourished in the 7th Century A.D., and was a disciple of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated Mīmāṃsist. But he differs from his master in some essentials, and founds a separate school of his own which is known as the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā. Prabhākara is a realist and explains the problem of error according to the true realistic light. It will be our endeavour to show in this chapter how the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas explain the problem of error and preserve the essence of realism at the same time.

The congnition of a mother-of-pearl as a piece of silver as expressed in the judgement 'This is silver' is usually believed to be a case of error or misapprehension. The philosophers of different schools give different explanations of the problem, but the fact that it is an error is admitted on all hands except by Prabhākara and the members of the school he has founded. They maintain in unequivocal terms that there is no error or misapprehension at any time. The proof of error is supposed to be furnished by the fact of contradiction. But what is contradiction ? ask the Prābhākaras. Contradiction consists in the sublation of one cognition by another which follows it. In the illusion of a mother-of-pearl as silver the cognition of silver is being corrected by the cognition of mother-of-pearl, and this is otherwise expressed by saying that the valid cognition of mother-of-pearl contradicts or cancels the illusory cognition of silver. Bnt this idea of contradiction is not logically intelligible. For it is difficult to determine what is contradicted, the cognition, its object or its result.

Contradiction may mean the cessation of the first cognition on the emergence of the second. But this cannot be regarded as a proof of falsity or invalidity because there is no inherent improbability in one valid cognition being succeeded by another valid cognition. The old cognition disappears yielding place to a new. Further, all empirical cognitions are evanescent and non-eternal. It is therefore their very nature to cease to be after a lapse of time. If cessation be proof of contradiction, i.e., cessation of one cogniton and appearance of another in its place, then all cognitions must share the fate of being contradicted and thereby falsified. Contradiction, then, does not mean the destruction of one cognition by another, which we have seen to be the general nature of all cognitions, the first being replaced by the second. Let it be supposed that contradiction consists in the opposition of the objects of two succeeding cognitions, and the opposition means destruction. This also cannot be a sound position. For nothing can take away the object of a cognition. Cognition is always the cognition of some object. To say that there can be a cognition which yet cognises nothing is to indulge in unmeaning verbiage.

It may be pointed out, again, that contradiction means, not the destruction of the object of a cognition, but the apprehension of the non-existence of the object. This also does not throw any light on the problem. Granted that the first cognition takes note of silver, and the second of the mother-of-pearl, the two cognitions are numerically different, and there is no ground for giving preference to one over the other. Each cognition has an object of its own and it is impossible to suggest that one single cognition should have reference to a positive fact and its negation at one and the same time. Whatever may be the case, each cognition stands with its object unassailed.

Nor can it be supposed that contradiction means the destruction of the result of the previous cognition by the following one. The result of the cognition is the manifestation of its object and this is bound to occur whenever there is a cognition. The second cognition, whatever it may be, cannot deprive the first cognition of its object-manifesting character. The fact that the previous cognition was of the form 'This is silver' and the socond cognition is of the form 'This is a mother-of-pearl' cannot mean that the first cognition is being cancelled by the second either as a mental or a psychical event or as having a reference to some distinctive object of its own.

Moreover the cognition contradicting the previous cognition must have an object which is either the same as that of the first one or different from it. The first alternative is rejected, for in that case there will be merely a repeating series of cognitions, and nothing else. The second alternative is equally unintelligible, for nobody holds that the cognition of a pen at one time is negatived by the cognition of a table at another. In fact, opposition could occur if one and the same cognition could have different and mutually incompatible objects at the same time.

In fine, it may be contended that contradiction means the cancellation of the motor activity, which follows upon the cognition of a situation. The motor activity is either in the form of acceptance or of avoidance, i.e., movement towards the object or away from it. But this also does not improve matters. For the motor activity of getting at or getting away from a thing is the result of the arousal of desire and will, and not of a cognition, and it is not a fact that a cognition is invariably followed by conation and consequent motor activity. So, the absence of motor activity is not an argument for or against the validity of the cognition.

To sum up, it has been found that contradiction cannot mean the destruction of a cognition or of its object or of its result, direct and indirect. The advocate of error quā misperception pins his faith on the fact of contradiction, which has been found on analysis to be unsound, and of course there is left no proof of the possibility of error.

The question that now crops up is, will the cognition of silver in a mother-of-pearl then be a valid one? The Prābhākaras reply that the objection is based on a basic misconception that there is error or illusion. But there is no such thing. For what can possibly be the cause of this so-called erroneous cognition? The answer that is usually given is that the defective sense-organs cause such experiences. But the Prābhākaras point out that the senses owing to certain defects will fail to serve their own purpose. The ear owing to defect will fail to receive sound or the eye due to defect will fail to see things, but it can never see a thing in a way which is not its real character. There can thus be no error because it has no cause. Now the problem that confronts the Prābhākaras is, how can the appearance of silver in mother-of-pearl be explained.

The Prābhākaras explain that in the so-called illusory experience 'This is silver' there are two cognitions one of which is perceptual, and the other pertains to the character of recollection. 'This' is the object of perception, 'silver' is the object of recollection. That the cognition of silver is nothing but recollection is proved by the fact that those who have no previous experience of silver will not cognise it in a place where it is not. But mere experience of silver does not exhaust the whole thing. The traces of it are to be retained in the mind, and these traces are revived by proper suggestions which closely resemble silver. This silver is not present here,

here is only mother-of-pearl with its specific character concealed. And that silver is recollected is also not felt. That is to say, there is silver with its memory character obliterated, i.e., its *that* character or past reference slurred over. It is not always true that a memory act should refer to its *that* (time), to its spatio-temporal location at a past time and place. It is a truism that a datum of memory is a thing of the past and usually things are remembered together with their spatio-temporal contexts. But it is not always the case that the content of memory is felt as such as a rule. It is a fact that in a negative judgement the cognition of the thing negated (*pratiyogi*) or the negatum is always an act of recollection. Consider, for instance, the negative judgement 'There is no pen on the table.' What should be the epistemological status of the negatum (here pen) in this judgement? It cannot be a perceived fact, because it is not present on the table. It is a veridical judgement since its absence is a fact, and not an imaginary construct. The pen is certainly referred to in the judgement, and the cognition of it as absent cannot but be regarded as an act of recollection. But though recollected, it is not understood as an elsewhere and elsewhen perceived object. In other words, it is not cognised as belonging to *that* time, i.e., a past time. Now such acts which do not refer to the *that* or to the specific spatio-temporal situation are known as the cases of truncated memory (*pramuṣṭa-tattvāka smṛti*). Thc well-known cases of truncated memory are cases of the cognition of the meanings of the words in a sentence. It is true that the denotative relation of the word to its meaning is first apprehended by us. And in a sentence the meanings of the words are understood without any reference to time and space in which the meaning was known for the first time. It is obvious that the understanding of the meanings of the words in a sentence is an act of recollection, conditioned as it is by the previous knowledge of the same. The instances of the data of memory with their past reference somehow withheld are not rare occurrences. The Prābhākaras take their stand on these findings and regard the cognition of silver as a case of truncated memory.

We may distinguish in this connection several grades of experiences between complete, full-fledged memory with definite location in the past, and incomplete and even rudimentary memory involving revival. In ordinary perception we have to assimilate the given sensation to similar past experiences. Thus perceiving is also conceptualising or subsuming a particular perceived fact under a class-essence or a concept or a general idea through assimilation of the given fact to other similar past experience. Here is therefore some revival of the past, but it is no independent revival but revival in subordination to and as part and parcel as it were of the given fact. A higher stage is recognition which again may be of different shades from recognition without time reference, as in the recognition of a face as familiar, which is a shade different from conceptualisation of a given datum as not involving subsumption under a class, and recognition of an individual that is recognised as one who was perceived at some definite point in the past. In the latter case the unity of the individual is cognised as linking him to past and present. Besides these, we may have full-fledged recollection of dated events started by some present percept but not blending with it in an individual whole of experience. The Prābhākara view comes very near the second grade of experience though there are also differences. The Prābhākara theory is based on two fundamental premises that every sense-illusion is a case of two valid cognitions, one presentational and the other representational, and the representational element is a case of incomplete revival (*smṛti-promoṣa*) with its time reference and time location in the past suppressed.[1]

Due to defect either in the sense organ or in the physical medium the mother-of-pearl is not distinctly perceived, i.e., as a mother-of-pearl. It is perceived only as *this*. Due to certain similarity between the mother-of-pearl and the silver the cogniser remembers silver and apprehends the object, i.e., the *this* as non-different from it. The distinction between the perceptual cognition and recollection is lost sight of. And the Prābhākaras maintain that the proposition 'This is silver' is nothing but two unrelated cognitions with their unrelatedness unfelt. Thus the proposition 'This is silver' when correctly analysed comes to this. 'This' stands for the mother-of-pearl which is perceived in its general outline as *this*, and there is no error in it. It is a datum of visual perception. Due to certain defects the mother-of-pearl is not clearly perceived, i.e., in respect of its specific feature. And only the generic features such as brightness, glitter, etc., are presented data. As regards silver which is given, as it were, as the predicate of the judgement, it cannot be regarded as a perceived fact since it is not present. It cannot even be an inferred object for the conditions of inference are entirely absent. It must be supposed, therefore, to be the object of memory. But, though an object of memory, silver is not felt as such, i.e., as a recalled image due to certain defects which impair the capacity of things. The cognising subject due to certain defects is deprived of its capacity to notice the discriminatory qualities of the mother-of-pearl, and hence the mother-of-pearl is perceived only as *this*, and the memory content is felt, not as the content of memory, but as of a cognition as such. The two contents of perception and memory are felt as contents of cognitions with their characters unspecified, and the fact that they are unrelated also escapes notice.

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[1] R. S. Woodworth—*Psychology*, pages 536-537.

The illusion arises according to Prābhākara through the failure to distinguish the representation and the presentation in their respective characters as represention and presentation because of suppression of past reference. One objection to the Prābhākara view will therefore be what kind of representation is representation of an object with its spatio-temporal location withheld. The Prābhākara contention is that it is a numerically different cognition from the presentation which aroused the representation through similarity. If it is a numerically distinct cognition complete in itself, what is it a cognition of? Is it a cognition of silver as such without spatio-temporal location, and how does it differ from a cognition of silverness? If it is a cognition of a particular silver, it must be the cognition of it as belonging to a particular time and space. When this spatio-temporal context is lacking it becomes indistinguishable from silverness as a common character of different pieces of silver. If, however, the Prāhhākaras say that it is silverness and not a particular silver that is cognised by the representation, the difficulty in this case is how can silverness be cognised as such without a particular locus. Disincarnate universals exist neither in thinking nor in being. Further the representation is a particular cognition and numerically different from the presentation as another particular cognition only by being the cognition of a particular type. If it be the cognition of an abstract universal, it ceases to be a particular cognition and becomes only a moment or element in a self-complete experience as judgement of a particular fact in terms of a universal.

There is thus the non-apprehension of the non-relation between the contents. In other words, 'This is silver' is a pseudo-proposition, the subject having no relation with the predicate. 'This' and 'silver' in no way stand connected in the scheme of reality. And the percipient due to defect fails to cognise the unrelatedness between the two. And this non-cognition of the unrelatedness, the Prābhākaras declare, can by no means be converted into a positive cognition of relatedness. Thus, so-called error is not a single composite experience. It is simply a case of the non-apprehension of the difference between the two cognitions, cognition of *this*, and the cognition of *that*, i.e., of the remembered silver. And the Prābhākaras declare that there is no case of error or misapprehension here. The subsequent negative judgement such as 'This is not silver' emphasises the fact of non-apprehension of the difference. 'This' means the mother-of-pearl, and 'silver' means silver. In other words, the mother-of-pearl represented by *this* is nothing but mother-of-pearl and not silver, i.e., is different from silver. The negative particle 'not' simply demonstrates this difference.

Let us see how this theory of non-differentiation works in the case of dream experiences. In the ordinary cases of error such as mother-of-pearl as silver the remembered silver is not felt as remembered and also as distinct from the yonder object, mother-of-pearl, perceived as *this*. The theory of non-differentiation holds good here because there are two cognitions, and also two different contents. But dream is one homogeneous experience being a series of recollections of the same kind. So the plea that the false dream experience is only due to the fact of non-differentiation breaks down here. Further, it may be contended that dream is not a case of memory but something else. Memory in its broad outline means the revival of past experiences conserved in the unconscious recesses of the mind in the form of traces or impressions. And the revival of the traces takes place only in accordance with the Laws of Association. When one thing is perceived, another thing is remembered because the two stand connected by the bond of association. But here the experiences being all of the same kind, viz., memory, we cannot fall on one impression for the arousal of another impression according to the Laws of Association.

The Prābhākaras rejoin that the contention is based upon wrong psychology. For besides the Laws of

Association there may be other conditions of the revival of the memory impression. Disturbed sleep is one of such conditions. When the mind is held in subjection by sleep, and the senses cease to work, the memory impressions remaining in the sub-conscious or unconscious region of the mind, and being held in check during waking life by the ceaseless flow of messages received through the senses, crop up on the focus of consciousness and produce the memories. So there can be no ground for repudiating the memory character of dreams. The Prābhākaras maintain that dream is a series of memory acts. Owing to defect, viz., sleep, their respective distinction is lost sight of. Hence the law of non-differentiation operates here also. It is to be mentioned here that only the fact of non-differentiation is the condition of the so-called abnormal experiences, and not the presence of the two different kinds of cognitions, nor even the loss of apprehension of the memory character of memory. The truncation of memory is only the condition of non-differentiation, and not the condition of error. Thus we see that non-differentiation takes place between perceptual awareness and an act of memory, also between two cognitions of the same kind, and between the data of such experiences.

Let us examine whether this law of non-differentiation operates in what may be regarded purely as cases of perceptual error. The illusion of a double moon is one such instance. There is only one moon, but it is perceived as two, when our eyes are squinted. Here the squinted eyeball is the defect, and due to this defect one moon is presented as two distinct images. And because of this defect the distinction between the moon and her images gets obliterated. So the element of non-differentiation is at work here also. As regards the perception of sweetmeat as bitter when the tongue is coated with bile, what is perceived is the bitter taste of the bile, and the sweet taste of the sweetmeat is non-differentiated from it. It is not a fact that sweetmeat is tasted as bitter, but what happens is that the sweet taste is overwhelmed by the bitter taste, and hence is not discriminated. Here also there are two gustatory perceptions but undistinguished. Similar is the case of the jaundiced man's perception of white conch shell as yellow. It will be wrong to say that the white conch shell is perceived as yellow. The yellow colour is present to the jaundiced eye, and the whiteness in the conch, though perceived, is yet not felt as distinct from yellow. There is not confusion of one colour with another but failure of discrimination. Thus it can be laid down as a universal rule that in all cases of putative error there are two numerically distinct data, and two distinct cognitions, and there is failure of discrimination between them. But the advocate of the theory of error goes one step further than this and holds that this act of non-discrimination gives rise to the confusion which consists in the predication of the character of one thing of the other. And this positive confusion is the cause of the motor activity, movement towards the yonder object. But the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka contends that the supposition is fostered by the imperfect knowledge of the springs of volitional activity.

It is no doubt true that in the veridical judgement 'This is silver' the *this* and the *silver*, the subject and the predicate, are felt as one identity. And it is also true that this felt identity generates the volitional activity which consists in approaching the yonder object for the acquisition of it. But it would be a hasty generalisation to conclude from this that the condition of the volitional activity is necessarily and universally the apprehension of identity and nothing else. In the so-called illusory experience the two contents are distinct and different, but not distinguished owing to the influence of some defect. And this non-differentiantion has the same efficiency of inducing a positive volitional activity as felt identity. Or we may be permitted to put forward an unwonted interpretation, in the interest of uniformity, that the universal condition of the volitional activity is non-differentiation. This element of non-differentiation is present in the case of the felt identity between the subject and predicate, as discrimination and differentiation would be fatal to the apprehension of identity. In the veridical judgement 'This is silver', the *this* and the *silver* stand for an identical denotation, and consequently they are not felt as numerically different. In the so-called false judgement (though no judgement at all) the *this* and the *silver* are also not felt as different. So the element of non-differentiation is present in both the situations, and this should be regarded as the *conditio sine qua non* of the volitional activity.

In fine, it may be observed that according to the Prābhākaras there may be wrong desire, but there is no wrong judgement. The wrongness of the will has no bearing upon the truth or falsity of the judgement. All judgements, i.e., all knowledge, are true judgements although the Prābhākaras admit the possibility of perverted will and misdirected emotion. But these psychological aberrations should not be supposed to indicate corresponding aberrations in judgement or knowledge.

It is undeniable that Prābhākara's theory is a piece of wonderful ingenuity and no writer on error has had the courage to pass it over with indifference. As a matter of historical fact, it is the most criticised theory in Indian philosophy. But the theory stands at one extreme in sharp opposition to the other extremistic theory called *asatkhyāti* which advocates the appearance of a non-entity. Prabhākara denies error, whereas the Buddhist nihilist sets down all knowledge as downright, unmitigated error.

All cognitions are true according to Prabhākara whereas all cognitions are false according to the Buddhist nihilist. The distinction between truth and error is obliterated in both the camps. In spite of the snags and difficulties which the critics have made out in the Prābhākara theory, it is to be admitted that it is a heroic defence of realism. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tātparya* and Gangeśa Upādhyāya in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* have summed up the reasons which induced Prabhākara to propound this astounding theory.[1]

The first objection of the Prābhākara is aimed against the subjectivist, the Buddhist Vijñānavādin, and the representationist. According to the Prābhākara the admission of error will give a handle to the advocates of these theories. As regards the representationist who believes that what is perecived is only a representation, a copy or image of the object, the Prābhākara thinks that this will inevitably lead to subjectivism. If we are concerned only with the so-called image we shall have no access to the real. The belief that what we perceive is only the formal copy of the real has no warrant, since the correspondence of the copy with the real will ever remain unverified. The believer in error has to admit that the thing perceived, e.g., silver, is not present in the context and he can account for the perception of a non-existent object by asserting that it is the ideal image of the thing conserved by memory, which is perceived as existing in outer space. As the representative theory has closed the door against verification, the supposition of an objective fact or object corresponding to the ideal content will remain an idle hypothesis. So the theory of error which affirms that the ideal content masquerades as the real object must end in subjectivism, which makes a havoc of the distinction between truth and error. Prabhākara accordingly dismisses this theory with scant courtesy.

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[1] Sākārapātād asato na bhānāt
Saṃvidvirodhād athahetvābhāvāt
Dhiyāmanāśvāsa-bhayācca neṣṭā
Yato 'nyathākhyātir ato yathārthā
—Tattvacintāmaṇi (Asiatic Society Edn.)
Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa—Akhyātivāda
&
Tātparyaṭīkā (Metropolitan edn.) pp. 73-74

As regards the theory called *asatkhyāti*, accredited to the Buddhist nihilist, it receives short shrift at the hands of the Prābhākara. The erroneous judgement in this way centres round non-entities from the first to the last. In the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* the logic of the nihilist has been set forth as follows. If a single element is false, all the constituents of the judgement will be false. If the silver is unreal, the seeing of it is bound to be unreal. There can be no seeing without the object. Accordingly the perceiving subject also will be unreal because it is by virtue of the act of seeing that he is to be called a seeing or perceiving subject. The falsity of the object entails the falsity of the act and also of the subject. As regards the distinction between the substratum, the this, and silver, it is believed to be an unwarrantable dichotomy. *This* cannot be severed from silver and, if the latter is unreal, the former cannot have a better pretension to reality. Hence the *this* must collapse with silver. Error is thus a case of total falsity. The Prābhākara objection to this theory is that there is no evidence in support of this extreme position. The nihilist cannot point to a single accredited instance of an unreal non-entity being the object of perception. It is based on a false assumption, and hence ought not to deserve serious notice.

The theory of wrong reference (*anyathākhyāti*) admits the possibility of error and yet seeks to bring it in conformity with realism. The silver is, according to the advocate of the theory, real. It exists in a different context, and owing to the defect it is perceived in that other context. But this defence of error in consonance with realism runs counter to the plain testimony of experience. No evidence can be adduced in support of the theory that a distant or a past object is perceived in error. The silver is perceived as a fact present *here* and *now*, and not *there* and *then*.

Another difficulty is presented by the consideration that there can be no connection between the sense and the distant object. This connection of the sense with the object is admitted to be the essential condition of perception by the Naiyāyika realist. He cannot make out any connecting link between the visual organ and the distant silver. The belief that the memory-image acts as the connecting link is easily demolished by the impossibility of what is called cognition *quā* connecting link (*jñāna-lakṣaṇasannikarṣa*). The Prābhākara does not believe in the possibility of an idea or memory-image acting as the connecting link between the sense and the object in any circumstance. The difficulties inherent in the belief in such a connecting link will be set forth in the sequel. As regards defect as a connecting link Prabhākara regards it as a desperate attempt. Defect is always privative in its result, and cannot be a means to the perception of a positive datum.

Lastly, the Prābhākara contends that belief in error must end in scepticism.[1] If any cognition can be false and can arise without a corresponding object, there will be no guarantee that other cognitions are conditioned by objective facts. The possibility that all cognitions are objectively unfounded cannot be ruled out, if error, as defined by the different schools of philosophers, is once conceded to be a fact. The Prābhākara concludes that his theory steers clear of all the incongruities and therefore should be accepted by all.

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[1] Aho-bato mahāneṣa pramādo dhīmatāmapi
Jñānasya vyābhicāritve viśvāsaḥ kiṃnibandhanaḥ.

This is how the problem of error is explained by Prabhākara and the followers of his school. This account may be characterised as the theory of obliteration of memory or *smṛti-promoṣa*, or the theory of the non-discrimination of the non-relation or the theory of neglected difference as Stcherbatsky[1] puts it. This Prābhākara account of error is very often misunderstood, and the meaning of the non-discrimination of the non-relation is not properly followed. And, if followed, it is not exactly expressed. In many text-books on Indian Philosophy the words like 'mixture' and 'amalgam' are not happily chosen to indicate this fact of non-apprehension of non-relation of unity between the things so blended and mixed up. But the account put forward by the Prābhākara steers clear of even the faintest suggestion of a relation. It is just a negative attitude, an attitude of non-apprehension of difference or unrelatedness existing between the presentation and the representation.

Even the accounts of the theory by reputed scholars like Stcherbatsky seem to suffer from confusion. What happens in the case of illusion or erroneous perception of a glittering nacre as a piece of silver is, according to Stcherbatsky's account of the position of the realistic schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣikas, "nothing more than what is expressed in language, one thing is mistaken for another, both being real. This doctrine is called *anyathākhyāti* or mistaking one thing for another. On the other extremity of philosophic opinion we have the Buddhist school of *mādhyamika* and the Brāhminical Vedāntins. For them all our cognitions are relative, and therefore illusions. All cognitions are just as wrong as the perception of silver instead of nacre, *sarvaṃ jñānaṃ mithyā*....There is a third solution which is called the Non-discrimination theory or *akhyāti*, or the theory of Neglected difference (*bhedā-graha*). This theory is endorsed by the idealistic Buddhists (*Nyāyavāḍino Bauddhāḥ*) and by the Prābhākara section of the mīmāṃsakas. According to Prabhākara error does not exist, *sarvaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ*. Knowledge is knowledge. It is not and cannot be error. What happens in the case of nacre and silver is simply the fact that we do not sufficiently discriminate between them. We neglect their difference. The perception of a glittering surface is at the bottom. It is all right, it is not error, it is knowledge. But it is also not the whole of the possible approach to truth; there is a difference between the glittering of silver and the glittering of nacre, a difference which we have failed to perceive. Having failed to perceive the difference (*bheda-agrahāt*) we identify the one with the other. The Brāhmiṇical and the Buddhist logicians are here opposed to one another in that the first maintain a positive cognition of non-difference, and the second on the contrary maintain a non-cognition of difference (*bheda-agraha*). The Realists assume that the cognition is positive because non-difference or non-existence is for them nevertheless something real, a meaning (*padārtha*). According to the Buddhists we have non-cognition of the difference, an imputation of identity, an imputed similarity of things absolutely dissimilar".[1]

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[1] Buddhist Logic—Volume 2 p. 403. (Dover Publication)

It is obvious that Stcherbatsky is not exact in his representation of the Prābhākara position. The Prābhākara realist does not recognise negation (*abhāva*) either as difference (*bheda*) or as negation of the relation of real expected in the context (*saṃsargābhāva*) to be a category (*padārtha*). Negation, according to Prabhākara, is nothing but the positive locus of the negation (*adhikaraṇa-rūpa*). There is no apprehension of identity (*abheda-graha*) in illusion as an objective fact. In short the difference between the Prābhākara realist and the Nyāyavādin Bauddha is here nil, and both sail in the same boat. It would be wrong even to say that according to the Prābhākara non-apprehension of difference (*bheda-agraha*) leads to an apprehension of identity (*abheda-graha*) as Stcherbatsky seems to suggest. We can at best assert that non-apprehension causes some confusion of the will and a false practical orientation as a consequence, which fails to work as a matter of fact, and thereby causes disappointment. We may in this connection compare the Prābhākara view with the Leibnitzian account of the idea of space and time as arising out of confusion due to our inability to detect the infinitesimal difference among the monads. Hume's account of the idea of personal identity is also based on similar reasoning. Personal identity according to Hume has been generated by our inability to notice the discreteness of the rapidly succeeding atomistic states of consciousness. Hume in this respect is thus an apt European parallel to the Mīmāṃsaka *akhyātivādin*.

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[1] *Op. Cit.*, pp. 403-404.

CHAPTER II

THE NYĀYA THEORY OF WRONG REFERENCE

We have so far been concerned with a detailed exposition of the theory of neglected difference (*akhyātivāda*) of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas. We now propose to consider the theory of wrong reference (*anyathākhyāti*) of the Naiyāyika realists. Unlike the Prābhākaras, the Naiyāyikas accept the reality of veridical as well as non-veridical experiences. For the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, as we have seen, there is no such thing as an errant experience. The Naiyāyikas join issue with the Prābhākaras in this respect. With their keen sense of loyalty to the actualities of human experience they recognise both veridical experience and illusions as established facts of every-day life. It may be noted, however, that though the Naiyāyikas acknowledge both true knowing and illusion and error, they do distinguish between truth itself and the test of truth, and error and the criterion of error. Thus for the Naiyāyikas as for many of the modern European realists truth is agreement of apprehension with the reality that is apprehended, just as error is disagreement of apprehension with reality. But the Naiyāyikas add that this is only truth and error in their logical character, though our subjective apprehension of true knowing as true and the false as false presupposes certain psychological criteria. Thus when the subjective expectation which an idea arouses is put to the practical test and it does not work, the consequent experience of disappointment brings home to us the erroneousness of the idea. And the same remarks apply *mutatis mutandis* to our veridical ideas. The point to note in the Nyāya view is that truth and the opposite are in themselves logical relations between ideas and the reality to which they refer, and are therefore neither psychological facts nor trans-psychic objects. A relation of agreement and disagreement between the psychological and the objective is itself neither a psychological experience nor an objective fact, but is a logical category, which we know as such through a psychological experience of practical fruition or the opposite. In this respect the Naiyāyikas and the Advaitins represent different schools of thought. The Advaitins believe in objective falsity, though of a different order from empirical objectivity. The false is not merely a case of wrong reference, but of the creation or projection of a false entity which is apprehended in the illusory apprehension.

In our detailed exposition of the Nyāya view we shall, however, have to commence with the Nyāya theory in its negative aspect as the refutation of the Prābhākara *akhyātivādins* as without such refutation the Nyāya view will have no legs to stand upon.

VĀCASPATI MIŚRA ON THE THEORY OF NEGLECTED DIFFERENCE

Vācaspati Miśra both in his *Tātparya* and *Bhāmatī* subjected Prabhākara's theory of error to a serious criticism. The Prābhākaras are thoroughgoing realists and point-blank deny the possibility of error which consists in the cognition of a non-existent element in some way or other. Erroneous judgement according to them is an impossibility. The typical examples of error 'this (rope) is a snake', 'this (mother-of-pearl) is silver' involve contradiction in terms. The predicate is incompatible with the subject. One may contend that this incompatibility is the very nature of error, in which a predicate which does not belong to a subject is affirmed of the latter. Error is a judgement which has nothing corresponding to it in reality. But Prabhākara stoutly maintains that this interpretation of error is only a superstition. What actually occurs is that the subject is perceived, and the predicate is given by memory. It is admitted on all hands that in so-called error the specific character of the subject as being a mother-of-pearl in not cognised. It is known only as *this*, which is supposed to accommodate many divergent predicates. The non-cognition of the specific character of the subject is the necessary condition, and Prabhākara goes several steps further by extending the scope of non-cognition to the predicate and the putative relation between them. The predicate silver is not present in the context, and is derived from past cognition by memory. From the cognitive side the perceptual cognition of the subject is not felt as such, and so also the memory character of the cognition of the predicate. The specific characters of the two cognitions, one perceptual and another memory, simply escape notice, and so their opposition and incompatibility are not felt. From the point of view of the contents one is perceived, the other is remembered, but these two traits are also slurred over. Further, the fact that these two items are unrelated also escapes notice. Thus the so-called erroneous cognition involves a series of non-cognitions or omissions. The mother-of-pearl *quā this* is not felt as different from silver either *quā* objective facts or *quā* object of different cognitions. There is no fault of commission which would have arisen if silver had been predicated of the subject. We have already given an elaborate treatment of this theory and the above in outline sums up the main results.

Prabhākara's theory of error constitutes an excellent defence of realism, but it goes too far. Its denial of erroneous judgement stands in sharp opposition to experience. It is felt that silver is predicated of the subject, and the two form a unitary whole. The negative interpretation[1] of the subject, the predicate and the relation without resulting in a positive assertion is not only psychologically unconfirmed but fails to account for the emotional and the conative reactions arising in the experient. The experient is the victim of a delusion and believes the object lying before him to be real silver. His cupidity is roused, he moves forward to acquire it and then is shockingly disappointed. These emotional and volitional reactions cannot be supposed to arise from mere non-cognition of difference or unrelatedness. Volitional activity is only an exponent of the belief that it is silver. Here *this* and *silver* are perceived, and believed to be one unitary whole. This cannot be satisfactorily explained in terms of negation. The mere fact that *this* (mother-of-pearl) is not perceived to be different from silver cannot be supposed to cause such a series of reactions in the experient.

Prabhākara and his followers when confronted with this objection assert that the difficulty is created by a long-standing habit of thinking in a particular strain. The positive judgement resulting from veridical experience no doubt gives rise to the psychical reactions set forth above, and the causal relation is supposed to obtain between them. But this is a case of *hysteron proteron*. In every positive judgement, there is cognition of a relation between the subject and the predicate, but this cognition is conditioned by the non-cognition of unrelatedness. The relation presupposes the absence of unrelatedness, and the cognition of a relation is necessarily conditioned by that of the non-cognition of non-relation. This negative condition is common to veridical and so-called non-veridical cognitions and it is only proper to affiliate the conative reactions to this negative condition as its cause, and not the positive judgement resulting from the latter.

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[1] The mother-of-pearl or the rope is perceived in its generic character as *this* and not in its specific character *quā* mother-of-pearl or rope. The predicate silver is recollected, but not cognised as such. The alleged relation is also unpreceived. The two elements, mother-of-pearl and silver, are unrelated facts, but in error they are not apprehended as such. This appraisal so far is accepted by all. But error does not stop at this negative interpretation. It is the condition precedent of ascription of the predicate, silver, to the subject. In other words, the unrelatedness is replaced by a positive relation between the subject and the predicate. Prabhākara denies this culmination of the primary negative experience of unrelatedness in a relation of ascription.

The Naiyāyika regards this explanation as strained and far-fetched. It is far too ingenious to be a natural, satisfactory account. The most unsatisfactory feature of this explanation consists in disregard of a plain fact that mere negation cannot lead to an activity. The two unrelated facts, *this* and silver, cannot give rise to an expectation of a present silver. *This* is a universal and there are many *thises*,[1] and without reference to a particular perceived datum, it has no specific character of its own. It cannot thus account for a specific psychological reaction which is seen to be the case. Further, unless it is connected with a covetable object, say silver, it cannot give rise to an acquisitive impulse. This also holds good of the experience of an undesirable object, veridical or false. A rope is mistaken for a snake, which experience produces the same reaction as a veridical one does. This is intelligible only if the snake and the *this* are related, and not if the two stand aloof in isolation. As has been shown by Dr Maitra, negation by itself has no objective status[2] apart from the terms of reference according to

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[1] Bradley—*The Principles of Logic*—Vol. II page—660.

[2] S. K. Maitra—*Studies in Philasophy and Religion* Chapter on 'The Theory of false appearance' (Critical) page 248.

Prabhākara. So the non-cognition of non-relation reduces to the cognition of the terms, e.g., *this* and silver apiece. The cognition of two isolated facts cannot lead to a practical result. The presented *this* is too colourless to be sought or shunned. And as regards silver as an isolated item, it also cannot inspire a volitional activity or impulse unless it is known to be present and attainable here and now. A silver which is not known to be present is as good as a mere idea. So this explanation by way of similarity of undistinguished items to a veridical judgement falls to the ground. It is too much to argue that non-cognition of difference and that of non-relation are equivalent to the cognition of a positive identity and that of a relation in respect of practical consequence. The two cases differ as much as the north pole from the south. And even if similarity be conceded, the two cases must have different consequences. It is never observed that the knowledge of one similar leads to an activity towards another similar. When one is known to be similar to another similar, they are *eo ipso* known as different. And if this similarity be made the spring of action by Prabhākara, that will sabotage his basic plea of non-cognition of differencc. Similarity, again, is not the substitute for identity. Thus Prabhākara cannot bank upon supposed similarity (of the undistinguished items, the perceived *this* and the recollected silver) to the elements of the veridical positive judgement as the explanation of the psycho-physical activity.

There is another point of difficulty to which Vācaspati Miśra has called attention. Prabhākara has laid stress on non-cognition of difference between the putative subject and predicate as the antecedent condition of judgement. And this negative condition is made the incentive to volitional activity. We have seen that mere negation cannot inspire activity. The mother-of-pearl is not felt as distinct from silver, and the failure of distinction is supposed to cause volitional movement towards silver. But non-cognition of difference is not restricted to silver and extends to a hundred other things. Prabhākara studiously insists that the mother-of-pearl is never cognised as silver, but only as not different from the latter. It should have been noted that the mother-of-pearl is different, not only from silver, but from all other things, and its difference from silver is as much suppressed and unnoticed as its difference from other things. The mother-of-pearl is not known as different not only from silver but also from many other things such as a jar, a piece of cloth, etc., and, if the negation of cognition can rouse activity towards silver, there is no reason why it should not do so towards many other things, from which it is not known to be different.

There is another objection. The Prābhākaras seek to explain the will to get at the silver from non-apprehension of non-relation between the cognition of the *this* and the cognition of silver. Prabhākara denies the erroneous judgement 'this is silver', but seeks to keep the two items, the putative subject and predicate, apart, subject to the reservation that the two are not felt as different and unrelated, though they are so in point of fact. Admission of this judgement will be tantamount to admission of error, which is according to Prabhākara fatal to realism. But the difference uncognised is regarded as the sufficient condition of volitional activity. The volition and the consequent activity are wrong, but this does not presuppose a wrong judgement. The non-differentiation will wake the will to get at silver. *This* (mother-of-pearl) is not felt as not-silver (different from silver), and, if this absence of differentiation be the condition of volition, it can be urged with equal plausibility that the not-silver being apprehended not as silver, there should be no will to get at it. The real point is this : what is not apprehended as not-silver is also not apprehended as silver. If the absence of apprehension as not-silver can be urged as a reason for our volition to obtain it, it may be urged with equal force that not being apprehended also as silver there should be arrest of all will towards it. In other words, both the conditions of will and its deterrent being present in the case, the Prābhākaras have no right to decide in favour of one of the possible alternatives to the exclusion of the other.

The Prābhākaras have failed to study the psychology of volition. Volition is conditioned by the emotion of desire or its opposite. For example, a man goes to a ration shop, when he desires food-stuff, and withdraws from a place disturbed by riot. Both of these seeking and avoiding reactions are conditioned by desire. Volition and desire have the same object. Desire or its opposite in its turn is engendered by the knowledge that the object is good or a means to a good or an evil or harm or a means to an evil or harm. This knowledge is got by inference on the ground that the object belongs to a particular class of objects which have this desirable or undesirable attribute in common. To return to our old example, the mother-of-pearl is not desired for itself, but silver is. The man who wants silver cannot move towards the mother-of-pearl unless he is persuaded to believe that it is silver. But the cognition of mother-of-pearl as silver must be a case of positive error, which Prabhākara denies. His contention that the mother-of-pearl is desired because it is not distinguished from silver has been examined and found to lack the support of experience as well as logic. The psychology of the genesis of desire has been found to involve an act of inference as its condition. The conative impulse is roused only by the belief that the object lying ahead is silver. The process of inference is something more or less like this. All silver is useful, the object before us is silver, therefore it is useful. The inference of usefulness of the object lying ahead is made possible by the knowledge of the minor premise, 'the object ahead is silver.' Prabhākara on the other hand seeks to arrive at the conclusion by substituting the negative unattached predicate for a positive one. He will have the minor premise as follows :—The object ahead is not different from silver. It is obvious even to an untrained mind that a negative belief in non-difference cannot generate a positive reaction such as that of seeking. The same remarks apply *mutatis mutandis* to reactions of avoiding as when we mistake a rope for a snake and start back in fear.

Prabhākara contends that in spite of its apparent snags and difficulties his theory is to be accepted as the superior alternative to the thoery of wrong reference. There is no reason why the mother-of-pearl should be perceived as silver. There is no connecting link between the visual organ and the distant silver. The contention of the Naiyāyika that a defect of the sense serves as the connecting link should be dismissed as a preposterous hypothesis. Defect induces privation, and cannot enhance the power of a thing. The defect in the usual sense accounts for the non-perception of the specific character of the mother-of-pearl. It will be too much to suppose that it will enable the sense to envisage silver lying beyond its normal scope and indentify the latter with the former. A seed has the capacity to engender a species of sprout. But this capacity is impaired when it is moth-eaten or scared. Here the defect adversely affects the capacity. The Naiyāyika's contention that defect augments the power of a thing is an argument of despair. Consequently there is no possibility of one thing being perceived as other simply because there cannot possibly exist any relation between the sense and the latter. The thory of non-discrimination as maintained by Prabhākara is to be accepted as the only alternative explanation because it does not make recourse to an unnatural assumption necessary.

This objection has a formidable aspect, and seems unanswerable. But the Naiyāyika asserts that the assessment of defect in terms of privation gives only a partial version. A defect is that which induces an abnormal consequence. This abnormality may partake of privation as well as excess. There may be a defect which abridges the scope of the visual organ. Myopia is such an instance. But there may be another consequence. The excess of vision may be another abnormality. Abnormality does not necessarily mean that which is below the normal, but also that which is above. The Naiyāyika mentions several cases of excess. A disease called *bhaṣmaka* induces enormous excess of appetite. A man suffering from it consumes enormous quantity of food, and yet does not derive any nourishment. Another instance cited is that of a cane-seed, which when singed by fire generates a *banana* plant. So there are defects and defects, one kind causing diminution, another excess of effects. The present instance of the defect acting as the connecting medium between the visual sense and the distant silver is only an illustration of the latter type.

It has, however, been argued by Bhavanātha Miśra, a Prābhākara Mīmāmsaka of the 11th century, that the example of the cauterized cane-seed is not an instance of excess. The cauterized seed is not capable of producing the cane, and is thus a defect. But when it makes itself the cause of another species, it is to be looked upon as a positive quality of excellence. Śālikanātha does not dispute the truth of the instances of excessive appetition (*bhaṣmaka*) and cauterised cane-seed, but he gives an ingenious interpretation. The disease of excessive appetition is a defect because it precludes nourishment. But when it makes consumption of enormous quantity of food possible, it should be looked upon as a positive quality. This also is the case with the cauterized cane-seed. The cauterisation is a defect, because it thwarts the growth of the cane which is its wonted effect. But when it invests the cane-seed with another unwonted power it should be regarded as a positive quality.

This defence does not undermine the cogency of the Naiyāyika argument. It reduces itself to a question of interpretation. It is admitted that the disease is a defect so far as it leads to undernourishment and emaciation of the body. Here the defect ends in privation. But when this induces excessive appetite, it is not privative, but produces a positive effect. Take, for instance, the case of an alcoholic patient. The patient under the influence of alcohol fails to see things in their normal perspective, but sees rats and rabbits, though they are not present in the context. Here the alcoholic influence acts both ways. It reduces one's normal vision and at the same time enhances his visual power so far as he sees other things, rats and the like. This is quite open to the interpretation that alcohol is a defect in so far as it frustrates the normal vision and is a positive influence in so far as it enables the sense to take stock of other things. The same line of argument may be applied to the defect of the visual organ. If the defect disables the visual organ from taking cognizance of the specific character of the rope or the mother-of pearl, it results in privation and omission, and so far is a defect. But when it actually leads to the vision of silver, which is a positive entity, it gives an excess of power and so far may be regarded as a positive quality. Prabhākara and his followers in spite of their ingenuity have virtually agreed to accept the dual capacity of a defect, one privative and another positive. It becomes a matter of nomenclature when the same fact is called a defect in respect of privation and an excellence in regard to a positive effect. The Naiyāyika relies on this dual capacity of the defect in his interpretation of perceptual error. The Vedāntist is also found to stress this dual function of defect when he makes it responsible for the omission of the specific character which he calls the veiling capacity (*āvaraṇa*) of the defect, and when he makes it a condition of the emergence (*vikṣepa*) of silver, he explains it as the power of new creation. Prabhākara lays stress on the privative role of the defect, but when he is confronted with the positive result produced by defect, he seeks to escape by giving it another name (*guṇa* or excellence). It is plain by whatever name one may designate a defect, it has a negative and also a positive result. The Naiyāyika, therefore, does not make an absolutely unwarranted claim when he makes defect productive of a positive result. Whether there may be a happier explanation of the positive result is a different question.

Prabhākara's denial of error is inspired by the fear complex. He is apprehensive that the acceptance of error as a fact is bound to undermine the claim of realism. If one thing can be perceived as another, so contends Prabhākara, one cannot have implicit faith in the evidentiary value of what passes for a normal cognition. What will be the distinguishing criterion of a normal cognition from an abnormal one, of truth from falsity? If non-contradiction be made the test of truth, it cannot be an infallible guide. There are errors which are not contradicted by subsequent experience. The uneducated man believes on the evidence of uncontradicted experience that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west, and the earth is stationary. Furthermore, there can be no assurance that a particular experience however persistent will not be contradicted in the future. Our instinctive belief in the identity of soul and body is not contradicted by experience. So absolute non-contradiction is not available, and as such our supposed normal experiences will not be immune from the doubt that they may be erroneous at bottom. Again the belief that the mother-of-pearl can be perceived as silver will lead to subjectivism. If the perceived *this* be an ideal (mental) representation and not an objective fact as the representative theory of perception holds, we shall have no evidence of the existence of an objective silver whether the experience passes off as normal or abnormal, veridical or non-veridical. Thus the representative theory has a dangerous implication of subjectivism which will confine the mind for ever to the charmed circle of its own ideas, and cut it off from its moorings in reality. If on the other hand the content of erroneous cognition be believed to be non-existent, this will end in nihilism. If a non-entity can appear to be present, all our cognitions will be liable to doubt regarding their veracity. Thus the admission of error will in the last resort end either in subjectivism or nihilism (*śūnyavāda*). Subjectivism is only the penultimate stage of nihilism. The existence of the subjective idea is proved only by experience of it, and like the experience of an objective fact the subjective experience also cannot claim an *a priori* authenticity. Both the consequences are fatal to normal life and activities, theoretical and practical. However respectable they may appear, these ways of thought must be abandoned as intellectual aberrations.

Both these conclusions are denied by the Naiyāyika as inevitable consequences of belief in error. The Naiyāyika is not a believer in representative perception, and so subjectivism in the sense of representationism cannot be urged against the Nyāya view of cognition.

The Naiyāyika also does not agree that a non-entity is perceivable, and thus avoids both the Scylla of representationism and the Charybdis of Buddist nihilism. Another objection is that error cannot be explained realistically because the perceived silver cannot be believed to be present in the context. The mother-of-pearl refuses to accept its identity with silver. But error entails this identification and thus involves a contradiction. The contention that real silver is perceived and referred to the mother-of-pearl under the influence of defect is not accepted by Prabhākara. The silver is not present, and a distant silver cannot be perceived because the visual organ cannot take stock of it.[1] But the Naiyāyika has shown that defect in the sense brings the distant object within its purview. It is thus a real silver that is perceived and not an ideal content nor a non-entity. So the admission of error does not lead to any one of these untoward consequences.

As for the spectre of scepticism raised by Prabhākara it is easily laid by the consideration that a veridical cognition sets all doubt at rest and gives no scope to scepticism. Our normal cognitions are caused by normal conditions uncontaminated by defect. These cognitions give us the knowledge of reality, and these are accepted as true. It is not necessary that one should adopt another extreme view in order to rebut the other extreme view of the Buddhist nihilist. When the Buddhist asserts all beliefs to be wrong, its refutal does not necessitate the assertion of the opposite extreme, that all beliefs are right. Both these extremistic views contradict our normal appraisal of knowledge. We know that there may be error and again that error is susceptible of correction. Truth is distinguished from falsehood and they cannot interchange their function. Both the Buddhist and the Prābhākaras are guilty of extremism in that they equally repudiate the distinction of truth from error. Scepticism and over-credulity are equally extreme attitudes, neither of which can be endorsed without doing violence to the confirmed beliefs of mankind.

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[1] It may be noted in this connection that the Naiyāyika rejects the possibility of any contact between the sense and the past. The past is past, it is dead and gone. The recollection of the past is also not regarded as its immediate perception. The Mādhva however points out that memory is quite competent to take stock of object that is past. It is an immediate vision of the past, a sort of hind-sight as it were in modern terminology. The connecting link between the past and the present cognitive apparatus is traces left behind by past occurrences. In other words the Mādhva believes, like Bergson, in the past enduring in the present in the form of traces or dispositiions and through them affecting the organ of experience. (Pramāṇacandrikā, (Calcutta University edition) rendition by Dr S. K. Maitra, pp. 21-22)

When Prabhākara contends that doubt and error are true equally with uncontradicted cognitions, he makes a claim which is too big to be acceptable. The sceptic cannot be sincere in his assertion of the universal falsehood of all cognitions. His belief that all beliefs are wrong convicts him of insincerity. The extreme credulity of Prabhākara that even doubt and error are equally true, not to speak of other cognitions, is as unacceptable as scepticism. Prabhākara's universal credulity cannot be accepted as a sincere assertion of a true belief. Both of these attitudes, universal scepticism and unqualified credulity, smack of pretence. A doubt results in deadlock and error in disappointment. They cannot be put on the same level with truth, which is confirmed by an unending series of experience.

We have already confronted the contention that contradiction is not explicable as a case of annihilation or nullification *per se*, or in respect of its object. But it is a case of sophistication of a plain truth. Contradiction is a logical process, and we shall discuss it in all its bearings at a later stage. For the present it will suffice to say that contradiction consists in the opposition of one judgement by another bringing home the unreality of the object envisaged in the context by the judgement concerned. The cognition conversant with such an unreal object is necessarily set down as unauthentic. Generally the subsequent cognition serves to invalidate the previous cognition as in the case of the silver illusion. But a previous authentic judgement also sets aside a subsequent false judgement particularly in the case of error induced by physical conditions. The stick immersed in water looks bent. The tree looks upside down when reflected in water. In these cases the previous cognition of the tree as it stands on the bank, and that of the stick as it is, give the lie to the subsequent experiences. Such optical illusions do not deceive the experiencer regarding their truth-claim, because he is firmly acquainted with the true character of the objects. The falsity of the wrong judgement is derived from the impossibility of the coincidence of two opposite characters in the same substrate. The tree stands erect with its upward branches. The stick is straight as seen before its immersion and again when it is taken out of water. Such is also the case with the persistent illusion of the smallness of the sun and the moon. Here true knowledge serves to debunk the usual experiences in spite of their persistence and universality. The optical organ is constituted in a fashion which makes it incompetent to take stock of their real magnitude or position. The camera is constituted after the fashion of the optical apparatus and therefore yields the same result. The convergence of the railway lines at a distance and the photographic reproduction of the situation do not invest these experiences with a better truth-claim. The adage 'a camera does not tell a lie' holds true outside these exceptional situations. Here our previous conviction safeguards us from entertaining the illusion as truth.[1]

As regards the contention of Prabhākara that absolute non-contradiction is not ascertainable, one need not dispute it. It is true that even some of our confirmed beliefs are found to be set aside by a later discovery. This may prove at the utmost that finality in truth may not have been reached, but the very possibility that our beliefs may be corrected shows that truth is not unattainable. This belief in the possible attainment of final truth makes for progress and search for truth. Universal credulity will take away all incentive to the investigation of the final truth which necessarily involves a prolonged and sustained effort. The practical consequences of Prabhākara's theory of the truth of all experiences are as dangerous as those of universal scepticism. And this should be the *reductio ad absurdum* of both these extreme positions.

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[1] Viṣayasya tāttvikatvābhāvabodhanadvārā pūrvajñānasya aprāmāṇyabodhanameva bādhakatvam. Tacca utsargata uttarajñānasya.........yatra pūrvapramāṇasya pravṛttisaṃvāda uttarajñāṇasya tadvisaṃvādaḥ.........pūrvasyaiva prābalyam, tatra utsargaḥ parityājyate, yathā vṛkṣāṇām ūrdhvāgratvajñāne........

—*Brhmavidyābharaṇa*—page-12.

CHAPTER III

THE NYĀYA THEORY OF WRONG REFERENCE (*Continued*)

The Naiyāyika explains error as a wrong reference, which consists in referring a content to a subject to which it does not belong. The wrong reference leads to the understanding of one thing as another, that is to say, in a different character. In the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl the content of silver is wrongly referred to a subject which possesses the character of mother-of-pearl, and not that of silver. Thus in error one thing is perceived in the form of another. It is also represented as the perception of the opposite of a thing. Perception of the opposite of a thing (*viparītakhyāti*) is not the same as the perception of one thing in the form of another. The Naiyāyika is an advocate of the latter position. In illusion, according to the Naiyāyika, we apprehend one thing in a form that does not belong to it, but belongs to another. Thus, the essence of the illusion consists in ascribing a character to a thing which does not possess it. But the Bhāṭṭas favour the former view of error as the perception of the opposite of a thing. According to them illusory perception is more than apprehending one thing in the form of another. It is apprehending a thing in a form which is contrary to or incompatible with the form which really belongs to it. Thus for the Naiyāyika the character which is ascribed to a thing is absent in it. It may or may not be incompatible with the real character of the thing. But for the Bhāṭṭas, however, there is not merely the ascription of an absent character, but also contrariety or opposition or antagonism between the ascribed absent character and the real character of the thing. Udayana, of course, says that the difference is a difference between tweedledum and tweedledee, that is, a difference of no philosophical consequence whatsoever. Error is designated as perception of A as its opposite B. Here one substance appears as another by way of identity. Unsophisticated people do not take the trouble of further investigation whether one entity A can be felt as B without the transference of the fundamental character of A to B. In a word, it is taken for granted that one substance is felt as another substance irrespective of the transference of quality. Udayana considers this popular estimation as fairly correct. But it is a case of over-simplification. Philosophers understand that there can be no apprehension of identity of one substance with another unless the fundamental character of one is ascribed to the other in supersession of the distinctive character of the substrate. It is, therefore, necessary in the interest of exactitude to regard error as a case of one substance appearing in the character of another.

Venkateśvara, the author of the *Nyāyapariśuddhi*, a work on logic written in conformity with the philosophy of Rāmānuja, has sought to justify this difference of designation in the following way. When A is felt as identical with B without reference to the distinctive character constituted by different attributes, error is designated as the perception of the opposite. Of course, as Udayana has pointed out, the commentator Śrīnivāsa also observes that there can be no identity of two substances without the attribution of the character of one to the other. But Śrīnivāsa observes that the fundamental character of a substance, for example, ropeness or snakeness, is not felt as different from the substance. A substance cannot be sundered from its constitutive character. So, though the identification of a substance A with B necessarily presupposes the identification of the constitutive character, it is regarded as a case of substantial identification. The conch shell appears as yellow, i.e., perceived as one whole yellow shell. The shell-character is not felt as incompatible with yellow, though it is naturally white. There is antagonism between whiteness and yellowness but not between the conch shell or its character and yellowness.

Venkaṭeśvara refers to another classification as propounded in a work called *Vivaraṇa.*[1] Error is a case of nescience which is threefold: first, the failure of cognition of a thing—it is a case of non-perception; secondly, when one is perceived as another—it is called a case of cognition of one thing in the form of another (*anyathājñānam*) just like silver in a mother-of-pearl; and thirdly, the cognition of the opposite in which the vivid perception of a thing though uncorrected by another is proved to be false by a sophistical argument. This is called the cognition of one as the opposite (*viparītajñāna.*)[2]

These fine distinctions do not seem to throw additional light on the nature of error. In error, A is felt as B. When it is interpreted in terms of identity, this is called opposite cognition. If the identity of one substance with another is considered as a case of identity of fundamental character, that is to say, if A is felt not in its own character but in the character of B, it transpires to be a case of wrong reference (*anyathākhyāti*). Error has however been designated or characterised both as a cognition of opposite and a cognition of one in the character of another. The two designations have been used synonymously in subsequent literature.

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[1] The work called *Vivaraṇa* as referred to is apparently a work of the Rāmānuja school, and not the work of Prakāśātmayati, which is a commentary on the *Pañcapādika* of Padmapāda.

[2] Vivaraṇe tu evam uktam. Trividham ajnānam. Svarupājñanamanyathājñānaṃ viparītājñānamiti. Svarupājñānaṃ nāma vastuno 'pratipattiḥ. Anyathājñānaṃ vastuno vastvantaratayā bhāsanam.........viparītājñānaṃ tu yathāvadvastuni bhāsamāne yuktibhistasyānyathopapādanam—The *Nyāyapariśudhdi* (Benares edn) —page 56.

Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara define error as the apprehension of one thing as another, and the apprehension of a thing as it is is the characteristic of a valid cognition. Śaṃkara, the exponent of the non-dualistic school of Vedānta, also subscribes to this characterisation of error, and accordingly he propounds the definition of error in the very same terms.[1] Akṣapāda in one of his aphorisms[2] designates error as a false cognition (*mithyā*) instead of erroneous cognition. Vātsyāyana in his commentary has retained the term. Despite the verbal differences the Naiyāyikas are unanimous in their view that error consists in the apprehension of a thing as something other than what it is.

The predicate content that we apprehend in erroneous perception is real—it is the elsewhere elsewhen real predicate that is perceived in the subject. It is an ontological fact existing in a different spatio-temporal context. The Naiyāyika is, therefore, an advocate of a doctrine of error as a cognition which takes stock of objective facts and does not involve any element of unreality. Thus an erroneous cognition has for its content a really existent object. The falsity of the cognition is not at all determined by the objective unreality of the content. Further, the content is not a subjective concept superimposed upon an objective fact. The Naiyāyika is an ultra-realist, and for him the concepts are not purely subjective figments devoid of corresponding objective reality. A concept in his view is an objective fact, which is subjectively apprehended as a concept. The mental fact is never detached from its relevancy to an objective universal. A pure subjective concept unrelated to an objective datum is an unthinkable absurdity. However paradoxical it may appear, the Naiyāyika cannot be charged with subjectivism even in the epistemology of error. The basis of realism in epistemology is confirmed by the affirmation of a one-to-one relation of the cognition and its contents to independent objective data as we have observed before. The epistemic character of error is not accounted for by the supposal of the unreality and subjectivity of the predicate, but only by a wrong reference which consists in referring a predicate, though real *per se*, (i.e., in a different context), to a subject to which it is irrelevant.

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[1] Atasmiṃs tadbuddhiḥ.........' The *Brahmasūtra-Adhyāsabhāṣya*.

[2] *Nyāyadarśana* (Metropolitan edn, Calcutta) 1.1. 2 page 69.

The question may pertinently arise, if the content of a false cognition be as real as the content of a veridical one, how can the difference between the two be determined ? The distinction between the two is a felt fact, and cannot be brushed aside by any amount of quibbling. The answer given to this charge is that a false cognition does not differ from a veridical one in so far as the ontological status of the content is concerned. For the content of an erroneous cognition does possess as much reality as that of a valid one. It may be remarked in this connection that Bertrand Russell argues in a similar vein. 'My visual sensations', says he, 'when I look in a mirror are exactly what I think they are. Things at the foot of a rainbow do really look coloured. In dreams I have all the experiences that I seem to have. There are in fact no illusions of the senses, but only mistakes in interpreting sensational data as sign of things other than themselves.'[1] The Naiyāyika, however, believes that all perceptual errors are necessarily concomitant with sense-perversion. So also has Dharmottara in his commentary on the *Nyāyabindu* laid emphasis upon sense-distortion as the necessary condition of perceptual error.[2] Error is thus sensuous and not merely intellectual. McTaggart also strongly asserts the possibility of misperception, i.e., perceptual error.[3]

The difference between the two kinds of cognition lies in the intrinsic constitution and adjustment of the content in the judgement concerned. All articulated cognitions (*savikalpaka*), that is, all types of knowledge and judgements must have a subject and a predicate. In the case of a veridical judgement the predicate by which the subject is described or interpreted does belong to the subject not merely in the experience of the knower, but also to the reality for which the (logical) subject stands in my experience or which my experience presents as subject. Thus if S be the subject and P be the predicate, and E stands for experience, and R for reality, X is Y in E, i.e., in my experience and also in R, i.e., in the objective reality, while in illusion S is P only in E, but not in R. Thus the characteristic feature of a veridical judgement is that the subject as determined by the predicate holds both in the experience of the knower and in actual fact[4], while in non-veridical experience the characterisation of the subject by the predicate is true only in the experience of the individual knower, but not in the objective situation.[5] It may be noted, however, that the characterisation of the subject by the predicate falls within the domain of individual experience in an illusory cognition and not within the domain of the objective reality. Therefore, the Naiyāyika must acknowledge that there is at least *something* in illusory experience, i.e., the characterisation by the predicate that does not hold good in the system of objective reality, but only within the realm of subjectivity. The Naiyāyika has, therefore, to conceive a sort of subjectivity which is yet other than the objective reality. And this is what a Śaṃkarite will contend as constituting the falsity (*anirvacanīyatva*) of the illusory and the erroneous. It is other than objectivity or objective reality and yet also not a sheer nothing or absolute blank in so far as it is a subjective referring or predicating and therefore not absolute unreality. It is thus other than reality and also other than unreality, and hence a logical indefinable.

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[1] Russell—*The Human knowledge—its nature and limits*, page 182.

[2] Vide *infra*-section—Defect quā medium.

[3] *The Nature of Existence*—vol. II.

[4] Viśeṣyavṛtti-prakārakaṃ jñānam pramā.

[5] Viśeṣyāvṛttiprakārakaṃ jñānaṃ bhramaḥ.

PERCEPTUAL CHARACTER OF ILLUSION

The problem of error primarily relates to sense-perception. The predicate irrespective of its ontological status does not belong to the subject, and is yet perceived in relation to it. Sense-perception presupposes an objective datum and the relation of the sense with it. All perception is a consequence of a sense-object contact. The Naiyāyika cannot avoid this fundamental condition even in erroneous perception. If the predicate in erroneous judgement be a real datum, and yet not existent in the context in which the subject is perceived, the question will naturally arise how the sense comes into contact with it and cognises it as related to the subject.

The Naiyāyika is committed to the presupposition that all perception is conditioned by sense and object, and the relation between them. The sense again must be related to the subject as well as the predicate. The problem can be posed as follows, how can the sense operate upon a predicate which is not existent in the context? What will be the nature of the relation between the sense and an elsewhere elsewhen object?

The problem that there cannot be any possible connection between a normal sense and an object far removed from the context seems to be an important one. In the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl the predicate of the illusory judgement, i.e., silver, on the Naiyāyika's own admission is a matter of a different space-time context, and it is preposterous to endow a normal sense, i.e., eye with a capacity to take stock of such an object. Under the circumstances the wrong judgement 'this is silver' with all its constituent parts seems a great hurdle to those who champion error as an outcome of visual perception.

The question raised seems to be pertinent, but before committing ourselves to such a position it may be worthwhile if we subject it to scrutiny. The conditions of a determinate perceptual judgement are, first, a contact between the sense and the subject of a judgement; secondly, the knowledge of the predicate; and, last of all, an apprehension of the relation between the subject and the predicate. The predicate is not recalled as an object of memory, but is cognised as a character of the perceived subject as a perceived datum, and not only the subject but also the predicate are presented as related. Take any instance of a perceptual judgement, and it can be shown to have occurred in consequence of the fulfilment of the triple condition. The wrong judgement being perceived should not be an exception to this rule. First, there is the contact between the sense and the subject. Owing to some defect either in the cogniser or in the physical medium, the subject with its specific character is not noticed, and the knowledge of the subject in its generic feature as *this* with a character which bears similarity with the generic character of the predicate stimulates the memory impression of the predicate which was perceived in the past, i.e., of which the epistemic subject had previous experience. In this way the second condition of the experience of the predicate is found to be operative. Owing to defect the gap between a far-away predicate and a nearby subject is not felt, and this non-apprehension of the unrelatedness between the two makes the transition to the affirmative judgement natural and easy. This is the third condition of a perceptual judgement. As a result, silver is made a predicate of the *this*, and it appears as being identified with it. There is first of all a contact between the sense and the *this*, the subject of the judgement. But the *this* is incompletely apprehened, i.e., apprehended in its generic character as a shining something, i.e., a character which it possesses in common with silver. There is thus, secondly, the revival of silver that was apprehended in the past in a different situation. But here also on account of incomplete revival, i.e., revival with the time-reference suspended, there is only an apprehension of silver as such or the silverness without any location in a past experience. Thus the silver being revived with its past reference suppressed on account of the incomplete revival, i.e., an apprehension of the silver without apprehension of its previous location, there is a positive reference of the revived silver to the presented *this* as its locus resulting in the judgement 'this is silver'. The relation between silver and its locus, viz., the presented *this* in the illusory experience is no ordinary relation. It is not a relation of substance and quality or the universal and the particular or any other of the usual objective relations, which act as the operative condition in normal or natural perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*). The eye here perceives the silver in the *this* through the mediating relation of past experience, i.e., subjective experience, which brings about an objective contact of eye and the silver. This is why it is called by the Naiyāyika an a-normal or a non-natural perception through an a-normal or a non-natural contact. Other examples of such perceptions are the apprehension of the fragrance of the sandalwood by the eye or of the cold temperature of ice by a perception of its look. Western psychologists, for example, Wundt, etc., describe such perception as complication, where revived experience becomes so closely blended with a presentation that it becomes as good as a presentation itself. The judgement 'this is silver' is then a case of visual perception, and there seems to be no logical incompatibility in holding it to be such.

But it may be urged that the analysis is more ingenious than convincing. If the judgement passes for a perceptual one with its predicate not noted perceptually, there may arise a difficulty. The difficulty is that the distinction between perceptual and inferential cognitions will be obliterated. In inference the subject is perceived, and the predicate is otherwise known. There is the perceptual cognition of the subject, and non-perceptual cognition of the predicate, and the non-relation between the two is not felt. So, if a determinate perceptual cognition is exclusively determined by these three conditions, then the inference of P in S, a perceived subject, should be considered as perceptual by parity of reasoning, determined as it is by the three conditions.[1]

The necessity of the actual contact between the sense and the character which functions as predicate of the subject in the illusion cannot be dispensed with as a necessary condition of perceptual cognition. It has been seen that the past cognition or non-perceptual cognition of silver cannot do duty for the sense-object contact. The predicate in the wrong judgement is *ex hypothesi* a matter of past experience, and exists in different space and time. It cannot possibly come within the purview of a normal sense. But the contact is to be posited. In the case of a normal and correct perception the contact is no problem, for both the subject and the predicate are present in the situation under consideration, whereas in the case of wrong perception the contact between the sense and the predicate is not easy to determine. The Naiyāyika falls upon another hypothesis that contact between the sense and a distant object may be instituted by the vestige of the past experience of the predicate. The vestige is a subtle and attenuated form of the perceptual cognition. The sense stands connected with the mind; the mind is in conjunction with the self wherein lie deposited the impressions of the past experiences. In this way the sense is in contact with the trace of the past cognition, which has necessary relation to an object. And such a type of contact by a complex relation deriving from simple relations occurring successively is not foreign to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology of perception.[1]

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[1] Vahṇyāder jñānasya pratyāsattitve tata eva pratyakṣattvāpattāv anumānādyucchedāpatteḥ—The *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* p. 77.
(edn. by M. M. Kṛṣnanātha Nyāyapañcānana)

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[1] The six types of contact

(i) The sense organ is believed to be a substance of the same kind with the object. Contact of the visual organ with a substance is called conjunction.

(ii) The contact of the sense with the colour inherent in the substance is conjunction-cum-inherence. The contact of the sense with the colour of the pen, and so also the pen universal is conjunction-cum-inherence.

(iii) The contact of the sense with the universal inherent in the colour, which is inherent in the substance is called conjunction-cum-inherence-cum-inherence.

It may appear strange that this mental disposition institutes a contact between the sense and the distant object. But a little reflection shows that the previous experience of the predicate, and consequently its relation as a lingering trace in the mind, are the *conditio sine quā non* of the wrong perception. Its distinctive role in the emergence of an illusory perception is beyond cavil, and

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(iv) The contact of the auditory sense, which is of the nature of *ākāśa* (ether), with sound, which is a quality of the latter is simple inherence.

(v) The contact of the auditory sense with the sound universal inherent in sound is called inherence-cum-inherence.

(vi) Adjectivality (or adjectivity) is the relation that is posited in perception of negation and inherence. 'I see no pen on the table' is an instance of it. The pen is not on the table and so its negation is perceived. The contact of the visual sense with the table is conjunction, and with negation subsisting in it as an adjective is called the relation of the substantive-adjective type. To be precise, the sense is related with the locus (say table) by conjunction and negation being an adjective to the table, the relation of the sense with it is called the relation of being an adjective to the substance in conjunction with the sense (*saṃyuktaviśeṣaṇatā*). Perception of inherence (of redness in pen) is thought possible by virtue of a relation of adjectivity. Inherence as a term only is an adjective to the substantive pen. So this is also on a par with the preceding case.

The postulation of these different kinds of relations between the sense and the object, direct and indirect, is the only corrollary of the fundamental postulate, that perception is only possible by real, physical sense-object linking. Those who, however, do not believe the relation to be necessarily physical, (e.g., the Buddhists) regard the postulation of these types of relation as uncalled for. The Buddhists do not regard the sense-object relation as one of physical contact but rather one of affinity and influence (*yogyatā*). The sense cognises the object by virtue of capacity. The sense is competent to apprehend the object, and the object is competent to be sensed. According to the Buddhists this alone suffices to account for sense-perception without the presupposition of a physical contact in addition, the Naiyāyika interprets its function as the institution of a link between the sense and the remote object. There is obviously no such link as physical conjunction or inherence, and so this remains as the only alternative, and there seems to be no inherent absurdity in the hypothesis that the vestige of a past experience can function as a relation. And consequently, in view of the existing links detailed above, the sense is asserted to come in contact with the predicate of a wrong judgement.

One thing. It would be better for us to call it memory, because it is well-known that whatever is generated by trace or vestige becomes mnemic. So let us call it memory instead of a memory trace, and see if we can be in a better position by supposing this to be the connecting link. The memory can establish such contact in the very same way. The sense is directly connected with the mind, the mind with the self, and in self inheres the memory of the past event. And the memory seems to be in a better position than memory trace, since it is an instance of a full-fledged cognition. And, this being so, it has a direct reference to the object. Again, since the relation between the sense and the object is established by memory, there will be no lack of eontact between the sense and the distant predicate. And this will account for the perceptual character of the wrong judgement as the qualified subject and the qualifying predicate are equally data of perception.

Cognition as such is sometimes found competent to contact an external object. In introspection,[1] which immediately follows upon a determinate cognition, one is in contact with the object of the latter. The contact in this case seems to be different from the normal ones, in which the object is directly intuited by the sense. In the case of introspection the function of the sense is suspended, and the object as such as a given external datum cannot be physically present within the mind. The mind also in its independent capacity cannot be supposed to have any direct contact with it. And the lack of any ostensible connection precludes the mental perception of the external object as such. But the perception of the external datum in introspection is too clear a fact to be denied so easily. What is then the explanation ? The explanation seems to lie in the supposition that the cognition acts as a connecting link between the self and the object. Cognition by its intrinsic nature is inextricably bound up with an object and a subject. There cannot be only cognition without an object as a cognitum and a subject as cognisant thereof as a matter of fact though not necssarlly known. Cognition, therefore, may be supposed to serve as a link between the object known and the subject and its instrument (mind).

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[1] It is necessary to note the epistemology of perception of the Nyāya school. It ls affirmed that sense-perception which is called *vyavasāya* or the first judgement, gives the proposition 'the pen is'. It is a purely objective existential judgement, whose content is an objective fact without reference to the knower. The second

Cognition again serves as the link between the sense and the objective datum, which was perceived in the past, and is not intuited now, though the latter is physically present in the situation. In the proposition 'I see

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judgement is introspection of the psychical event, of the knowledge of the pen, that has occurred. 'I know the pen is' is the form in which it delivers itself.

For those who assert that all cognition is self-cognisant, i.e., cognition cognises itself in the process of coginsing the object, distinction between the primary perceptual judgement and the secondary introspective judgement has no *raison d'être*.

fragrant sandalwood' or 'the ice looks cold', I seem to have an immediate visual cognition of the fragrance of the sandalwood, and also of the coolness of ice. The sandalwood is lying at too great a distance to allow its fragrance to be smelt by me. It will not do to credit the visual sense with an unwonted capacity to apprehend smell. The capacity belongs to the olfactory sense and never to any other. The judgement is veridical, for the fragrance is actually present in the sandalwood which is visually perceived. But the judgement clearly asserts that the fragrance also is visually perceived and there is no reason to impugn its authenticity. It can, however, be justified if it can be shown that under peculiar circumstances the cantact between the sense of sight and fragrance need not be impossible. And in the absence of any such ostensible relation let us suppose that the past experience of fragrance in the sandalwood in question acts as the link between the object and the knowing subject and his visual sense. The hypothesis is not against empirical facts, for the past cognition is conserved in the subject, and the sense of sight being in conjunction with the mind, which is conjoined with the knowing subject, and indirectly with the past cognition inhering in the subject, becomes connected with the cognition conserved in the subject through successive links. Here the relation of the external sense with the cognition is obviously an involved and round-about process, but none the less it is effective as much as a simple direct relation. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology of perception is neither enamoured of simplicity nor afraid of complexity in the *modus operandi* of the sense-object relation where the facts of the case can be explained by a complicated process. Thus the past olfactory cognition of fragrance becomes the occasion of the present visual perception of it. But we must not lose sight of the fact that the contact between the sense of sight and fragrance here and now becomes possible, because the cognition of it took place in the past along with the cognition of the sandalwood, which forms the real datum of present visual perception. Thus it may not be implausible that the fragrance of the sandalwood and the sandalwood itself happen to be the data of visual perception. This explanation also applies to such experiences as 'The ice looks cold', 'The sword looks sharp', etc., which the Western psychologists describe as cases of complication.

Let us see whether the situation is exactly analogous to the illusory perception of silver in a mother-of-pearl. The silver in question was never perceived as present in the mother-of-pearl. So, how can the knowledge of silver act as the connecting link between the sense of sight and the absent silver ? The fragrance of the sandalwood was perceived along with the perception of the sandalwood itself, and the fragrance was felt as belonging to the sandalwood. When the sandalwood is perceived later, its association with fragrance is remembered. And this memory of fragrance being cognitive in character may establish a connection between the sense of sight and fragrance which is actually present though not directly apprehended. Thus there is a vital difference between the two cases. Silver was never perceived in the past as belonging to the mother-of-pearl. Therefore, though the visual perception of the mother-of-pearl as a bright white substance may arouse the memory impression of silver by reason of similarity, the latter (memory impression) cannot serve as the connection between the mother-of-pearl and silver character, because it was never perceived in the substratum of the mother-of-pearl. The analogy between the illusory perception of mother-of-pearl as silver and fragrant sandalwood is thus out of the question since cognition operates as relation only regarding the actually present datum which was perceived in the past in the same substratum.

In this connection we must take into account a peculiarity of cognition as a relating link. The objective datum which cognitive relation is thought to link up with an external sense is invariably perceived as a qualifying adjective and never as a substantive in the resulting judgement. For instance, the visual perception of fragrance in the sandalwood is acknowledged to be the outcome of the cognitive relation, and of course it is always understood as an adjective of the sandalwood and never as a substantive. If silver in the illusion were supplied by the past cognition of it, then this silver should always be perceived as a qualifying adjective of the subject, the *this*, (i.e., the mother-of-pearl). But this silver may appear either as the predicate or as the subject. Then this twofold form of the judgement proves that the appearance of silver is not occasioned merely by the past knowledge of it. To suppose that the silver in the situation has been generated by the knowledge of it is to maintain that silver will as a matter of necessity be the predicate in the judgement, 'this is silver' (*idaṃ rajatam*) and never function as a subject as it does in the proposition, 'silver is this' (*rajatam idam*).[1]

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[1] The relation of the subject and the predicate in a judgement is always relative to the standpoint of the cognisant subject. The same situation may be viewed in different perspectives. When one observes fire in a volcano one may judge it in different relations, for example, 'the fire is in the hill', 'the hill is possessed of fire'. This difference in deliverances is due to the emphasis inspired by the focus of attention. If these are legitimate expressions of judgements, the underlying principle which is presupposed by the logical process of conversion ought not to be impossible in the case of perceptual judgement—veridical or non-veridical. 'This is silver' is as much a singular judgement as 'the Duke of Wellington is the victor

The coercive role of the terms in the judgement will of necessity detract from its claim to be perceptual in character. Because in perception there is no hard and fast rule of one being the subject and another being the predicate, there can be a legitimate interchange of the subject and the predicate in respect of their relative position in a perceptual judgement. But in inference and in other cases the position of the subject and the predicate is fixed and under no circumstances they may change places. So to admit that silver in the illusion of mother-of-pearl as silver is occasioned by the knowledge of it is to admit that silver will always be the predicate in the resultant judgement. But the perceptual judgement is never subject to such a duress and the operation of it will place the judgement 'This is silver' in a separate category.

It may be argued against the above charge that the case of error is a little different. It is caused also by some defect or other in addition to the previous cognition of it as one of its conditions. This makes the judgement more flexible and as a result silver may appear either as the subject or as the predicate. The wrong

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of Waterloo.' Obviously the latter proposition is convertible and there is no reason why this should not be the case with 'this is silver'. The converse will be 'silver is this'. Conversion is not merely a linguistic manipulation, but is the exponent of a judgement, as we have seen that the subject-predicate relation is determined by the attitude and standpoint of the cogniser.

If the above finding be not illegitimate, the subject-predicate relation in judgement determined by the cognitive attitude may be reversible. But the postulate of the Nyāya realist is that the content of cognition quâ relation always functions as a predicate, and as such the relation in judgements as 'this is silver' 'the sandalwood is fragrant', is fixed and irreversible. This is a snag of the theory and a Naiyāyika cannot adduce a decisive argument in support.

judgement is not on all fours with the judgement 'I see the fragrant sandalwood' which is true and veridical. The coercion of status of the terms in a perceptual judgement holds good when previous perceptual experience alone is the connecting link between the sense and the datum.

The hypothesis of previous cognition serving as the connecting link between the sense and the distant object has been challenged on another ground. The admission of the hypothesis will make inference impossible. If cognition be supposed to act as the connecting link in the case of the illusory experience of silver, it may also be assumed with equal plausibility to act in the case of inference as the connecting link between the sense and the unperceived *probandum*. Inference is conditioned by the cognition of invariable concomitance between the *probans* and the *probandum*, say smoke and fire. Fire is inferred from a column of smoke, because of its invariable association with the latter. This knowledge of the invariable association is exactly analogous to that of fragrant sandalwood. The previous cognition of fire, therefore, should act as the link between the sense and unperceived fire. And the situation will eventuate in a perceptual cognition as the self-same conditions are at work. Besides, the contention is supported by the epistemological law, viz., 'In a situation where the conditions of inference and perception are alike present, and the object to be cognised is self-identical, the conditions of perception will prevail over those of inference and the resultant knowledge will be perceptual'.[1]

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1. Nyāya-Vaiśesika—by Dr S. Mookerjee (published in the *Cultural Heritage of India Vol. III* by The Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, pages—100-102).

It has been urged in defence that there is misapplication of the rule in the case under consideration. This rule is applicable only to the cases of ordinary or natural perception. That is to say in a situation where the conditions of inference and ordinary perception are alike present and the object is the same, the conditions of perception are more powerful than those of inference. But the present instance is a case of a-normal or non-natural perception. It is non-natural because the contact between the sense and the distant object is sought to be established with the help of cognition, which falls outside the six recognised types.[1] And in the situation where the conditions of a-normal or non-natural perception and inference are alike present, and the object is the self-same entity, the conditions of inference are more powerful than those of non-natural perception, and the resultant knowledge, e.g., the hill is on fire, will be inference and not anything else.

The relaxation of the rule in the case of non-natural or a-normal perception is dictated by a logical necessity. But for this amendment there would be no *raison d'être* of inference, if the superior strength of the conditions of perception as such over those of inference were admitted in the case of the self-same object. The conditions of inference are the knowledge of the two premises, the major stating the necessary concomitance between the *probans*, (e.g., smoke) and the *probandum*, (e.g., fire), and the minor premise stating the relation of the *probans* to the subject. The Naiyāyika insists on a third premise, in addition, synthesising the two as the proximate condition of the inference. In other words, before inference takes place there must be the knowledge of the *probandum*, for without it the knowledge of concomitance between the *probandum* and the *probans*, and the mediating tertiary judgement that brings the premises into a logical relation (*parāmarśa*)[1] will not be possible. And in the absence of these two inference cannot take place. So one must admit that before inference takes place, one must possess the knowledge of the *probandum*. And if the knowledge of the *probandum* be alleged to act as the link between the *probandum* and the sense, then the *probandum* will be automatically perceived in the subject instead of being inferred. For the conditions of a determinate perceptual cognition are present in full. There is, *first*, the visual perception of the subject, *secondly*, there is the knowledge of the *probandum*, and, *thirdly*, there is the apprehension of the unity, viz., the subject as qualified by the *probandum*. And we are led to an absurd position that inference is impossible. It is, therefore, maintained that, in the situation where the conditions of non-natural perception and inference are alike present, and the object is the same identical fact, the conditions of non-natural perception are weaker than of those of inference, and the resultant cognition will be inference.

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[1] vide *Supra* page—62,

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[1] *Tṛtīyaliṅgaparāmarśa*—where the *probans* (*liṅga*) is brought in relation with the subject of inference (*pakṣa*) and the *probandum* (*sādhya*), i.e., the object that is inferred in respect of the subject. It is called *tṛtīyaliṅgaparāmarśa* because the *probans* or the ground of inference appears here in this mediation process for the third time, first of all appearing in the knowledge of the invariable relation where it is cognised as an invariable concomitant of the object to be inferred, and appearing for the second time in the knowledge of the relation of the *probans* to the subject (*pakṣadharmatājñāna*), and, lastly, for the third time in the relating of the knowledge of relation of the *probans* to the subject with the knowledge of the universal concomitance between the *probans* and the *probandum*, i.e., bringing these two cognitions together so as to bring out their logical bearing upon one another.

Notwithstanding the Nyāya defence, therefore, it seems a strange innovation to credit cognition with the capacity of linking up a sense with its object. It is the established tradition among the Naiyāyikas that there are six kinds of contact and cognition is not mentioned as one of them. Further, the distinction between natural and non-natural, normal and a-normal perceptions is arbitrary. Natural means what is usual, in the normal conditions of the world, which seem to be quite plain and ordinary. A perception is natural when it has its mooring in the normal conditions of the world. The perception of silver in a shell is nothing else than the natural and ordinary, for it is an experience of a fact here and now and is determined by the conditions of the world. The experience is too patent and too familiar to be dubbed as a queer and out-of-the-way occurrence. The victim of error is not led to believe that the perception or its content is not akin to veridical perception or its content. When the erroneous perception is contradicted, he becomes conscious of his error no doubt. But this consciousness of error does not induce the belief that the perception was of a different kind. Had he been so persuaded, he would not have run to yonder object for getting hold of it. Thus a little reflection shows that the classification of perception into the above two types seems to be unsupported by reason and common sense alike.

If it is assumed for argument's sake that cognition acts as the connecting link between the sense and the object, this does not improve the situation, and the problem of error remains as unexplained as before. Again the admission of the priority of the conditions of inference over those of non-natural perception is a gratuitous assumption to which experience gives the lie directly. Consider, for example, the case of an illusory experience of a post or a trunk of a tree mistaken for a man standing at a distance from the perceiver. Here the past cognition acts as the link between the sense and the object absent in the present context. It may be called a case of non-natural perception because the contact of the sense is other than the recognised types of contact. Here the conditions of non-natural perception and those of inference are alike present. First, there is the visual perception of the subject (*pakṣa*) ; secondly, there is the knowledge of the different characteristics of a human being, (i.e., *sādhana* or *hetu*) ; and thirdly, there is the awareness of the existence of these characteristics of a human being in the object lying ahead which may be called the mediating tertiary cognition bringing the previous two cognitions into a logical relation with each other. These are the conditions which are present in full in the situation, and it is needless to add that these conditions are the conditions of both inference and non-natural perception. Now, if the conditions of inference were more powerful than those of non-natural perception with regard to the same object, then the illusory cognition, viz. 'there stands a man', instead of being an instance of perception should pass for an inference. And we have strong reasons to think so, because the awareness of the existence of the human characteristic in the yonder object is nothing but the mediating tertiary cognition resulting in an erroneous inferential cognition. But if we consult the deliverance of experience we must reject this interpretation, and adjudge it to be perceptual. For no one believes that there is here an erroneous inference, and no perception. This discrepancy with experience is unavoidable because perception has been classified into natural and non-natural types.

The objection is, however, met by the assumption that the conditions of valid inference only are more powerful than the conditions of non-natural perception.

But, in the situation where the conditions of erroneous inferential cognition and the conditions of non-natural perception are alike present, the conditions of non-natural perception would have the priority over the conditions of inferential cognition. And thus the conditions of inference in the illusory experience of man in the inanimate post would, of course, be weaker than those of non-natural perception.

The defence, however, does not seem to be convincing. What again amounts to the complication of the issue is that there has been a greater divergenee of opinion among the exponents of the theory as to the nature of knowledge, perceptual or inferential, which arises after the state of perplexity as regards the definite character of the object, i.e., whether it is a man or a post. The view of Vardhamāna Upādhyāya is a case in point. The Upādhyāya thinks that cognition after doubt is always inferential. The analysis, as outlined above, reveals that a definite knowledge of the object in question is formed only if it is preceded by the awareness of some definite character, either of a man or of an inanimate post, in the yonder object. This consciousness of the presence of some distinguishing characteristics as the concomitant of one of the alternatives seems to be the mediating tertiary cognition necessary for resolving the doubt. And this tertiary cognition is the immediate antecedent of inference. Therefore, the knowledge achieved after the doubt as to the nature of a thing is bound to be inferential, because the conditions of inference are stronger than those of perception. But if we deny the priority to inference, the conditions of perception would prevail and the result would be an unending series of instrospective perceptions of the mental act (*anuvyavasāya*) because the conditions of perception will always overpower those of inference. Let us, for example, revert to the case of indecision as to the nature of the yonder object whether it is a man or a post. Here the conditions of inference resolving the doubt in favour of a post rather than a man may be present, i.e., some distinctive character, present in the post and absent in the man, may decide the issue. This internal experience, again, will be another perceived object having the force of a presentation, and this latter will maintain another internal perception. To obviate the predicament, Vardhamāna Upādhyāya asserts that the cognition of man occurring after a state of doubt and perplexity is inferential in character.[1]

The case of the fragrant sandalwood is also to be interpreted in the very same way. The contact between the organ of vision and the fragrance of the sandalwood has been established with the help of the past cognition of fragrance in the sandalwood. But Vardhamāna observes that this does not seem to be a case of perception. The alleged contact between the sense of sight and fragrance with the help of the past cognition of it is possible because we are already aware of the invariable concomitance between the sandalwood and fragrance. The knowledge of the invariable concomitance between sandalwood and fragrance has to be admitted as the condition of the cognition of fragrance, and it is this knowledge of the invariable concomitance between fragrance and sandalwood that is supposed to act as the link between the sight and the unperceived fragrance. The fragrance in this case is the inclusive or pervasive character of which the sandalwood is the pervaded or included feature. The sandalwood is visually perceived as a substance and this perception causes the knowledge of fragrance. The former can cause the latter because we know that there is a necessary concomitance between the two. And this generates the judgement, 'This is sandalwood, that possesses fragrance without fail', which is the mediating tertiary cognition. So the judgement 'I cognise the fragrant sandalwood' should be understood as an inferential one, because we see that the conditions of inference are more powerful than those of perception.

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[1] Vyāpyatvena tu bhāne parāmarśasadbhāvādanumitireva tatra jāyate, pratyakṣasāmagrītaḥ anumitisāmagryābalavatvāt. Anyathā parāmarśānaṇtaraṃ dhārāvāhikaṃ parāmarśāntaram eva syāt—*Nyāyavārtikatātparyapariśuddhiprakāśa* by V. Upādhyāya (Royal Asiatic Society edition—pages 115 to 116.)

Further, the view that in the context the judgement of the fragrant sandalwood is an instance of visual perception, is contrary to fact, because, if the percipient subject be asked as to the genesis of such a cognition, he or she may come forward with the reply that the yonder object is a piece of white sandalwood, and this is visually perceived and is, of course, possessed of fragrance. This is the situation and it seems to be a case of inference because the fragrance in question is not directly sensed.

Again, the non-perceptual character of the cognition of fragrance under consideration is proved by the fact that the content of such cognition is revealed in its generic features, and our thirst for the further knowledge of it is not quenched. And this seems to be another differentiating mark of a non-perceptual cognition from a perceptual one. It is invariably the case that the predicate of an inferential cognition is always revealed in its generic features, because the specific features of the *probandum*, which vary from individual to individual, are left out of account in the knowledge of the universal concomitance. And under the circumstances our desire for the further knowledge of the *probandum* in its specific features is not fully satisfied because it can be so satisfied only in a perception of the fragrance in question.[1]

Again, it cannot be maintained that non-natural perception is a class by itself, and not conditioned by the canons of natural perception, and under the circumstances it is no wonder that the nature of the content of the deliverance of the former becomes different from that of the latter. The content of the perceptual cognition is revealed in its specific character. And the case of non-natural perception, however different it may be from the cases of ordinary or natural perception, is perception *per se* and should not differ from the ordinary and natural type, in so far as their generic character is concerned. In short, to admit the difference of a non-natural perception from a natural one is to repudiate its perceptual character.

The judgement 'I see a fragrant sandalwood', is thus a cognition partaking of the characters both of perception and inference. The knowledge of the sandalwood is perceptual, and that of fragrance is inferential. The objection that two different kinds of cognition—perceptual and inferential—cannot exist together in a single cognition on the plea that two universals not related as higher and lower cannot subsist in one substratum is an unsound one. The Naiyāyika condemns the theory that two kinds of cognition, perception and inference, cannot envisage the same substrate and yet in the same breath he does not think it inconsistent to uphold the compresence of naturalness (*laukikatva*) and non-naturalness (*alaukikatva*) in one identical cognition.

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[1] Śrīharṣa, the author of the *Khanḍanakhanḍakhāya*, means by the perception of a thing as that type of cognition which causes the complete cessation of our desire for the further knowledge of it. 'Yena pramite sati, na pramitsā punarbhavati, tajjñānaṃ sāksātkāraiti' —The *Khanḍanakhanḍakhādya*—edited by M. M. Lakṣmaṇa Śāstrī (Chowkhamba edition)—page 586.

Further, the admission of cognition as the connecting link between the sense of sight and the absent silver fails to explain the essential character of an erroneous presentation of illusion of sense. It has been shown that non-natural perception is essentially an inference, and the context revealed in it is, of course, a blurred content. Had the cognition 'this is silver' been generated by the conditions, the same as those of visual cognition of 'fragrant sandalwood', then the content of the illusory cognition should have been revealed to us only in its generic features. But on the contrary the silver which is revealed in illusory cognition is revealed in all its aspects. The same cause cannot produce divergent effects.

To conclude, the content of illusory perception cannot be instituted by the memory-trace of it, perceived in the past. In one word, cognition cannot be made to serve as the link between the sense and the object. It fails to meet the requirements of perceptual cognition, and seems to be a counsel of despair.

DEFECT *QUĀ* MEDIUM

The perceptual character of the illusory perception cannot be accounted for by the cognition *quā* relation. The idea is riddled with contradictions and goes against the verdict of experience. But the perceptual character of illusory perception is a fact and has to be satisfactorily explained. And the Naiyāyika in order to do it falls upon a fresh hypothesis of defect. Defect as one of the conditions of erroneous perception is a truism and established by the joint method of agreement and difference. Whenever there is defect in the set of conditions there is a false cognition, and whenever it is absent, the result is a true cognition. So the efficacy of defect as the cause of false cognition is beyond doubt. And the Naiyāyika, being quite unable to establish a contact between the sense and the absent and distant object, credits defect with a new capacity of connection. Defect, then, has a twofold function to render, one as the condition of a wrong cognition, and the other as the connecting link between the sense and the distant object. It may seem strange to many that defect can serve as the link between the sense of vision and the remote object. The hypothesis of defect *quā* link is an innovation, and this is not noticed in any other situation. And this being so the hypothesis may appear to be queer. But despite its oddity and strangeness, the supposition has been made, because other explanations are not conceivable and the contact cannot be otherwise explained.[1] The contact is a fact and the existence of the object of illusion in a different space-time background is also a fact. And the Naiyāyika has no other alternative but to trot out this hypothesis of defect *quā* connection. This defect, as is evident, falls outside the recognised three types of non-natural or a-normal contacts[1], and is not regarded as a case of it, and the cognition generated by defect should not, of course, be branded a non-natural or an a-normal one.

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[1] Anyathānupapattiścet asti vastuparasādhikā
Pinaṣṭi dṛṣṭa-vaimatyaṃ saiva sarvabalādhikā—The *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*—page 123.
'when other explanations are out of the question, the fact that it cannot be otherwise explained makes inevitable the admission of the only available condition as the cause of it.'

N.B. It may be noted that Śriharsa's principle that when by the process of elimination only one condition is left for explaining a phenomenon that must be taken as the true explanation thereof, is open to the following objections. In the first place, it takes for granted that all the conditions likely to determine the phenomena have been duly noted or observed, and in the second place, that the explanation of the phenomenon must lie in one or other in the conditions observed. But none of these assumptions will bear strict examination. It is a truism that no human observation is ever thorough-going, complete and exhaustive, and that in spite of the best efforts some of the relevant facts may escape notice altogether. In the last place, it is also quite clear that because some conditions have not been observed by us, therefore they cannot have anything to do with the phenomenon under investigation, is a supposition without logical justification.

Before entering into the logical side of the problem we hope to be excused if we make a digression and give here in brief outline a general account of defect. Viśvanātha in his *Bhāṣāpariccheda* has stated that the presence of defect in the conditions of perception makes the perceptual cognition invalid, and the number of these defects is legion[2]. It is also a fact that what is defect in one may be rather a point of excellence in another. Distance, for example, is a defect in the case of an illusion of the trunk of a tree as a human being, while it is an advantage in the case of the perception of white flakes of snow in a winter morning. Here distance is conducive to the true perception, and proximity induces a blurred view. There are some defects appertaining to the cognising subject, some belong to the object, and some to the medium or means of knowledgc. Further, there are some defects which belong to the objective situation, i.e., the location of the viewing subject. It is a matter of common experience that while travelling by a train, the surrounding situation seems to be in motion. Here the motion belongs to the place occupied by the viewing subject. Similarly, a disturbance in the constituent humours in the human organism is found to occasion the illusory perception of a column of fire. This is the analysis of defect as made out by Dharmakirtī in the first chapter of his *Nyāyabindu.* The question now arises whether defect occupying these four distinct places generates an invalid cognition or not. Dharmakirtī's cryptic statement does not give any definite answer. It is only Dharmottara who while commenting upon it asserts that defects occupying these four distinct places cannot by themselves generate an invalid cognition. In so far as defects cripple or maim the sense concerned and thereby alter its normal reactions do they have any effective part in the causation of an illusory experience. This analysis of Dharmottara seems to be a *rechauffe* of the views of Śabarasvāmin, the commentator of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*. The celebrated commentator does not dilate upon the four distinct places of defect. He makes an economy of the situation and holds that defects without interfering with the sense in action cannot cause wrong cognition.[1] He thinks, again, that in erroneous cognitions in general immediate or mediate defects injure only the instrumental cause. In the case of immediate perceptual error the defect affects the sense in action, and in the case of the mediate erroneous cognition, the instrumental cause, whatever that may be according to the nature of cognition, is vitiated by defect. It seems evident that both Śabarasvāmin and Dharmottara are in agreement that a defective instrumental cause alone occasions a wrong judgement, perceptual or inferential. It is due neither to the cognising subject nor to the cognised object. And this defect besides its accredited capacity of generating invalid cognition has been held by the Naiyāyika to institute a link between the sense in action and the absent object.

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[1] For three types of non-natural contacts vide Swāmi Satyānanda's *the World Philosophy*, pages 30-31
Dr S. C. Chatterjee's '*The Nyāya theory of Knowledge*', pages 228-249

[2] Doṣo' pramāyā janakaḥ pramāyāstu guṇo bhavet
Pittadūratvādidoṣo nānāvidhamathaḥ—*Bhāṣāpariccheda*
kārikā—131.

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[1] Yasya ca duṣṭaṃ karaṇaṃ yatra ca mithyeti pratyayaḥ, sa eva asamīcinapratyayo nānyaiti—*Śabarabhāṣya—Bṛhati*—page 51.

But the position is liable to a grave objection. The Naiyāyika, as is well known, is an advocate of the theory of extrinsic invalidity and extrinsic validity. The theory means that the validity or invalidity of a cognition with respect to its genesis as well as its realisation in consciousness as valid or invalid depends upon factors external to the set of conditions necessary to beget it as cognition as such. In other words, according to the Naiyāyika, what makes a cognition what it is does not make it a valid or invalid cognition. Nor are the conditions which make a cognition what it is the conditions which make it recognised in consciousness as a valid or invalid cognition. It means that the conditions of a cognition are not those of its invalidity or validity. Invalidity or its opposite is caused by an aberration or an excellence respectively, introduced *ab extra*. One of the intrinsic conditions of perceptual cognition in general is the contact between the sense and the object. In the case of an invalid cognition defect institutes a link between the sense and the elsewhere object. Thus defect becomes an intrinsic condition in the case of an invalid cognition, and this again, as is known, is responsible for the invalidity of a wrong cognition. So what is regarded as a causal condition of cognition is also regarded as a condition of its falsity. The invalidity of a wrong cognition is thus intrinsically determined, which means a departure from one of the established conclusions of Nyāya philosophy.

It may be maintained in reply that defect has been admitted to be the connecting link between the object and the sense in the case of perceptual error, but it is not suggested thereby that defect *quā* contact is responsible for the invalidity of the cognition. Defect has two characters—first, it is the connecting link between the sense and the absent object in illusion and, secondly, it is the cause of invalidity. And these two characters must not be confounded in spite of the numerical identity of their substratum. They are functionally two distinct characters, though they belong to numerically one self-identical entity. It is to be noted that it is not an unusual phenomenon that a self-identical entity possesses two contrary characters. A man of medium height, for example, may appear short by the side of a very tall man, and the same man may appear tall by the side of a man of very small height. Here the contrary characters, tallness and shortness, appear to belong to the same person, the man of medium size. The self is held by the Naiyāyika to be the constitutive or material cause of psychical events such as happiness, cognition, etc. But it is also the efficient cause of the same, being the substratum of moral forces of previous deeds which are asserted to be the universal condition of all occurrences, physical or non-physical alike. The self is thus the *causa efficiens* of the psychical events, though it is also their *causa materialis* at the same time. But the two characters are numerically and functionally different in spite of the numerical identity of the substratum. Exactly analogous is the case under consideration. Defect in its functional role as connecting link and as generative of invalidity exercises two different capacities. And they are not incompatible with the numerical identity of their substratum. So the charge of intrinsic invalidity must be dismissed as unfounded.

It has been shown that the erroneous cognition is always generated by some defect in the conditions of cognition, and it has also been made clear that defect occupying different positions ultimately affects the instrumental cause of such cognition. The wrong judgement of perception is therefore a resultant effect of the presence of defect in sense, the instrumental cause of all perceptual cognitions in general, veridical and non-veridical. Every wrong judgement has three constituents, the subject presented as *this*, the predicate, and a relation between the subject and the predicate. And a question may be asked which of these three is due to defect. The knowledge of the subject is veridical; the knowledge of the predicate is also veridical, since it is *ex hypothesi* a real datum; the relation between the subject and the predicate cannot be said to be unreal in the sense of an impossible fiction, and hence the knowledge of it, it is to be admitted, has not been occasioned by the presence of defect in the conditions of cognition. Thus it is clear that none of these three factors of the illusory judgement can be affirmed to derive their genesis from defect. So can it be asserted that defect is responsible for the emergence of an erroneous cognition?

The question is, however, due to a misunderstanding of the problem and of the Nyāya account of error as already suggested. Error, as it has been repeatedly observed, consists neither in the knowledge of the logical subject nor of the predicate. The knowledge of the relation also is a real relation, for it exists between the predicate and its character. Error means only the factual non-coincidence of the two contents, the nature of the subject and the predicate. And this fact of non-coincidence felt otherwise is due to the presence of defect in the conditions of cognition.[1]

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[1] We may point out here that in spite of all that the Naiyāyika

It may still be argued that the illusory cognition is one single cognition and it is nothing but the consequence of the factual non-coincidence of the two characters. If the non-coincidence of the two elements felt as coincidence be due to the influence of defect and the erroneous judgement be the result of this non-coincidence, then how can the component factors be singled out and set down as authentic ? The judgement is a synthetic combination of the subject and the predicate, and if these two factors together with the relation be authentic data, it becomes a puzzle how the judgement can be wrong. How can the result be wrong if the constitutive factors be one and all authentic and veridical ?

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says about nothing unreal being apprehended in illusion analysis shows that there is an element of unreality in the content of an illusory experience. Take the stock example of an illusion as a case in point, e.g., this is silver. Here, according to Nyāya, there are three elements, the subject (*viśeṣyata*), the predicate (*prakāratā*) and the relation between the subject and the predicate. The *this* is the presented subject of Illusion, and it is presented in the form of silver which was an object of experience of true silver, perceived elsewhere and at a different time. The silverness of this elsewhere silver belongs to the silver of a different time and place. It therefore has no actual relation to the presented *this*, here and now. The silverness thus is perceived as a character of the *this*, i.e., in relation to the *this* (*saṃsargatā*) even though there is no actual relation between the *this* and the form of silver. Therefore, a relation which does not exist (*asat*) is perceived between the *this* and the form of silver. It is thus a case of *asatkhyāti* or the cognition of the not-real. But since the pure *asat* or utterly unreal cannot fill experience and be its content, it cannot be called also unreal. Thus it is neither real nor unreal (*sadasadbhyāmanirvācya*). It is an indescribable appearance of the Śaṃkarite. The relation between silverness and silver may be real elsewhere at a different time and place, but it is certainly not real in the locus of the *this*. Thus the Nyāya view critically considered will be replaced by Śaṃkarite conception of *anirvacanīyakhyāti*.

The Naiyāyika may submit in reply that in the wrong cognition, although the knowledge of the different parts is authentic, yet the knowledge of the relatedness where there is unrelatedness is wrong. Thus in the erroneous cognition the wrongness or invalidity consists only in the apprehension of a pseudo-relation between the subject and the predicate. The subject, the predicate and the relation taken by themselves *in abstracto* are all veridical no doubt, but the compresence of these elements is not true of a real situation.

Again, the admission of defect as the cause of the apprehension of a pseudo-identity between the subject and the predicate does not mean that it becomes *functus officio* as a connecting link. It does its function as such and explains the perceptual character of the illusion quite creditably. It has mysterious and diverse powers. And the capacity of linking up a distant predicate or causing the apprehension of a false identity between the subject and the predicate does not exhaust the entire range of its possibilities. It should not be supposed that it has no other function to render and no other quality to possess. It has immense possibilities of which only two are revealed to us in error—one as its linking capacity and the other the apprehension of an illusory identity. And the two characters, although they belong to defect, should not be confused as numerically identical.

But it may be objected that the alleged possibilities and mysterious power of defect have a telling effect, which makes the man affected with it unusually powerful. He will be in a position to take cognisance of diverse objects, near and far, known and unknown.

The objection is, however, the result of supression of certain facts necessary for the emergence of an illusory perception. Defect is but one of the many conditions among which the traces of past experience, resemblance between the absent predicate and the present subject, and also the attachment or passion for the predicate may be mentioned. Thus there are so many conditions besides defect, and these when put together result in an illusion. And it is needless to assert again that a defective sense-organ alone cannot cause an illusory cognition.

But the above position may be liable to an attack from a different angle. It may be urged that the percipient subject has in the mind various impressions of various experiences, and the presented *this* resembles many things besides the superimposed predicate, and the percipient has passion for an indefinite number of objects. Why, then, is it that, despite all these, only one particular predicate is projected upon the presented subject ? In the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl, for example, the mother-of-pearl in question resembles so many things besides silver, and the perceiving subject has in his mind an indefinite number of traces of past experiences, and also an attachment for a good number of things of the world. So, in spite of all these, the silver is apprehended in the substratum of the mother-of-pearl, which does not appear, as anything else, say a piece of lead or corrugated sheet.

The objection, however, like the previous one is also based upon wrong appraisal. The illusory experience of a thing may not take place even though all the accessory causes are present in the situation. There is no necessity that when the cause is present, the effect must follow, because there may be counteracting agents at work of which one may have no knowledge. On the contrary, the rule should be propounded that when there is an effect there must be a cause. In other words, the causal inference is justified only when it is used from an effect to its cause, and not from a cause to its effect. And this has been specially emphasised by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in his gloss on the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.[1]

Defect is thus supposed to link up the distant silver and the sense. But the position is not intelligible because there seems to be no physical or intelligible link between such object and sense-organ. The case of veridical cognition presents no problem, because the sense finds no difficulty in intuiting its object, as it lies within its usual range. The contact here is one of the recognised six types of natural contact. But the case of wrong cognition does present a problem, for the superimposed element is bodily far beyond the reach of one's normal sense. So there cannot be any possible relation between the defect residing in a sense, and such a distant object.

The Naiyāyika maintains that there is some relation between the defect residing in the sense and the distant object. But this relation is different from the six types of natural relations between sense and object. As relation, however, it is not a *tertium quid* besides the relata. It has no status besides the terms and this relation is nothing but their specific nature which may be characterised as terms *qua* relations (*svarūpasambandha*). In most of the cases where the terms stand related, the relation which holds between them is something besides the relata. In the case of a book on the table, the book is related to the table, and this relation is one of conjunction. This relation of conjunction is something wholly different from the table and the book. Here the relation is a quality, and the relata are the substances. Consider, again, the example of a coloured pot. The colour is inherent in the pot, and the relation between the two is one of inherence. In this case, one of the relata is a substance and the other is a quality, and the relation is something different from both. In these two cases, relation is different from the relata. But if relation be something over and above the relata, the terms will never be related, for the relation is nothing but another term. And we must relate this new term to both of the original terms with the help of another relation. This relation again is nothing but another term, and this necessitates another relation to relate this new term to other terms, and this process will go on without end. And this is what Udayana means when he says that if relation be understood as a *tertium quid* this infinite regress is the inevitable result.[1] And the only escape from this impasse is to deny the independent status of terms outside their peculiar situation. It is to be remarked *en passant* that the terms *quā* relation are always a relation between two differents, and this difference between the two is always there ; it is never obliterated. And the cancellation of the view of relation as a sort of *tertium quid* besides the terms related does not mean that the terms become absolutely identical in all respects. Further, the relation always generates a determinate perceptual cognition, which means the existence of more than one thing, the determined subject and the determining predicate. And it will be a mistake to think that the cancellation of the idea of a relation as something different from the terms will result always in a relation of identity.

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[1] Sati cārope nimittānusaraṇaṃ, na tu nimittaṃ asti iti āropaḥ—*Ātmatattvaviveka* (Royal Asiatic Society edn) page 591

The terms *quā* relation, then, in the last analysis are found to mean that the terms stand related simply because of their specific nature as exhibited in a peculiar situation.

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[1] Prāptyantare tu anavasthānāt—The *Kusumāñjali* ; vide Dr S. Mookerjee—*The Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism* Chapter on Relation—pages 195-233,

But the point is that everything has a specific nature and if terms become related by their respective specific nature, then anything can be said to be related to everything. The Himalayas may stand related to the Alps, because each has its own specific nature, and there can very well be a single determinate cognition having for its determined and determinant the Himalayas and the Alps respectively.

The Naiyāyika may submit in reply that the reduction of all the relations ultimately to the specific nature of the terms does not mean that anything can be related to everything. Relation between two things will be supposed only when they are actually found to go together. Consider, for example, the case of a man who stands in the Cape Comorin and the Himalayas in the furthest point north. The two terms, the man and the Himalayas, are possessed of specifie features, but nobody can say that there is a relation between the two. The reason is that the two are not given together. And the alleged objection that the Himalayas may be related to the Alps may likewise be disposed of as a gratuitous assumption.

But in spite of this defence of the Naiyāyika, the terms *quā* relation cannot be accepted so easily, for the view is open to another objection of a more serious type. The objection is that an object that is past and gone out of existence may appear as actually present in a dream, and such an object, being devoid of any kind of existence, cannot pretend to self-individuality. The illusory experience is ultimately made possible by the terms which are possessed of existence and self-individuality. And the default of a recognisable relation does not make them unrelated. Even if the hypothesis that terms do function as relation be conceded, the fact remains that the terms must be real terms, i.e., in real existence. This is not possible between terms either of which is unreal, and thus devoid of individual existence in space and time. The utmost that one can claim is that relation is reducible to the self-individuality of the terms. But this claim breaks down if one or both of the terms happen to be unreal fictions denuded of self-individuality, which is the case under review.

This objection, however, misses certain essential points. The terms of a relation need not be present living facts, possessed of causal efficiency. The lack of causal efficiency does not make them incompetent to be terms of a relation. For example, past objects are remembered, and there may be other mediate knowledge of such objects. And doubtless there is some relation between the object experienced in the past and the present knowledge. This relation is nothing but the specific nature of the terms themselves. And when the relation between the cognition and the object as experienced in the past is acknowledged, there cannot be any possible objection to the supposed relation between defect and the past object, even though the latter is not a physically present reality.

But this Nyāya defence seems to be self-contradictory, for the past object on Naiyāyika's own admission is a non-existent fact. It has no physical status in the space-time continuum, and is as good as a fiction. Those who believe in the conservation of matter and energy may claim some sort of reality for past data, and a ralation between them may not seem to be implausible. But such a position cannot be sponsored by an advocate of the opposite theory such as the Naiyāyika, who thinks that a past object is past and gone out of existence altogether, and is an utter non-entity.

But the Naiyāyika considers the objection as fantastic. The past objects, however unreal they may be, are after all historical facts, and our frequent references to them bear out their actuality at some date. There is some difference between a fictitious non-entity which is never real at any time, and an entity which, as past and gone, is no longer an existent fact, but which did exist at some date in the past. And in these latter cases obviously they become the objects of our cognition, and stand somehow related to the mind. It is evident, therefore, that they have a significance and individuality which fictions do not possess. And a relation between sense and such objects may not, therefore, seem absurd.

STATUS OF THE ILLUSORY OBJECT

Two more points have to be considered to make our treatment of Nyāya view complete, viz., what according to the Naiyāyika is the status of the illusory object, and, what constitutes the illusoriness of an illusion. We may say the first question is the ontological question of the status of a rejected object and the second is the logical question as regards the mark or marks that distinguish an illusion from perception of truth and reality. We may borrow the language of the late Professor K. C. Bhattacharyya and say that the latter question is the question of correction as a logical process, while our first question is a question of metaphysics as regards the ontological status of a false appearance.

With regard to the metaphysical question, we shall go into Vācaspati Miśra's account of the Nyāya view of illusion as set forth in the *Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā* and the *Nyāyakaṇikā*. Vācaspati upholds the traditional account that the Naiyāyika considers illusion to be a subjective unification of real elements. Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, however, holds that Vācaspati has thought out quite a different explanation of the problem. Our view is that Vardhamāna Upādhyāya has misinterpreted Vācaspati

Miśra in this respect. Vācaspati is a realist *par excellence* when he interprets the Nyāya position, and has not deviated in our view from the traditional account, though Vardhamāna thinks otherwise.

The Nyāya, as we have already seen, explains illusion as a case of wrong reference, i.e., as a reference of an object to a place which refuses to accept it as a matter of fact. This does not mean that the illusory object is unreal. The object of an illusory experience is real *per se* and is intuited as such though wrongly referred to a locus to which it does not belong. An absolute naught, a pure fiction of the imagination which nowhere and never is real, is never the object of any experience, according to the Naiyāyika. In the illusion of a mother-of-pearl as silver, the mother-of-pearl is perceived in its generic feature, and the silver is apprehended with its elsewhere elsewhen location missed, and silver as so apprehended is projected upon the mother-of-pearl. The mother-of-pearl is real, and the silver is equally real, and the relation of silverness to silver is also a real relation, and these, each of which is real, are the constituents of our illusory experience. It is the contention of the Nyāya school and also of Vācaspati in so far as he plays the role of an authentic exponent of the Nyāya view that in the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl a real silver is apprehended.

It may be remarked that the admission of the possibility of error and the admission of the appearance of a real object in illusion in the same breath seem to be contradictory. If it be granted that the object of an illusory experience is real, then error and illusion should be regarded as figments of the imagination. One who does not hesitate to advocate the appearance of a real object in illusion should in consistency deny illusion as an objective fact, as the Prābhākara, for example, does. The Naiyāyika, therefore, may be said to be inconsistent in accepting the facthood of error while denying the appearance of an unreal object in illusion. The appearance of a real object in illusion seems thus to be the Achilles's heel of the Nyāya view of error as an objective fact.

The objection that the Naiyāyika is inconsistent in maintaining the objectivity of illusion and the reality of the illusory object at the same time rests, however, on a misconception of the Nyāya view. The Naiyāyika as a realist has formulated his theory of error in truly realistic terms. In the illusory judgement 'this is silver' there are, according to the Naiyāyika, three parts, the *this*, the silver, and a relation of silverness to the *this*. All such in these three things are real, and they are apprehended as such in the situation. Yet, the perception is not veridical, because the predicate is wrongly referred to a subject to which it does not belong. The cognition is erroneous, not because it is an apprehension of an unreal object, but because of this fact of wrong reference resulting in an apparent coincidence of the non-coincident predicate with the subject, the silver with the *this*. This is also in conformity with the philosophy of the school 'whatever is known is amenable to proof'. The two are essentially connected, the former being the pervaded, the latter the pervading. The existence of the former (e.g., smoke) necessarily entails the existence of the latter (e.g., fire). In the situation under consideration, the mother-of-pearl in the form of *this*, the silver and the relation between silverness and silver are all known facts and hence they are logically determinable as existent and real.[1] The relation

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[1] Saptānāmapi sādharmyaṃ jñeyatvādikaṁ ucyate

While commenting upon it Viśvanātha has remarked than of silverness is known in the situation, and it should be shown that it also is logically determinable, and it becomes obvious when one comes across real silver. And in the illusion of a mother-of-pearl as silver, this relation of silverness has been supposed to be a real relation. The logician thus declares that even in illusion one always intuits a real content.

It may not be out of place to note a point of controversy. It seems a paradox that the Naiyāyika asserts that the object of error, i.e., the false predicate in the judgement is also an object of valid cognition. This would apparently abolish the distinction between error and truth, the false and the veridical. But the paradox is only apparent. Had the Naiyāyika believed the object of error to be also the object of a veridical judgement at one and the same time, he would have to acquiesce in the absurdity that error is also truth or deny the possibility of error, as Prabhākara does with plausibility. But the Naiyāyika believes in the distinction between error and truth, and so his thesis that all that is knowable is also attestable by valid cognition should be interpreted as follows. The predicate of an erroneous judgement, though unreal in the sense that it does not belong to the subject, is real *per se*. But what is the proof of the reality of the predicate even in another context ? Nothing can be accepted as an object of valid knowledge unless it is supported by valid evidence.[1] But the Naiyāyika is committed to the metaphysical reality even of the false predicate. Certainly when a man

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jñeyatva *means* jñānaviṣayatā. Sā ca sarvatraivāsti, evam abhideyatva-prameyatvādi bodhyam—The *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali*, kārikā-13

[1] Prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇād hi. *The Sāṁkhyakārikā*

erroneously perceives silver in the mother-of-pearl, he cannot be said to have valid cognition of silver. One can admit this extreme position only by abrogating error or the distinction between error and truth. In order to substantiate his claim for the metaphysical reality of the silver predicate, the Naiyāyika is under an obligation to adduce proof. But the erroneous perception cannot be the proof of it. What is, then, the other possible alternative ? In answer to this question, the Naiyāyika must maintain that it is proved by another veridical cognition, which is the case with true silver as known in another context by valid cognition. In the case of a supersensuous entity, it must be known to God's intuition. But we are not concerned with supersensuous facts, which cannot be the object of misperception. In error the predicate is always a fact which has been perceived before. The initial perception must be a valid cognition, otherwise an unending series of erroneous perceptions has to be posited, as the Advaitin does. The Naiyāyika realist cannot escape from his commitment that all that is known does exist and all that exists can be asserted to be real only on the basis of our knowledge of it ; and this knowledge must be valid at the same stage. Even error is conditioned by valid cognition. It is the validly cognised elsewhere silver which appears as a predicate in the erroneous cognition 'this is silver'. In other words, though the erroneous cognition cannot be the proof of the reality of silver, the latter is proved by some other valid cognition. If the truth of this contention be not accepted, the reality of silver must remain a moot question.

But it is an adage handed down from generation to generation that the logician advocates the appearance of an unreal content in illusory experience. It has also gained support in some modern writings on Indian philosophy.[1] Vardhamāna Upādhyāya while elucidating the views of Vācaspati has mentioned[2] that the latter thinks that an unreal relation can appear being attached to two reals, but never can it do so by itself.[3] What Vācaspati means, according to Vardhamāna, is that an unreality alone or by itself cannot appear in a tangible form, but an unreality, when appended to two reals, can very well appear. In the illusory judgement, the subject as a presented datum in the form of the *this* is real, the predicate is real, and the relation between the two, although unreal in the situation, appears in illusion in a tangible guise. This is the situation and Vācaspati seems to have caught this point and has been supposed to have sponsored this view. In other words, Vardhamāna's contention is that the subject of the illusory judgement, i.e., mother-of-pearl, is a real object, and the silver as which the mother-of-pearl is perceived, i.e., the predicate, is also real (elsewhere). The relation between the mother-of-pearl and silver, however, is non-existent in fact in the situation in question. The illusory judgement thus apprehends a non-existent relation between two existent objects. It is, therefore, according to Vardhamāna, a case of an apprehension of the non-existent or what is not. Vardhamāna, however, misses the main point of the Nyāya position, which also clearly appears in Vācaspati's account of it. The relation between silver and the mother-of-pearl, which is held to be non-existent in the situation, is the relation between silver as an adjective to silver as a substantive, i.e., between silverness and silver. This relation though non-existent between silverness and mother-of-pearl in this particular case is existent between silverness and silver that exists elsewhere. Therefore, it is not the apprehension of an absolutely non-existent relation, but of a relation which is non-existent here but real elsewhere.

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[1] Na ca tārkikairapi asataḥ saṃsargasya bhānāṅgikāreṇa teṣāmapi evamapi āpādyeta itivācyaṃ, tathāṅgikāre teṣām api tathaiva (*Advaitasiddhi*—Nirnayasagar Press edn—page 645)

[2] *Nyāyapariśuddhiprakāśa.*

[3] Saduparāgeṇa asatsaṃsargasya bhāṇam.

Vardhamāna himself thinks that an absolute or pure unreality (*akhaṇḍa asat*) cannot appear in a visible form. What does he mean by this ? What is meant by an absolute naught ? Sky-flower, barren mother, and hare's horn are the conventional examples of absolute unreality. They are either logical contradictions or factual impossibilities. They are never the objects of one's cognitions. Because they are physical or logical contradictions they cannot claim to have any spatio-temporal existence, and consequently intuition of them by means of any sense-organ becomes impossible. Thus, perceptual knowledge of them being ruled out, inferential knowledge about them is also not passible, because such cognitions take place only on the basis of our ultimate intuitional cognition of the universal relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*. The relation between the *probans* and the *probandum* is ascertained by observation of instances of agreement in presence and observation of instances of agreement in absence together with non-observation of the contrary (instances). Such observation here being ruled out, the ascertainment of the invariable relation between the *probans* and the *probandum* is also ruled out. Such relation being incapable of ascertainment, inference of the fictitious and the impossible cannot however be said to be possible.

Again, an absolute naught being devoid of any physical existence cannot refer to anything in the world. It cannot denote anything positive. It is an unmeaning abracadabra. The fact that we understand by hare's horn something different from a barren mother is due to a wrong reference of horns to a hare and motherhood to a barren woman. The facts as integral wholes are nowhere in reality. Further, the position that the phrases 'hare's horn', and 'barren mother', when they are uttered, give rise to the cognition of a definite connotation with a fixed denotation is unintelligible. Because if words are admitted to have any such natural causal efficacy then the people in distant land and climes and using different media of expression will have no dfficulty in understanding one another. Thus in any case they cannot claim to have any reference to reality and to denote anything definite and positive. The phrases thus stand for absurd amalgams of two reals. The two reals, the hare and the horn, which occupy two different places, are made to appear in one substratum by a *tour de force* of imagination. Such being the case, let us try to understand the meaning of Vardhamāna's contention that a pure unreality cannot appear except when it is appended to two reals. Pure unreality cannot be posited either in thought or in fact, and consequently the apprehension of it or appearance of it becomes *a fortiori* an absurd proposition.

Vācaspati maintains[1] that a pure unreality cannot be said to have either existence or non-existence. In other words, the judgement affirming or negating its existence is a nonsensical assertion. If it is maintained that an unreal relation is apprehended in illusion, then it is also to be maintained that the subsequent correction should negative the very same fact. For it is admitted by all that what appears in illusion is corrected by the subsequent negative judgement. But the correction that follows negatives a relation that is also real. In the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl, silver appears as real, and the subsequent correction simply denies it, i.e., it simply says that the relation between silverness and silver which is attributed to the locus, i.e., the mother-of-pearl here, is real elsewhere, but not so in the situation under review. In other words, the negative judgement 'there is no silver' has for its negatum (*pratiyogi*) 'the silver'. This is what is done in and by a negative judgement. In the present case, both the affirmative and the negative judgements should have for their contents the same thing, the real relation of silverness. There cannot be any difference in their respective contents. If a difference be admitted in their contents, then the subsequent negative judgement in the situation loses all significance and meaning as correction. Vardhamāna thinks that Vācaspati has maintained that an unreal relation appears or is affirmed to exist in error, while a real relation is denied by the subsequent process of correction. This is, however, very unfair to Vācaspati. To represent Vācaspati as saying that in the illusion there appears unreality, whereas in the corrective judgement taking place later after the valid perception of the substratum a real relation is negatived, is to ascribe to Vācaspati something which he never says. We are familiar with the common saying 'give a dog a bad name and then hang it'. Vardhamāna seems to be following this common maxim in his critique of the Vācaspati's account of the Nyāya theory. So Vācaspati evidently cannot be said to have maintained the appearance of an unreal object in illusion either as a relatum or as a relation.

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[1] *Tātparyaṭīkā*, Metropolitan Edn, p. 75.

Vācaspati again has made the problem clear when he compares his position with that of the Advaitin. The Advaitin thinks that the content of an illusory experience is indescribable. The content of an illusion appears as real and is so, so long as this illusory experience lasts, and transpires to be unreal when it is corrected. This reality and unreality regarding the very same thing puzzle the Advaitin, who ultimately brands it as indescribable or incomprehensible by logic. Vācaspati as a Naiyāyika shows his disagreement with the Advaitin when he says that there are two distinctive judgements which are referred to in the situation, first, the illusory judgement and, secondly, the corrective judgement. In the illusory judgement the object is apprehended as existent in the context, and in the corrective judgement this existential character of the object is negatived in respect of that content. That is to say, the content was not denied to be unreal though its reality in the particular context was denied. Thus the determination of the status of the object in the two judgements is not made impossible.[1] It is existent in one place and non-existent in another. So it is determinable and comprehensible as real, though its existence in the specific spatio-temporal context be not factual. And this fact is clearly different from that of an absurd fiction like a hare's horn, etc., for the former is directly perceived as existent or real in one place and known as not so in another, whereas the latter cannot be said to be either existent or non-existent.[2]

Further, Vācaspati has expressed his view almost in unequivocal terms. While introducing the problem of error, he anticipates the objection that if a mother-of-pearl appears as silver in illusion then it is to be admitted that the mother-of-pearl as silver is unreal and it follows *a fortiori* that the object of an illusory experience is always unreal. To this Vācaspati answers that in this interpretation he has no difference with the adversary and will not quarrel with him.[1] In illusion one real thing appears as identical with another real thing. A thing may be real *per se*, but viewed as another, occupying a different spatio-temporal context, it cannot be regarded as real. Were it possible, then it would pass for a correct perception, and consequently the experience would not have been characterised as one of wrong reference. The problem of error is a case of wrong reference, because one thing appears in the guise of another, and one real thing is wrongly referred to another real thing.[2]

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[1] Na ca rajatātmanā purovartino dravyasya anirvacanīyatā, mithyājñāna-samayena sattvena, bādhakasamaye ca asattvena nirvacanīyatvāt—The *Tātparyaṭīkā* (Metropolitan Edn)—page 75.

[2] evambhūtasya asataḥ prathā nopapadyate, tasya sadasadbhyām upākheyatvāt—*op. cit.* page 73.

In another place[3] Vācaspati has argued that the relation which appears in illusion is real elsewhere. In the illusion of mother-of-pearl as silver, silver is real elsewhere, and this elsewhere existent and elsewhen perceived silver, due to certain defects either in the cogniser or in the physical medium, is wrongly referred to a place where it stands cancelled. Thus silver, though not existent in the situation under consideration, is *per se*. not an absolutely non-existent fiction. Further, in illusory cognitions the *that* and the *what* are apprehended as one identity, i.e., the subject and the predicate appear as related. And this apprehension of relatedness where there is absolute unrelatedness leads to the perception of one thing as another. This relation is non-existent in the context, but it exists elsewhere between real silver and silverness.[1] In other words, silver is a real predicate of a substratum. Thus the subject of an erroneous perception is real, the predicate is real *per se*, and the relation also cannot be said to be unreal in the sense of an impossible fiction. Still it is not a veridical perception, for the nature of the subject and the predicated attribute do not coincide in the same locus. Thus the falsity of the cognition is determined by the non-coincidence of the two, the nature of the subject and the predicate in the same place in erroneous perception, and never by the ontological status of the objects. And the correctness and authenticity of cognition is determined by and depends on the coincidence of the two, the *that* and the *what*, the nature of the subject and the predicate, in the same substratum.

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[1] Tatra anujñayā vartāmahe—*op. cit.*, page 583,

[2] Na khalu anyathākhyātivādinopi sadantaraṃ sadantarātmanā sadabhyupagacchanti, tathā sati anyathā ityeva na syāt

(*op. cit.*, page 583)

[3] *Nyāyakaṇikā*—Vācaspati Miśra (a commentary on the *Vidhiviveka* of Maṇḍana Miśra),

From the above discussion it appears that Vācaspati never means that in error we apprehend an unreal relation. On the contrary, a real relation is apprehended and that an error is the cognition of one real as another. And this is also the opinion of all the logicians, old as well as new.

CORRECTION AS A LOGICAL PROCESS

With regard to the logical question as to how and by what mark or marks an illusion is to be distinguished from a veridical experience it may not be out of place to begin our enquiry with an account of the controversy that raged round this question between the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, on one side, and the Naiyāyika, on the other. The Naiyāyika holds the usually accepted view that an illusion is known as such only through the process of correction (*bādha*) that follows. There is no way, according to the Naiyāyika, of knowing a false experience as false except in and through the process of rejection that cancels the false experience. This is, however, a view which the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, as a believer both in the self-illumination of consciousness and the self-validating character of all cognitive experience, cannot accept as tenable. It is obvious that if cognition validates itself through itself, as the Prābhākara holds, there is no room for any cognition that is invalid or false. So, according to the Prābhākara, what passes generally as illusory experience is in reality neither illusory nor false, strictly speaking. The so-called rejection is really nothing but conscious discrimination of experience and their *real* objects previously undiscriminated. Against the Naiyāyika, who contends that correction (*bādha*) is a real process of overthrow or rejection of a previously accepted judgement, the Prābhākara points out that the Naiyāyika cannot give any intelligible account of the so-called negation of an accepted belief (judgement). What is this negation, asks the Prābhākara, of an accepted judgement ? Take the stock example of the illusion of silver in a piece of mother-of-pearl. In the primary experience the mother-of-pearl appears as silver in the form of the judgement, 'this is silver.' As long as the illusion lasts there is no sense of falsity. But, when closer examination reveals the mother-of-pearl in its real character, there is rejection of the primary judgement in the form 'this is not silver.' But what does this rejection really amount to, asks the Prābhākara ? Is it a denial of the primary experience as an occurrence in time ? This is obviously absurd. The second judgement can in no wise reduce the primary judgement to something that did not happen. The mere fact that a second experience succeeds a primary experience in time and thereby monopolises the field of consciousness does not mean that the primary experience has been reduced to naught. If after the experience of a blinding flash of lightning we have a subsequent experience of thunder that does not reduce the primary experience to a no-fact. Nor is there any contradiction in saying that the substrate or subject of the primary experience is the same in both the consecutive experiences, while the predicate is silver in one case, and other than silver in the other case. There is no incompatibility between the experience of sugar as a white substance in the first instance and as a sweet thing when it is put into the mouth immediately afterwards. A lamp that burns now may cease to burn sometime later when the oil is consumed. But the latter does not entail the rejection of the judgment that it was burning sometime earlier. Thus the Naiyāyika does not, the Prābhākara contends, give any rational explanation of the process of correction. In fact, the difficulty of the Naiyāyika arises from the assumption that there is false experience and that it is through correction of such experiences that we become aware of their falsity. In fact, there is no false experience anywhere, strictly speaking. In the stock example 'this is silver', the *this* is a perceived datum and silver is an object of partial recollection with its temporal mark obliterated. What is called an illusion is nothing but the non-discrimination between the percept as percept and the image as image. And in the so-called process of correction or rejection they are cognised, each in its distinctive character, the *this* as a presented mother-of-pearl, and silver as a represented or revived memory-image. There is no falsity or unreality anywhere. The recollection is not rejected, nor is the image that it revives. The presentation also is not rejected, nor is its object, the mother-of-pearl. All that happens is that each is apprehended as what it is in its full distinctive character.

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[1] Saṃsargamātrasya kvacit sadbhāvāt, tatrāpica kathañcit upapatteḥ—*The Nyāyakaṇikā*—page 189.

To cognise anything more fully does not entail the nullity of all partial cognitions.

The Naiyāyika examines the different meanings of contradiction as set forth by the Prābhākara and rejects them all. Contradiction, in the first place, is not the spiriting away of the object of the previous cognition (*viṣayāpahāra*). Nor is it the downright denial of the cognition of the object. A cognition may be succeeded by another cognition. That is not a however the denial of the previous cognition as a temporal event. But correction is not the mere fact of denial of one cognition following upon another cognition. It is something more than that. Nor is it the negaion of the object of the previous cognition. An object, such as an earthen jar, may be destroyed and smashed by the stroke of a heavy stick. But contradiction is not the destruction of the object in this sense. Destruction presupposes the previous existence of the object that is destroyed. But contradiction is not *viṣaya-apahāra* or the spiriting away of the object of a cognition. The denial of the object in contradiction is more thoroughgoing and complete. It is the denial of the object at the very time and place where and when it was cognised as existent.[1]

It may be objected, however, since every cognition has its own temporal mark or location in time, how is it possible for the subsequent cognition, i.e., a correction, to apprehend the non-existence of the object of a cognition of a different time? How can a present judgement refer to a past existence or non-existence? In other words, a cognition takes stock of the object which is present at the time of the cognition itself, and this is what usually occurs. And it is rather strange to suppose that a subsequent cognition determines the object of an antecedent cognition. The correction or the knowledge of contradiction takes place after the valid knowledge of the predicate, and this is a later event in relation to the cognition which is corrected. Under the circumstances, the contradicting judgement, being a posterior fact, cannot be said to imply that the object referred to by it is absent in the anterior judgement which is contradicted. Correction does not amount to the assertion that the contradicted cognition did not cognise the object which it apprehended.

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[1] Yanmayā tadā rajatam iti gṛhitaṃ, tadrajataṃ na bhavati anyadeva tat vastu iti—The *Nyāyamañjari* by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (Lazarus edn) page 186

The Naiyāyika replies that it is no fault of the Naiyāyikas in particular that this kind of self-transcendence is the very nature of a cognitive experience or judgement[1] that corrects or overthrows another. In the second place, the Naiyāyika rejects the Prābhākara analysis of the consequence (*phala*) that results from the act of knowing or judging. A cognitive act or judgement, according to the Naiyāyika, culminates in the consciousness of the cognised object as being desirable or undesirable. With the rejection of the object there is also necessarily the rejection of all sense of desirabtlity or undesirability.

In the third place, the Prābhākara has stated that a cognition contradicting a previous cognition must have a content which is either the same as that of the first one, or one that is different from it. They have rejected the first alternative on the ground that it results in merely a repeating series of cognitions. The second alternative is equally objectionable, for nobody holds that a cognition of a pen at one time is rejected by the cognition of a table at another. The Naiyāyika meets the Prābhākara by saying that contradiction is a logical fact and is confined to the sphere of judgement. Two judgements are contradictory to each other when they have two different predicates regarding the same subject. Contradiction is possible when two incompatible characters are predicated of the self-same object. Now a question arises, if an object is known to be possessed of variegated colour, then why does this judgement not involve a contradiction? The answer is that there is no contradiction in such a judgement simply because it has not come into being after destroying any prior judgement. The different colours can coexist without mutual collision in one complex whole, this being evidenced by experience. In the case of a repeating series of cognitions also the cognition at t_1 is not contradicted by the cognition at t_2 simply because the cognition at t_2 has not emerged after cancelling the cognition at t_1. But after the perception of the mother-of-pearl the knowledge of silver is contradicted because the former takes place after reducing the latter (viz., silver-cognition) to an illusory wrong reference owing to the incompatibility of the two predicates with the same subject.

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[1] Kiṃ kurma, tathā pratyayotpādāt (*op. cit.*,—page 186)

Lastly, the Prābhākara has urged that supposing that a second cognition incompatible with the first does actually occur, why should the second dislodge the first, and not the first the second? The first is in possession of the field and therefore is strong enough to hold its own against all new-comers as pretenders with spurious claims to acceptance. Possession is nine points of the law. The Naiyāyika's reply is that the second cognition emerges superseding the first, not as a factual experience preceding it, but as claiming to be a deliverance of truth and reality. The contradicting subsequent experience is not merely a deliverance of its own object but also is a deliverance of the illusory nature of the preceding experience. It thus does not say that the preceding cognition did not happen, nor does it say that it did not cognise a different object. It says only that this cognition which cognised a different object did not cognise the object in its real character but in the character of something else.

N.B. It may conduce to clearness if we distinguish between the Naiyāyika and the Advaita views of the false in this connection. For the Naiyāyika, the false silver is false because correction reveals it as non-existent in the object at the time we experienced the object as silver. The Naiyāyika does not hold that it is absolutely non-existent. i.e., not existent anywhere else also. He means that it is non-existent as the character of the object when we perceived it as silver. He means that the silver non-existent in the mother-of-pearl at the time is, however, existent elsewhere. The Advaitin, however goes beyond the Naiyāyika in this respect. What the Advaitin says is that correction cancels not merely silver at the particular place and at the particular time in the situation (mother-of-pearl) in question but also denies or rejects its existence altogether and for all times and places. The Advaita contention is that the silver as the qualification of the mother-of-pearl as which it appears at the time of the illusion, though an experienced object (*pratīta*), is yet something that cannot be real from the very nature of the case. Silver may be real elsewhere, but silver that is the character of a mother-of-pearl is nowhere real. And yet as an object experieneed it cannot be equated with an utter naught or nullity. Hence, the Advaitin says that though bearing some likeness to the silver of ordinary experience, it is yet a new category different alike from the real silver of practical experience and utter unreality (*śūnya*). We may call it an objective fact, something which we experience but still is not real.

The Naiyāyika, again, does not deny the reality of the illusory object, the silver, that is misperceived, though real in the locus in which it is perceived, but it is real elsewhere, e.g., in the silversmith's shop. The relation between silverness and silver may not be real in the mother-of-pearl perceived as the '*this*.' But this relation is real in the silver that is to be found in the silversmith's shop. Hence, the object of the illusion is not false in the sense of being utterly non-existent. Nor is the illusion as a psychological state unreal or false. What is false is the experience in its logical

SOME FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS AS REGARDS THE OBJECT THAT IS WRONGLY REFERRED TO IN AN ILLUSORY EXPERIENCE

It has been pointed out that the Naiyāyika explains error as a wrong reference. It is the reference of a predicate to a subject which refuses to accept it in the long run. In veridical cognition the predicate is referred to a subject and the subject also accepts it as a matter of course. The 'wrong reference', then, is an expressive term which explains the account of error. Akṣapāda has characterised error as a false cognition (*mithyājñāna*)[1] Vātsyāyana while commenting upon it accepts the term and reproduces it without making any other characterisation of its nature.[2] Uddyotakara also steps into the shoes of his predecessors and does not give us any definition of false cognition (*mithyājñāna*). It is Vācaspati of the ninth century A.D. who for the first time introduces the characterisation of error as a wrong reference (*anyathākhyāti*) into Nyāya literature. But to credit Vācaspati with the original coinage of the expression 'wrong reference' as the essence of error would be unfair to the real author[3] who first gave currency to the expression. In

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aspect as wrong reference, i.e., as reference of an object real elsewhere to a locus to which it does not belong. It is the experience quâ this wrong reference that is overthrown and negatived by the act of correction and not the experience as a psychical occurrence in time.

[1] Dukṣajanma – pravṛttidoṣa – mithyājñānanamuttarottrāpāye tadanantarāpāyādapavargaḥ—(*Nyāyasutra* .2)—The *Nyāyadarśana* (Metropolitan edn)—page 69.

[2] Tatra atmādyapavargaparyantaprameye, mithyājñānam anekaprakārakaṃ vartate (The *Nyāyabhaśyaṃ*—Metropolitan edn—page 70).

[3] Tasmād yadanyathāsaṃtam anyathā pratipadyate. Tannirālambanajñānamasadālambanaṃ ca tat—Vācaspati quotes this

fact, this epithet is found in the writings of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of the seventh century A.D. Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, too, quotes the couplet in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, but makes a mess of it by assigning its authorship to Vācaspati.[1] It appears, therefore, that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is the first to use the term 'wrong reference', and in the absence of any earlier evidence we may give him the credit for originality in the invention of this expressive term.

The characterisation of error as a wrong reference and the consequent understanding of it as such are borne out by experience. In every judgement the predicate is understood to characterise the subject. In veridical judgement the characterisation of the subject by the predicate is true of reality, and in non-veridical judgement the characterisation of the subject by the predicate is false and a deviation from the real situation. It is a wrong characterisation, as the predicate has been referred to the subject wrongly; in other words, the subject does not accept the predicated character as a matter of fact. Whatever may be the way of expressing it, the fact remains the same—it is a wrong reference of the predicate to a subject. The verbal difference among the authors does not entail any real difference in the situation—it is the same old wrong reference that is being indicated by these various expressions.

But the situation seems difficult, and a slight inadvertence in the selection of words has led to serious divergence of opinion among the exponents. Error has

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Kārikā which occurs in the *Ślokavārtika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (Benares edn)—page 205.

[1] Taduktaṃ Vācaspatiṃisraiḥ—Tasmāt yadanyathāsantam anyathā pratipadyate, etc.—The *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Royal Asiatic Society edn) page 537.

been defined by Vācaspati as a wrong reference. Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya explains error as an experience in which the subject is characterised by the predicate that does not exist in it.[1] Gaṅgeśa uses the term 'form of the predicate' or 'predicate-character' instead of 'predicate', and it may be suggested that these two definitions, that of Vācaspati and of Gaṅgeśa, of the same thing result in two different theories. Vācaspati means that in error a predicate is superimposed upon a subject, and it appears from the definition as given by Gaṅgeśa that the predicate-character (taken in its connotation), and not the predicate (in denotation) is superimposed upon the subject. Or, to put the whole thing the other way about, according to Vācaspati an individual thing (*dharmī*) is superimposed (*atasmin tadbuddhi*), while according to Gaṅgeśa the class-character or class essence resident in the particular individual thing is superimposed upon a presented subject which does not possess it. Let us consider the illusion of mother-of-pearl as silver. Vācaspati thinks that silver as such is ascribed to the mother-of-pearl presented as *this*, while Gaṅgeśa thinks that silver-character, i.e., silverness, is placed upon a presented datum. The problem seems to be based on a theory of the universal, and it can be posed thus : Can a universal be cut loose from a spatio-temporal concrete and relevant individual, and be ascribed to another unrelated datum ? Is universal a floating adjective or a parasite cut loose ? Can it ever be viewed as such, i.e., apart from its concrete embodiment ? Can silverness be detached from its substrate, silver, and attached to a presented subject ?

Before coming to a direct answer to this question it would be worthwhile to give a general account of the theory of universals as sponsored by a section of Indian philosophers. While introducing the problem of the universal in his *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, Prasastapāda of the fourth century A.D. thinks that the universal is the cause of the apprehension of a character persisting as same or common in different individuals.[1] Take, for instance, the class of individuals known as men. Individual men are numerically different from one another. But in spite of this numerical difference they fall under a class, and are synthesised by a common category, viz., manhood, because they possess some common character among themselves. This persisting common character runs through all individual men. This universal exists everywhere in all its relevant particulars. Vyomaśivācārya, a very old commentator of the *Prasastapādabhāṣya*, has referred to a particular group of Vaiśeṣikas who think that universals are omnipresent, that is to say, existent everywhere and that any universal can exist in any particular. Cowness exists, not merely in all individual cows, but also in the horses, dogs, etc., and horseness exists, not merely in all individual horses, but also in different cows, dogs, etc. In other words, every universal is everywhere and everywhen. And the reason that the horse universal is not cognised in a cow-particular is that a cow-particular is not an adequate manifesting medium, and this lack of medium does not, however, make horse universal *non est* in a cow-particular. Being anywhere it is made manifest only when it attaches to a relevant medium.

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[1] Atadvatitatprakārakaṃ jñānaṃ bhramaḥ—*op. cit.* p. 537.

Prasastapāda flatly denies the idea and clearly states that a universal does not exist anywhere and everywhere.

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[1] Anuvṛttipratyayakāraṇaṃ sāmānyam.

It is present only in a relevant particular. Cowness is always in individual cows, and never in individual horses. The idea that any universal can exist in any particular is an unproved hypothesis, and to think it can is as ludicrous as to suppose the existence of the Himalaya in a mustard seed.

It cannot be supposed that the universal is like ether (*ākāśa*), and exists everywhere.[1] For what will be the relation of such a universal to the indiscriminate particulars? Is it a relation of inherence or of a simple contact or conjunction? The ether is in relation with every object of finite magnitude and this relation is known as a relation of contact, and never as inherence. It is a simple relation. The universal cannot be said to be related, like ether, to everything of finite magnitude because the former exists in its relevant particulars only by inherence alone. It cannot, again, be supposed that the universal exists in any particular by a relation of contact, for it is *ex hypothesi* impossible. The relation of contact holds between two substances, and the universal is not a substance according to the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika. Further, it cannot be supposed that the relation referred to is some non-descript type of relation, for in that case this will be proving something which is admitted as a well-established truth by everybody and is never questioned. For anything can be said to be related to everything else either by direct relation or by indirect relation of mediation. So the supposition that the universal exists everywhere and like ether is connected with everything is either unproved or proved in a manner that is beside the point. Prasastapāda thus declares that the universal does not exist anywhere and everywhere. It exists always in its relevant individuals. And this is also what Vyomaśivācārya holds and what Uddyotakara sets forth clearly in their respective works.

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[1] Sāmānyaṃ sarvaiḥ sambadhyate, vyāpakatvāt ākāśavat.

Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu*[1] finds fault with the theory of Prasastapāda and traces it to the aphorism of Kaṇāda, the great sage and the celebrated founder of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. Kaṇāda characterises universal as something which is perceivable (in individuals amenable to perception), simultaneously inherent in more than one particular, motionless and one. Pailuka, a putative disciple of Kaṇāda, states, explaining the aphorism that a universal, say cowness, exists everywhere, not merely in the relevant individuals but also in the intervening spaces occupied or unoccupied by heterogeneous individuals. The universal, like ether, exists everywhere. Just as ether is conjoined with an indefinite number of individuals at one and the same time, so is universal inherent at one and the same time in more than one particular existent of the same class in diverse situations of time and space. Paiṭhara, another reputed disciple of the same master, has offered a different explanation and concludes that universal exists only in its relevant particulars. Cowness does not exist everywhere for the reason that it is not everywhere visible. It is perceived only in the cow individuals. And there seems to be no good reason to hold the existence of cowness at a place where there is no particular cow. If cowness ever existed at a place devoid of particular cows as their locii, it would have been surely perceived by this time. But as a matter of fact it is not perceived though perceivable *per se*. The conclusion follows, therefore, that it does not exist outside and alongside of its relevant individuals.

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[1] Stcherbatsky—The *Buddhist Logic* Vol. II—translation of the *Nyāyabindu*—pages 226-227.

We are thus confronted with two distinct propositions, (1) the universal always exists in the relevant particulars, and (2) it exists everywhere in all the particulars, relevant and irrelevant alike. And the wonder is that both claim the authority of Kaṇāda in support of their conflicting contentions. And this is the charge which Dharmakīrti brings forward in his *Nyāyabindu* against Kaṇāda's views regarding universals. But the situation is not so desperate as Dharmakīrti makes out. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Tātparyaṭīkā* undertakes an examination of the problem *de novo* and poses the question—Does the universal exist in its relevant particular or does it exist everywhere? If cowness be admitted to exist in everything, then everything will become cow, and if it be admitted to exist in the relevant individuals then how can a new-born calf acquire its determinant cow-character? Vācaspati thus sums up the critique of Dharmakīrti and finally suggests an escape from this impasse. Universal, so Vācaspati goes on, like ether, soul, time and space, is existent everywhere. These are all-pervasive entities of the Vaiśeṣika. Just as they remain everywhere, without being related with one other, so also the universals exist everywhere and in everything without being related to it. Whenever a new individual comes into existence, it becomes determined by its determinant class-character which existed there. Udayana in his *Ātmatattvaviveka* supports this view of Vācaspati, and Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura expounds the position that the cow universal, though unrelated like ether and space, being existent everywhere, becomes automatically related to the proper individual it meets with.[1]

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1. It appears from the account of Vācaspati that every universal

The discussion leads to the conclusion that the universal is concrete. They are not abstract and are no ghostly beings. They are always embodied in their relevant individuals. And under the circumstances the explanation of Gangeśa that in the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl silverness is superimposed upon the mother-of-pearl, viewed as *this*, seems to be an innovation

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is all-pervasive, i.e., everywhere. In other words, it is both where its suitable particular exists and also where such particulars do not exist. The only difference is that where suitable particulars exist the corresponding universal becomes manifest, and where, however, such particular is wanting the universals exist as unmanifested universals in particular individuals. It will be, therefore, inconsistent for Vācaspati to contend in the same breath that universals without particulars cannot exist, for he himself admits that they exist even where the particulars as the relevant manifesting media are not to be found. It is inconsistent therefore for Vācaspati to posit the view against the view sponsored by Gangeśa that in illusion that the superimposition must be of one substantive (*dharmi*) on another, and not of an attribute (*dharma*) on a different substantive or *dharmī*. This view of Vācaspati is based on the contention that that there cannot be a universal without a particular, a *sāmānya* without a *viśeṣa*, i.e., *nirviśeṣa sāmānya* or a wandering adjective. Here, however, Vācaspati contends that a universal exists everywhere, both where its relevant particulars are as well as where they are not, and that when a new relevant particular comes into being the universal already existent comes into relation to the particular in question without coming into being. It may be further noted that this view of universal as being *sarvagata* or *vibhu*, i.e., being both where its relevant particulars are and where they are not, contradicts the later definition of *sāmānya* as *nitya* and *anekasamaveta*. According to this latter definition *aneka-samavetatva* or inherence in more than one particular is part and parcel of the very nature of a universal. Vācaspati's view of *sarvagata* universal will mean the existence of universals without inherence in particulars, for where particulars are wanting the universal exists, but exists without inhering in any particular.

and a departure from the Nyāya view of universal, which is never abstract. To explain the illusory experience the identification of the predicate as a substantive (*dharmī*) with the subject has to be admitted. Therefore, even from the Nyāya point of view, the proper reading of the illusory judgement 'this is silver' should be not, as Gangeśa points out, 'this', i.e., the particular object ahead has the 'silver property', but, rather, 'this is a piece of silver', i.e., a single object having a certain distinguishing mark. As a matter of fact introspective evidence also supports this view of an illusory judgement. The illusion when it lasts precludes disbelief or doubt and appears as complete belief in the *this* as a piece of silver and not in the *this* as presenting a silver-character. The question remains, however, how *this*, as a piece of silver as it appears in an illusory judgement, is to be interpreted, and here the Advaitin parts company with the Naiyāyika.

CHAPTER IV

THE ADVAITA VIEW OF THE FALSE OR ILLUSORY

We have seen that according to Prābhākara there is no such thing as erroneous perception and erroneous judgement. In the case of so-called misperception, Prābhākara holds that the subject *this* is actually perceived, and the similarity of the subject (mother-of-pearl) with silver stimulates the memory-image of silver, and the two items, the perceived *this* and the remembered silver, are not distinguished. The *this* is an object of visual perception, since it is the eye which is in operation. The silver-image is revived because of its similarity to the perceived object. The difference between the perceived and the remembered is not apprehended. This negative non-distinction is asserted to lie at the root of all so-called non-veridical experiences. The perception of *this* is a veridical experience; the recollection of silver is also a veridical revival in memory. Prābhākara points out that there is no actual contact of the eye with the silver that is cognised. In the absence of sense-object contact, perception of the silver is out of the question, and the inference is irresistible that the silver is cognised only through revival in memory.

Here the Advaitin joins issue with the Prābhākara. The silver is cognised here and now. Had it been revived in memory, it would have been cognised as a silver of some other place seen at some other time. Nor can it be said that only the *this* in the illusion 'this is silver' is what is cognised as present here and now, and not also the predicate silver which qualifies it. The assertion that the silver is not perceived as the predicate runs counter to the deliverance of experienee. In a veridical perception, such as 'this is a jar', the *this,* i.e., the individual subject and the jar-character by which the subject is perceived as qualified, are immediately apprehended as indissolubly bound together (*itaretarasaṃsṛṣṭau*).[1] Why should it be otherwise in the case of the illusion 'this is silver'? The contention that there are really two existentially separate cognitions which because of immediate succession without any interval of time are confounded as one single qualified cognition and so expressed in a verbal proposition does not bear examination. There is no felt difference in the testimony of introspection in this respect between a veridical and a non-veridical experience. The non-veridical experience as expressed in judgement shows no inferiority or deficiency in this respect in comparison with a veridical experience. The contention that the absence of actual silver in front of the perceiver constitutes the inferiority or deficiency in this case is untenable for the following reasons. How do we know for certain that there is no silver in front of the perceiver? Is it because there is no testimony of consciousness as regards the existence of a piece of silver before a perceiver? Or is it because the consciousness of such silver as existing is contradicted by a judgement of correction that follows? The first alternative does not bear examination. Experience does not support the contention that silver is not peceived. And, if the experience of the silver as existent is to be derived on the ontological ground that there is no silver actually existing, this will only be begging the question. Accordingly, the Advaitin concludes on the strength of immediate experience that silver as actually existing has to be posited.

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[1] *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha*—Bengali edn by MM. Dr Pramathanāth Tarkabhūṣaṇa—page 175.

But it may be contended that the Advaitin deduces the objective fact from the subjective experience. But viewed from the other side the experience is regarded as valid because it is supported by the objective fact. It is more reasonable, therefore, to proceed from fact to experience than from experience to fact. The denial of the erroneous judgement by Prābhākara is the logical consequence of the non-existence of silver in the context. But this argument is vitiated by the fallacy of *hysteron proteron.* If knowledge of fact be made the antecedent condition of the knowledge of experience, it will lead to an infinite regress. There can be no assurance of the actual presence of object without knowledge of it. And, if the latter be made dependent on the knowledge of fact, it will necessarily presuppose an unending series of factual cognitions. It is for this reason asserted that a cognition does not remain unknown, i.e., it cognises itself in the process of knowing an object. Self-cognition is thus logically prior to the cognition of object. It is the cognition which proves the object and not conversely. It is, therefore, natural to affirm the existence of silver on the basis of its experience. There is no *a priori* ground for rejecting the objectivity of silver. As for the corrective judgement, we will show that it also does not set aside silver as a fiction. So far as Prabhākara is concerned, he cannot make capital out of this negative judgement of correction.

The error is considered to be corrected by the judgement, 'this is not silver.' Prabhākara denies the judgement 'this is silver', and interprets it as a case of non-differentiation. By parity of reasoning, he should interpret the negative judgement 'this is not silver' also as a case of non-differentiation of *this* and not-silver. In the absence of the negative judgement he cannot conclude the non-existence of silver. If he argues that the negative judgement is not a case of non-differentiation, but a clear judgement because it is confirmed by verification, he will be guilty of abandoning his position that all judgement is self-revealing and self-validating. That 'this is not silver' is a judgement should be self-evidently known. If it is to be known as a judgement only when it is certified by verification, its self-evidential character will go. He may contend that, though he believes in self-evidence, he wants to prove its judgemental character in regard to a person who entertains a doubt about it. But this defence is also suicidal, since the doubt can never be absolutely set at rest without belief in the self-evidence of a judgement at some stage. All these considerations apart, the main contention of Prabhākara that the negative judgement proves the abosolute non-existence of silver in the spatio-temporal context is not endorsed by the Advaitin.

In error, it is undeniable that silver is positively perceived. The corrective judgement, however, proves that there is no such thing as silver. Silver is proved to be non-existent in the past, present, and future in the context. And the admission of a positive silver *quā* false is flatly contradicted by correction. In reply to the objection, the Advaitin who is an uncompromising realist in epistemology, asserts that the silver that is perceived is not the real pragmatic silver of the empirical order. There are three types of reals, (1) absolute, (2) empirical, and (3) apparant. The first type of reality can be aserted only of the Absolute Reality, which exists in its own right and eternally repels negation. The second type of reality is posssessed by things of the phenomenal world. This reality has pragmatic validity or practical utility and stands uncontradicted exccpt by the knowledge of the Absolute Reality, which is the only reality unifying existence, consciousness and bliss in itself. The Advaitin does not deny the provisional existence of the empirical order of reals, and, in this respect, is in agreement with the realists. But he differs only when the empirical and the absolute are believed to be identical. The third type of real is what is called apparent and false *par excellence*. This apparent real is coeval with illusion and ceases to be when the illusion is corrected. The illusory silver experienced in error has an existential status of the third type. The Advaitin is not a subjectivist like the Yogācāra Buddhists or Bishop Berkeley. He does not subscribe to the proposition *esse est percipi*, that is, the existence of a thing consists in its being perceived. He believes in the opposite dictum, a thing exists and therefore it is perceived. Existence, according to the Advaitin, is logically prior to perception, and is objective and independent of the knowing subject (*jñātā*).

That silver exists is proved by the perception of it, though erroneous. What is perceived as an object must be numerically different from, and independent of, the act of perception. The corrective judgement, of course, asserts unreservedly the absolute non-existence of the empirical silver and not of the false apparent silver. The unavailability of the silver is proved by disappointed volition. The implication of the corrective judgement 'this is not silver' is the non-existence of the real silver, and the existence of the false silver. The victim of illusion is actuated by his greed or need of real silver, and the existence of the apparent silver does not avail for him.

It may be objected that the negation of silver will be pointless if one type of silver is perceived and another type is sought. Negation is always pertinent in relation to a likely fact. Here one thing is presented and perceived and another thing is sought. This is an obvious anomaly. But this objection does not affect the Advaitin. The empirical silver and the apparent silver are the two different species of the same genus. They share in common the generic class-character 'silverness', and this is responsible for the conative reaction. The experience is regarded as erroneous and false, not because it has no existent object, but because the object is not what can satisfy an empirical want. Error is objective as much as the veridical experience. The difference lies only in the difference of the specific character of the two species of existents. There is no *a priori* unlikelihood of the empirically real silver existing in the place where the apparent silver is perceived. The non-existence of the real silver is quite compatible with the existence of the false silver, and this is attested by the two-fold implication of the corrective judgement, one negative and the other positive. The negative judgement 'there is no silver' implies first the negation of real silver, and, secondly, that it is only false silver that was perceived.

One may object that the admission of the three kinds of existence is inspired by the Advaitin's metaphysical theory and is not warranted by psychological evidence. The Advaitin admits the objection as a plausible one. Psychologically speaking we do not cognise any difference in the quality of the perception of silver, veridical or otherwise. It is on the basis of this experience that the Advaitin asserts the existence of silver in the present context. The silver is believed to be existent because it is perceived. But when it is subjected to logical examination it transpires that the silver has not a co-ordinate status with the real silver perceived in veridical experience. Were it otherwise, there would be no distinction between error and truth. Psychological evidence demands admission of an existent silver, and logical examination makes the admission incompatible with the falsity of the judgement. The two together point to a lower type of existence. So, the postulation of an apparent, false existent in erroneous experience is entailed by a logical necessity consistently with psychological evidence.

Furthermore, the negative theory of Prabhākara does violence to the psychological verdict. It seeks to explain away the positive experience of relation of identity between the *this* and silver by putting a negative interpretation upon it. We have already shown the inconsistency of Prabhākara's theory with experience. Apart from the psychological inconsistency, the negative interpretation is also not logically conceivable. The positive relation is interpreted in negative terms as the negation of perception of non-relation or non-difference. Absolute negation of experience is possible only in deep dreamless sleep and not in waking or dreaming states. Nor can it be understood as a cognition which inspires wrong volitional action. This would make undetected or immediately detected error impossible, because volitional activity may not take place on account of lack of interest or inaccessibility of the space-time context. It may not occur also when the misperceived object is immediately known to be falsely perceived by the sudden emergence of correction. It would be impossible to decide in case of undetected error whether it is true or erroneous. But if 'error' be made the condition of inevitable activity, such possibilities would be ruled out. Moreover, non-perception of difference is only a meaningless assertion. *This* and *silver* are two elements, and they must be known as different. This is evident from the consideration that when expressed in words the two are felt as different in spite of their being held in a relation. *This* and *silver* are not felt to be absolutely identical. Their relation can be characterised as identity of differents. Even if we accept the theory of Prabhākara that the perceived *this* is not felt as distinct from the recollected silver, the apprehension of the two elements necessarily involves the apprehension of their numerical difference, implicit or explicit. If they are not felt as different, there will be no apprehension at all. Mere negation of apprehension is only a blank vacuum which can possibly be felt in deep sleep. But nobody interprets it as error. In a word, there is no psychological evidence for the admission of non-perception of non-difference or non-relation. Non-perception is only negation which cannot be cognised without reference to a negatum or a substratum. It may be argued that non-perception of non-relation is the necessary presupposition of perception of relation, since perception of non-relation would make perception of relation impossible. It may be so, but it is only a deduction from a positive fact. The positive perception of relation is interpreted in negative terms as non-perception of non-relation. A is perceived as A, and may be interpreted as 'not-A is not perceived'. But this will be a *tour de force* of logical formalism. So far as experience is concerned, it is always positive and never negative, as Maṇḍana Miśra observes.[1] Prabhākara also does not believe in negation, and he explains it as experience of a positive fact. Even the Naiyāyika, who admits negative judgement, asserts that negation is always cognised in relation to a positive fact. Non-cognition of the non-relation of *this* and *silver* reduces itself to cognition of *this* and cognition of silver. If silver is not felt as perceived or recollected, it will not be felt at all. Thus the attempt of Prabhākara to explain away the plain experience of error in negative terms ends in a fiasco. If, again, this be not felt as different from silver and *vice versa*, it should be felt as a mere *this* or a mere silver and not this-silver.

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[1] Āhurvidhātṛ pratyakṣaṃ na niṣedhṛ vipaścitaḥ
The *Brahmasiddhi* by Maṇḍana Miśra - page 39.
(Madras Govt Series)

One of the reasons which has prompted Prabhākara to propound such an ingenious theory is his fear of absolute scepticism. If any cognition ever be found to be wrong, this would undermine the faith in all cognitions as evidencing reality. We have already referred to this point while discussing Vācaspati's objection to the theory. The Advaitin attacks this position from a new standpoint and points out that it is incompatible with actual facts of experience. If the mother-of-pearl which is in contact with the eye be not apprehended as a piece of silver or of a piece of silver existing elsewhere be not apprehended as existing here and now, then the person seeking silver would not reach out towards the mother-of-pearl as the silver he is seeking. But this is a fact of experience, and to deny it for the sake of a preconceived theory is to deny experience and build on the foundation of imagination. It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that the *this* (mother-of-pearl in its outline) does appear as a piece of silver, just as silver appears as one with the *this* in the illusion of 'this is silver'. This identification of one thing with another, though false, is an established fact of experience, and in this sense reciprocal superimposition or false identification (*anyonyādhyāsa*) is also a fact of experience. The Naiyāyika interprets this false identification as the identification of one real with another real. The silver is real just as the *this* (mother-of-pearl) shining before the perceiver. The silver is real in some other place though not real in the locus of the mother-of-pearl. Thus the perception of the *this* as silver is the perception of one real as another. The Mādhvas, however, interpret this reciprocal superimposition in a different way. The silver, according to the Mādhvas, is unreal in the locus of the mother-of-pearl. The superimposition here is, therefore, of the absolutely unreal on the real substrate of the mother-of-pearl. The silver may be real elsewhere, but a silver which is also a mother-of-pearl is nowhere real. And, therefore, according to the Mādhvas, in all illusion a real is perceived in a character absolutely unreal.

The Advaitin differs from both the Naiyāyika and the Mādhva. The silver is actually perceived (*pratīta*) in the locus of the mother-of-pearl. The perceiver does not perceive his perceiving. He perceives an object other than his perceiving. In this sense silver that is perceived in the illusion has objectivity. The illusory silver may not last beyond the duration of the illusory experience. But its *esse* is not its mere *percipi*, having as we have shown a trans-subjective or objectivc reality. This is what distinguishes the illusory object from the Berkeleyan conception of objects. For Berkeley, the object is nothing but the experience of the object. The *esse* is in the *percipi*, the being of the object is its being perceived. But an illosory object is other than the mere perceiving or illusory experience of it, though it does not last beyond the duration of the illusion. Because it is a fact of experience (*Pratīta*), it cannot be an utter unreality, as the Mādhvas hold. But it cannot also be reality in the ordinary sense because when the illusion ends through correction it is realised as something absolutely non-existent in its locus. And the experience of the correction is of the form, the *this* never was, never is and never will be a piece of silver. It was not silver even when it appeared as such. Hence, the

Advaitin maintains that in reciprocal superimposition there is not the superimposition of one real upon another real, nor of an utterly unreal on a real substrate, but of the real and the false (*mithyā*) in the sense of something describable neither as real nor as unreal. Hence the Advaita view is properly stated as *anirvacanīyakhyāti* meaning the perception of an indescribable appearance in a substrate of reality.

Prabhākara misses the important fact that, unless the mother-of-pearl is positively apprehended as a piece of silver, it should not prompt the person seeking silver to appropriate it. A thing that has not been cognised as a piece of silver is powerless to rouse any such activity. A lump of earth, for example, does not prompt a silver-seeker to activity for the simple reason that it is not apprehended as silver. Nor can it be said that the activity of the silver-seeker can be explained by the mere recollection of silver which the perceived *this* induces. The silver that is recollected is non-existent in front of the perceiver, and yet the person does not seek it elsewhere, where he had previous perception of the silver. He seeks it immediately at the locus of the mother-of-pearl where no silver exists.

But it may be pointed out that the recollection of silver is only a partial recollection. It is the recollection of silver is as such without any reference to its proper time and place. Its remoteness is not felt due to some reason or other; because of this non-perception of remoteness the perceiver is moved towards the object in front of him. But this also is not free from objection. The point is that if non-apprehension of remoteness is the cause of a practical reaction towards the object in front of the perceiver, then there is such non-apprehension of remoteness in respect of many other things. In other words, the silver is apprehended, it is said, minus the fact of its remoteness from this shining object before the perceiver. But the silver also being apprehended as silver as such is also similarly apprehended minus its remoteness from other things. Why, then, does the recollected silver cause a practical reaction towards the shining object in front of the perceiver, i. e., the mother-of-pearl, and not towards other objects, e. g., a lump of earth or a trunk of a tree in respect of which its remoteness is also not apprehended ?

It cannot, again, be said that the lustre of the mother-of-pearl explains this preference, for a person seeking silver will be actuated not by lustre in general, but by lustre recognised as the lustre of silver. But Prabhākara does not admit that the shining mother-of-pearl is cognised as a substrate of the lustre of silver. In other words, he repudiates any positive cognition of the mother-of-pearl in the form of silver.

A Prābhākara may, however, try to explain the preference in respect of practical reaction towards the mother-of-pearl in this way. The mother-of-pearl is a perceived object in its generic character as bright shining *this*. The silver is an object of partial recollection without its past reference. Because of the non-apprehension of the difference between the perceived object and the recollected image, the person seeking silver is actuated towards the mother-of-pearl. But a lump of earth and a trunk of a tree are not objects perceived, and there is, in fact, a non-apprehension of difference between the recollected silver and such unperceived objects. But the non-apprehension of difference between the recollected silver and the perceived *this* is quite different from the non-apprehension of difference between the recollected silver and the unperceived lump of earth, etc. The difference between a recollected and a perceived object and the difference between a recollected and an unperceived object are not on the same plane. Non-apprehension of such difference is the cause of conation in the first case, while such non-apprehension of difference between a remembered and an unperceived object is powerless as a cause of volition.

But the Advaitin points out that non-apprehension between a recollected image and a perceived object, and non-apprehension between a recollected and an unperceived object *quā* non-apprehension, do not differ. It cannot be urged, therefore, with reason that one is the cause of volition while the other is not. Non-apprehension of difference is negation of actualised differentiation. It is a blank vacuity which cannot be distinguished without reference to the positive negatum. Furthermore, this unactualised differentiation is an unrealised possibility which is not consciously felt. An unactualised differentiation of which the percipient is totally unconscious is as good as what has not existed at all. Such a negative vacuity cannot be regarded as the cause of a conative reaction. The attempt of the Prābhākara to distinguish it from other such cases of non-differentiation is an argument of despair. An unfelt negation is only a verbal quibble and not even a fiction of the imagination.

It may be said, however, that volition is always in respect of something which is an object of cognition. The mother-of-pearl is an object of perception, while the lump of earth is not. Therefore, the seeker acts with reference to the mother-of-pearl which he actually cognises, and does not act with reference to the lump of earth, which is not an object of his cognition. The reply to this is that the silver in front towards which the seeker moves is also not considered an object of cognition. The reason is what the cogniser cognises as lying in front is the mother-of-pearl as a shining something.

How, then, does he act towards it though it is not cognised as the silver lying before him ?

It may be argued, however, that in the case of the mother-of-pearl that is mistaken as a piece of silver, there is actual stimulation of the organ of vision by the mother-of-pearl. As a consequence of it there is the actual perception of the mother-of-pearl though generically as a bright shining something. In the case of an unperceived object such as a lump of earth, there is no actual contact of sense and object, nor, also, any perception of it either incomplete or complete. Therefore, it must be conceded that there is an essential difference between non-discrimination in respect of a perceived (*dṛṣṭa*) object, and non-discrimination with reference to an unperceived something. But the Advaitin may reply that non-discrimination is nothing but negation of discrimination, and in respect of negation it is immaterial whether there is sense-object contact or partial or complete perception. Non-discrimination is the antecedent negation of discrimination. How can such negation be caused by sense-object contact or by perception in any form ? Sense-object contact and perception have relevance only in the case of a positive ascription of silver to the mother-of-pearl or of the mother-of-pearl to the silver. The illusion of silver in the mother-of-pearl is a visual illusion, and for visual illusion contact of object with the organ of vision is a necessary condition. Only in so far as the mother-of-pearl is in contact with the eye, and is, therefore, perceived in its generic outline as a *this*, can there be the superimposition of silver on it. In other words, sense-object contact and perception have relevance only in the case of a positive superimposition of one thing on another and have no significance as a condition of negative non-apprehension.

CHAPTER V

THE ADVAITA VIEW OF THE FALSE OR ILLUSORY (*Continued*)

We have so far considered the Prābhākara theory of non-apprehension in detail and also its strong and weak points. That all illusion involves some kind of non-apprehension goes without saying. The theory of wrong reference (*anyathākhyāti*), the theory of the apprehension of the false (*anirvacanīyakhyāti*), and other theories have all to recognise some element of non-apprehension in the causation of an illusory experience. But, as we have seen, non-apprehension does not make the whole story. There are other important factors in illusory experience which also deserve careful consideration. This is where the Naiyāyika parts company with the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka even when he recognises non-apprehension as a necessary condition of illusion. The Naiyāyika points out that it is not the sufficient condition that explains the illusory experience in all its vital aspects. He believes in a positive wrong reference in all illusory experience which presupposes non-apprehension as a negative condition, but which cannot be explained merely as negative non-apprehension. We have, therefore, now to consider critically the positive theory of the Naiyāyika, which may be described as a cognition of one thing as another. We have already explained the Nyāya position in some detail. It will not be out of place to emphasise some special points regarding the Nyāya view.

Unlike the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, who denies the facthood of illusory experience, the Naiyāyika accepts illusion as real. In other words, the Naiyāyika does not dissolve illusion to mere negative non-distinguishing between two real cognitions, but explains it as a positive wrong reference which is certified as wrong by the act of correction. The Naiyāyika, however, resolves this wrong reference as a mistaking of one real thing for another real thing. For example, in the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl perceived in front of oneself, the Naiyāyika holds that the silver, though not real in the locus of the perceived object, is yet real elsewhere. The mother-of-pearl in the locus whereof the silver is preceived is a real object immediately present before the perceiver. The relation between silver and the mother-of-pearl is also not absolutely unreal. The relation which is real elsewhere between silverness as adjective and the silver as substantive is also real in every actual piece of silver, though it may not be really existent in the mother-of-pearl in which it is perceived. The Naiyāyika, in other words, rejects the view that an absolutely unreal can ever be an object of experience. He points out that the non-existence of silver in the mother-of pearl does not prove the absolute non-existence of silver. If non-existence were the same as absolute non-existence, then everything can be described as non-existent, for nothing is existent in the sense of non-existent nowhere. It is only the absolutely non-existent, such as the child of a barren mother, that cannot be an object of any experience. The relatively non-existent, i.e., what is existent in one place and time and non-existent in another is the object of veridical as well as illusory experience.

It may be useful to distinguish here between the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika. The Vaiśeṣika, for example, explains the ubiquity or all-pervasiveness of space, time ether (*ākāśa*), self, as spaceless and timeless existence. That which is everywhere and everywhen, and in this sense all-pervasive, has no position in space and time. In this sense all all-pervasive objects are timeless and spaceless reals. That they have being and are not non-existent, as is a barron mother, is proved by their being the substrate of certain real attributes, number in the case of all these, sound in the case of ether, pleasure and pain in the case of self, etc. Hence, though they are non-existent in space and time, they are not absolutely non-existent. The Mādhva, however, contends that all pervasive objects should not be described as non-existent everywhere (*sarvatra avidyamāna*), as the Vaiśeṣika does, but, rather, as existent everywhere (*sarvatro vidyamāna*). The Naiyāyika thus distinguishes between the relatively non-existent, i.e., non-existent in one place or time, but existent elsewhere or at a different time, and the absolutely non-existent, i.e., what is not existent in any place or time. Between these two the Vaiśeṣika will have the all-pervasive reals which are existent, but without location in space and time. The Nyāya contention is that just as in veridical experience it is reality that is apprehended as some object or other, so also in illusion it is one real that is apprehended as another real. In the stock example of the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl, the silver, the mother-of-pearl and also the relation are real objects, there being no unreality or other than reality anywhere. The Advaitin, however, contends that the silver that is perceived in the mother-of-pearl is an apparent silver quite different from the silver of our veridical experience. The Mādhva holds that the silver that is wrongly perceived in the mother-of-pearl is not an entitative silver of the apparent sort as the Advaitin maintains. This silver is a pure fiction because the mother-of-pearl has a charactar which necessarily precludes silver-character. The two characters, viz., being mother-of-pearl and being silver, are fundamentally opposed and so they cannot co-exist in the same substratum. We have, therefore, to distinguish the Nyāya view which explains wrong reference as a reference of one real to another, and the Advaita view, which explains the wrong reference as the experience of the apparent object in a real object, and also the Mādhva veiw explaining it as the cognition of the absolutely unreal in a real substrate. Common to all these is the thesis of the reality of the substrate to which somothing has been wrongly referred. The Buddhist nihilist, however, goes beyond all these three and explains away the substrate also as devoid of reality. The issue, therefore, between the Avaitin and the Naiyāyika is as regards the ontological status of the superimposed object in the substrate which is the subject of the logical judgement. The point of contention, in other words, between the Naiyāyika and the Advaitin hinges on the status of the predicate of the illusory judgement.

The Naiyāyika holds, as we have seen, that the absolutely unreal cannot be an object of cognition in any situation. Furthermore, he does not admit any distinction of kind in reals, and accordingly he unceremoniously rejects the Advaita classification of reals under three kinds, the absolute, the empirical and the apparent. All reals are absolute reals; the latter two varieties are denied by him. The Naiyāyika contends that all cognition is cognition of the real or that whatever is an object of a cognition is absolutely real. He proves this by means of an inference which may be stated thus: Whatever is an object of cognition (*vedya*) must be real (*pāramārthika*), as, for example, the Advaitin's Brahman. The Advaitin, however, joins issue with the Naiyāyika. The Naiyāyika has cited Brahman as an instance of invariable relation between objectivity and reality, but Brahman is neither an object nor a subject. It is knowledge itself and never an object of knowledge. Certainly, there are scriptural texts which appear to refer to Brahman as the object. Here the cognitive process involved in the act has only an indirect reference to Brahman. It is, however, not Brahman itself but the cognitive process lighted up by Brahman that has objectivity.[1] In fact, the assumption that Brahman is an object of cognition leads to the absurdity of its being both subject and object at the same time. Consider what is involved in the concept of intelligence revealed in the mind as the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa-abhibyakta caitanya.*) If this intelligence or consciousness were the same as Brahman, then Brahman is both intelligence that reveals, and the object that is revealed, which entails obliteration of the distinction between knowing and known. As Dr Maitra has aptly pointed out, the supposition is as absurd as that of a knife cutting itself.[2]

There is a further objection to this view that the mind, being non-intelligent (*jaḍa*), is other than Brahman, i. e., reality the essence of which is intelligence. A mental mode consequently as a modification of this non-intelligent mind is other than reality and as such is indescribable and false. Therefore, the mental mode which has the form of Brahman is false and indescribable. To say that Brahman becomes the object of the mind is merely saying that there is a mental mode simulating the form of Brahman. The form, being false *per se*, cannot be regarded as a real experience of Brahman as object. A real relation is possible only between objects of the same grade of being (*samasattāka*). And this holds also in the case of the relation between knowing and known. No such relation is possible between objects of different dimensions of being (*viṣamasattāka*). Between Brahman, which is absolute reality, and a mental mode, which is indescribable as reality or unreality, no real relation is possible. The Naiyāyika speaks of the objectifying (*viṣayatā*) involved in knowing as a variety of terms *quā* relation (*svarūpasambandha*) where one or other of the relata is itself the relation. The mental mode is an indescribable, false appearance. How can there be such a relation between a mental mode, which is indescribable and false, and Brahman, which is absolute reality - a relation in which one of the terms is both term and relation at the same time? Another consideration leading to the same negative result is the following. What is the proof that whatever is an object must necessarily be real? The Nyāya inference equates objectivity with reality, but there is nothing to prove that objectivity does not belong to that which lacks strict reality. It cannot be said that if the objective were not real it could not be objective at all. There is no causal relation between reality and objectivity. If reality were the cause and objectivity the effect, then in the absence of reality there should be absence of objectivity. But there is nothing to prove that knowability or objectivity is not found in anything other than reality. According to the Advaitin, no instance can be cited in which knowability or objectivity proves reality or absence of reality proves absence of knowability. The Naiyāyika urges that the relation between reality and knowability holds absolutely without exception anywhere (*kevalānvayi*). Nothing can be cited as knowable which is also not real, and nothing can be cited as real which is denuded of knowability or objectivity. But the Advaitin points out that the relation between reality and objectivity does not hold absolutely. It has its exception in Brahman, who is real but not knowable, or object. The relation is an agreement in the presence of which there is no instance of absolute failure of the concomitance anywhere. This can be illustrated also in the case of the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl. Here the invariable concomitance of knowability and reality or being a cognitum of a valid cognition has obviously failed. The oneness of the mother-of-pearl and silver that appears in the illusion is neither real nor an object of a valid cognition. The same is true of other cases of illusions, the contents of which are objects of cognition without being either real or validly known.

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[1] Brahman is not an object of cognition. It appears to be unknown to the individual subject, owing to the latter's ignorance which serves to veil the Brahman. The cognitive process only rends asunder the veil. The Brahman shines forth in its own light. It is illustrated by the example of the cloud veiling the sun. When the cloud is removed the sun shines in its own light. Removal of the screening veil is pragmatically considered as the revelation of Brahman. In fact, Brahman does not stand in need of any external aid to reveal itself. But since the removal of the veil immediately culminates in the revelation of the Brahman, it is asserted loosely to be the object of cognition.

[2] *Fundamental questions of Indian Metaphysics and Logic.*

The Naiyāyika points out in reply that oneness with silver that appears in the mother-of-pearl in the illusion in question has to be considered more fully before it is finally disposed of as unreal. What, in fact, is this oneness with silver which appears in the illusion ? This oneness is a property belonging to an object actually existing in it.[1] Thus oneness with silver means the property that characterises silver actually existing in the thing. Now, what is the property that characterises silver ? Obviously it is silverness, and this silverness is what appears in the illusion of a mother-of-pearl as silver. This silverness as a property is not an unreal fiction. It is a real property of all silver and is also an object of a valid cognition. Therefore, the oneness with silver which appears in the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl is not a case of failure of concomitance between knowability and reality. It may be said that though silverness is real and also an object of valid cognition, yet there is no relation between silverness and the mother-of-pearl in which it is apprehended in the illusion. The Naiyāyika submits in reply that the relation of silverness to silver is a fact in all silver. Therefore, the constituents of the illusory perception, viz., the mother-of-pearl perceived as *this*, the silverness as a property and the relation of silverness are all real objects. In the illusion 'this is silver' it is these three that appear. The silverness which appears as specifying the mother-of-pearl is a real specifying property of all silver. There is no other specific feature manifest in the illusion, and therefore in illusion nothing but the real manifests itself. Why, then, it may be asked, is the experience of silver in a mother-of-pearl called an illusory experience ? The Naiyāyika replies that an illusion, despite its being the cognition of the real, is called an erroneous cognition because it cognises one thing in the form of another. When in a judgement the character predicated of the subject does not actually belong to the subject, we have an erroneous cognition. This applies to all categories of erroneous cognition, perceptual, inferential, etc. Again, in a sense-illusion there is in the subject the absolute negation or absence of the predicate-character by which it (the subject) is judged. In other words, all illusory experiences are judgemental experiences in which the subject immediately given in experience is explicated or interpreted by means of a predicate. There is no room for illusion in non-judgemental experiences. Where there is no judgement and no interpretation, there is no room for misinterpretation and misrepresentation. In sense-illusion there is necessarily some character predicated of the given subject. But the predicate which is claimed to describe the subject in question belongs to a subject other than the given subject. The predicate specifies the subject, and the relation, actual or merely claimed, between the subject and the predicate is one of specification. An illusion is thus a determinate cognition.

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[1] *tādātmya* is *tadvṛttidharma*.

But a question may be raised, what are the conditions that cause a determinate cognition ? The Naiyāyika maintains the conditions of an illusion as a determinate cognition are the residual trace of past experience (*saṃskāra*) contact of sense and object (*sannikarṣa*) and presence of defect (*doṣa*). Silverness was previously perceived in the silver in a silversmith's shop. Such an experience leaves its trace behind, and the trace of mental disposition of such an experience is one of the conditions. The second condition is stimulation of the visual organ by the mother-of-pearl as bare *this*. Though the mother-of-pearl acts on the visual sense, yet, on account of the presence of defect (defective light, defect of vision, distance, etc), it is not apprehended in its specific character, but only as bare shining somewhat. The lustre apprehended in the object in front of the cogniser revives the trace of silverness left behind by the previous perception of it in the shop. There is unrelatedness between the presented *this* and the revived image of silverness. On account of defect there is non-apprehension of this unrelatedness. The consequent result is a specific cognition in the form 'this is silver'. The Naiyāyika subscribes to the theory of error as an apprehension of what is real (*satkhyāti*). Neither in illusion nor in veridical cognition is there ever any apprehension of the absolutely unreal. Whatever is an object of cognition is also real. In the mother-of-pearl there is no oneness with silver and yet this identity with silver is what appears in the determinate cognition which is the illusion 'this is silver'. How, then, is this illusion to be called an apprehension of reality? The Naiyāyika says in reply that he admits that there is no 'unity of silver' (*rajatatādātmya*) in the mother-of-pearl which is cognised in the form 'this is silver'. But this does not make the unity of silver and mother-of-pearl an unreal fiction. The mere fact that a thing does not exist in one place or time does not make it an absolute unreality. In fact, almost all objects of cognitions, veridical or illusory, would be unreal in this sense, for they exist in some place or time and not in all places and at all times. The unity with silver may not actually exist in a mother-of-pearl, but it exists elsewhere, that is, in silver wherever it is found. In this sense the unity with silver perceived in the mother-of-pearl is no cognition of the unreal. Not to speak of the apprehension of silver in a mother-of-pearl, even the objects which appear in dreams and reflection of the moon that appears in a waterpool are not unreal fictions. They have existence elsewhere though not in their present contexts.

It will not be out of place here to refer to the view of the Neo-Naiyāyika on the point at issue. The Neo-Naiyāyika suggests that the so-called apprehension of an identity of silver in a mother-of-pearl is basically the same as the superimposition of the property of silverness on the presented reality. In other words, it is not a case of the apprehension of the mother-of-pearl as a piece of silver but a determinate cognition of mother-of-pearl as characterised by silverness. The so-called cognition of identity of silver with mother-of-pearl (*tādātmyāropa*) is in reality a case of the superimposition of the property of silverness on the mother-of-pearl (*dharmāropa*). Thus the predicate in the illusory judgement 'this is silver' turns out to be 'silverness' and not a particular piece of silver. Predication is thus a case of attribution of the relation of an adjective to a substantive (*saṃsargāropa*). Thus, according to the Neo-Naiyāyika, both the ascription of identity and of relation are nothing but ascription of a character or property. The question thus arises, if the attribution of the relation of ān adjective to a substantive is nothing but attribution of character, and if the same be true of identity when falsely attributed, how is the Naiyāyika going to dlstinguish between the two? The distinction between the two types of ascriptions has not been obliterated and has been emphasised in the classical works of Nyāya literature.[1] Again, if in every case there is attribution of a character, how are we to explain the deliverance of the experience of correction that follows? When we reject the illusion, we say 'this is not silver' and not 'this does not possess the property of silverness'. In other words, the evidence of correction points to the rejection of an asserted identity, not between '*this*' and 'silverness', but in respect of *this* and a piece of silver. What is rejected is not the relation of an adjective to a substantive as between the silverness and the *this*, but the non-difference or identity between *this* and silver. The rejection is rejection of what was previously cognised. The rejected content is here the identity of silver with the *this*. Therefore, on the evidence of rejection we should admit that what was cognised in the illusion is the *this* as a piece of silver, and not *this* as characterised by silverness. It is absurd to suppose the rejection is rejection of something different from what was cognised in the experience that is rejected. Again, there is no evidence that rejection is rejection of the attribution of a character, and there is no ground for supposing that the original experience was an apprehension of a substantive quilified by an adjective.

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[1] The *Tātparyapariśuddhi* (Metropolitan edition, Calcutta) by Udayana—Pages 390, 392.

But the Naiyāyika seems to be concerned not so much about the false apprehension of identity as with the character of being of the element that is superimposed. The oneness with silver, according to the Naiyāyika, is not unreal. Every silver is silver, and, therefore, is a case of such oneness. This oneness with silver, which is illustrated wherever silver is, is thus nothing unreal. And when in illusion it is cognised in the mother-of-pearl, nothing unreal is cognised thereby. But the objection to this is that the illusory experience does not cognise bare oneness with silver, but it cognises oneness with silver in a substrate where it, in fact, does not exist. Therefore, in so far as this oneness is non-existent in the object lying in front of the cogniser, and yet is cognised in it, the whole theory of the cognition of the real in illusory experience falls to the ground. In fact, if the Naiyāyika were to say that what is cognised in illusion is only the non-difference from silver, the answer is that in that case the rejection would be in the form 'there is no non.difference from silver in the object lying ahead'. But the usual form of the rejection in such a case is 'this is not silver'. The negative judgement 'this is not silver' asserts reciprocal absence or ṇegation (*anyonyābhāva*),[1] i.e., is a denial of identity as distinguished from denial of something in some relation other than the relation of identity. In fact, there is some difference between the statement 'A is not B', and the statement 'A is not in B'. The former rejects the identity of A and B, but does not reject B itself. The latter is an entitative denial of B in

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[1] *Tādātmyasambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitāka abhāva*

A, and is a case of entitative negation (*saṃsargābhāva*).[1] The rejection of an illusion is obviously of the form of rejection of identity. Therefore, the illusion itself must be in the form of assertion of identity and in the form of the identity of silver with the *this* and of the *this* with silver (*anyonyādhyāsa*). Such identity, which appears in the illusion, is not obviously seen elsewhere, and therefore here is, the Naiyāyika must concede, a case of cognition of what is not real.

The escape from this impasse may be sought through the conception of the attribution of relation in place of attribution of identity. And the Naiyāyika may say that the illusion is of the form '*this* has silverness as its property'. To this the obvious objection is that silverness is a universal, and a universal, according to the Naiyāyika, is related to its particular instances by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Therefore, silverness as a universal can be attributed to the *this* only through the relation of inherence. But the *this*, which is the locus of the attribution of the relation of inherence, is the mother-of-pearl cognised only as a bare shining something. And the mother-of-pearl is a substance possessing various qualities, such as size, colour, etc. These qualities are related to the substrate (mother-of-pearl) by the relation of inherence. Thus the mother-of-pearl is something in which the relation of inherence exists. Attribution is always an ascription of what does not exist in a thing. What exists or belongs to a thing we find or discover. We attribute only what does not exist in or belong to a thing. The Naiyāyika says that silverness is predicated of the *this*, i.e., the mother-of-pearl, by the attribution of the relation of inherence. But inherence is already an existent

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1. *Tādātmyavyātiriktasambandhāvacceinnapratiyogitākābhava.*

property of the *this*, i.e., mother-of-pearl. How can that which already exists in the mother-of-pearl be an object attributed to it? In fact, the Naiyāyika believes that there is only one relation of inherence. If inherence be one, and already existent in the mother-of-pearl, how can it be falsely attributed to it? The Naiyāyika may say that though inherence is one, yet we must distinguish between inherence delimited by silverness and that delimited by mother-of-pearl. Thus inherence delimited by silverness belongs to silver and does not belong to the mother-of-pearl, just as inherence delimited by mother-of-pearl belongs to mother-of-pearl and not to silver. Hence, inherence is one, yet it will differ with reference to the different relata it relates. But the point is that if one and the same inherence relation as the substantive (*dharmī*) is to be the substrate of two contradictory properties, viz., delimitation by silverness and non-delimitation by silverness, then it will, because of this internal rift, split into two different inherences. This militates against the Nyāya view that there is only one relation of inherence. Hence, consistently with the Nyāya view it must be said that delimitation by this or that relatum makes no difference to the relation of inherence. Inherence remains one and the same however much the relata may differ, and thus the difficulty as regards the attribution of a character which already exists will remain unsolved. The difficulty of the Naiyāyika arises from his conception of inherence as a relation which is one and the same in all instances. The Advaitin does not believe in the relation of inherence at all, far less in its being one and the same in all cases.

The Naiyāyika replies that though inherence is one, the fact remains that in the mother-of-pearl there is the absolute negation of silverness. The question, why this is so, seems however irrelevant. The reason is that we cannot raise any objection as regards the given nature of an object of experience. It is as absurd to ask why mother-of-pearl is a mother-of-pearl as it is to ask why there is absolute negation of silverness in a mother-of-pearl.

The Advaitin, however, points out that it is not simply a case of the given nature of a thing. The Naiyāyika assumes the existence of a particular relation in the mother-of-pearl, viz. the relation of inherence. Silverness as a property is related to its substrate by this relation. To say that the relation exists in a thing and at the same time to say that which is related by the relation to the thing in question is absolutely non-existent in it is absurd. If the relation to a property exists in a thing, the property which the relation relates must also exist in the thing. In fact, existence of the relation and absolute non-existence of the relatum which the relation relates are mutually incompatible. To say that inherence, by which the silverness is related to the mother-of-pearl, exists in the mother-of-pearl, but not the silverness which this inherence relates to the mother-of-pearl, is an obviously untenable position.

The Naiyāyika may reply that the Advaitin here is guilty of a confusion. What is incompatible is the property of silverness with the absolute absence of the property in question. But there is no incompatibility between the absence of the property with the presence of the relation by means of which the property is related to its substrate. Thus, in spite of the existence of the relation of inherence by which silverness is related, there may yet be absolute non-existence of silverness itself in the mother-of-pearl.

The Advaitin suggests that such a contention will land the Naiyāyika into undesirable consequences. If the relation be an existent feature of the mother-of-pearl, then he cannot say that the illusion is a case of attribution of a relation. What exists in a thing cannot be attributed to it as we have already pointed out. Therefore, the Naiyāyika will have to admit that illusion is a case of the attribution of a property. And what he has said about illusion being a case of an attribution of a relation falls to the ground.

The Naiyāyika may say that whether there is attribution of a relation or of a property his own theory is unaffected. If he admits only attribution of a property (silverness), the question in that case is what will be the form of the illusory judgement in such a contingency ? It would be of the form 'this silverness' and not 'this is silver.' It would be of the nature of a conjunctive experience (*samūhālambanajñāna*) of the terms *per se*, for the relation between *this* and silverness does not enter into the illusory attribution. In other words, it would be consciousness of an unrelated manifold and not of one single substantive characterised by an adjective. But this would amount to the negation of illusion as illusion.

Another objection to this view is that when the illusion is corrected in a subsequent experience, the resulting experience of correction shows itself in the form of the absence of the relation of silverness in the mother-of-pearl. If the primary experience had not been an experience of relation, how can the resulting cognition be in the form of an experience of the negation of relation in question ? Therefore, the deliverance of the experience of correction clearly points to the primary experience being an experience of the relation of silverness to the *this* (i. e., mother-of-pearl cognised as *this*). Negation as disbelief of relation presupposes a primary experience of belief of relation. Therefore, the Naiyāyika must admit that the illusion involves an attribution of relation and not merely of the property of silverness. Since this relation is rejected and negatived by the experience of correction, it cannot be the real relation of inherence of the Naiyāyika. Thus, the Naiyāyika has to concede the appearance of an unreal relation. This gives away the whole case of the theory of error as an apprehension of the real (*satkhyāti*). In fact, the Naiyāyika must admit all error to be a case of the experience of the indefinable. As rejected and negatived, it cannot be anything real. As actually presenting itself in the illusory experience, it is, again, not absolutely unreal as is a barren mother. It is thus not desfinable either as real or as unreal (*sadasadbhyām anirvācyam*).

The Naiyāyika has, of course, said that silverness is real in other places and times and so is the relation between silverness and silver. Why should we suppose, then, that in illusion what appears is an unreal property or an unreal relation ? The silverness and its relation to silver can be actually found in the silver of the silversmith's shop. Thus the question of an unreal something appearing in any unreal relation does not arise.

The Advaitin in reply points out that there is no evidence to prove that the silverness or the relation of silverness to the *this* that appears in the illusion is a real silverness or a real relation existing elsewhere. In the illusory experience what presents itself is a silverness as related to the *this* in front of the cogniser. This does not in any way show that this silverness or its relation has existence elsewhere. The Naiyāyika cannot say that the proof of the existence of silverness or its relation elsewhere is the illusion itself. In the illusion what actually appears is a silverness related to a here-and-now object. It does not reveal the silverness or its relation as being real elsewhere. If the illusion had revealed the reality of silverness or its relation elsewhere, then the person seeking silver would not have reached out towards the object before him. Similarly, the correction that follows is in the form of the negative judgement 'this is not silver'. The negatum which is denied in this negative judgement is silver as such, not a silver existing elsewhere. We say 'this is not silver' and not 'this is not a silver existing elsewhere'. Rejection in the locus of the *this* does not involve also the position of the rejected content in a different locus belonging to a different place or time. In fact, all that really follows from the deliverance of an illusory experience is that silver appeared as real in the locus of the *this*, and is what is negatived as unreal in a subsequent experience of correction. It does not prove the existence of the silver in a different locus and at a different time.

But the Naiyāyika may ask how is it possible for the silver to be real at the time of the illusion ? Further, if the silver be real in the mother-of-pearl when illusion occurs, how can it be negatived ? If something exists in some locus or substrate, it cannot at the same time be negatived in that locus. Therefore, if the silver is real in the *this*, it cannot be negatived. And if it can be negatived or denied in respect of the *this*, it cannot be real in it at the same time.

The Advaitin points out that this is hardly an objection worth serious consideration. Consider any real object, such as an earthen jar. The jar comes into being through the putting together of the clay potsherds. If we smash the jar to pieces by the stroke of an iron rod, the jar ceases to be in the potsherds in which it once existed. So, in the same way in the illusion the silver becomes real in the *this*, and in the correction the silver is unactualised and negatived in the self-same *this*. But that does not mean that the negatived silver in the *this* simply changes position, and becomes real as before, but in a different place and time.

The Naiyāyika thinks that there is, however, some difference here. Hitting the jar with an iron rod, and thereby breaking it to pieces is quite different from correction of an illusion. There is a causal relation established by agreement in presence and agreement in absence between the stroke of an iron rod and the destruction of the jar. But perception of the specific character of the locus of the illusion is a form of cognition. And cognition cannot effect the destruction of an object.

In reply to this the Advaitin suggests that there is no difference between the two cases. Just as causal relation is established by agreement in presence and absence between the hitting with a rod and the destruction of a jar, so is an invariable relation established between the perception of the locus of the illusion and the cancellation of the illusory content.

But the question is how is it possible for the real silver to be produced in the locus of the mother-of-pearl? Where are the causal conditions for the production thereof? The Advaitin suggests in reply that the cause has to be assumed on the basis of the effect actually observed. Because ordinary causes are not applicable to a particular case of an effect, one is thereby not justified in denying the reality of the given effect. The given in experience is our starting point. If it cannot be accounted for by the ordinary methods of explanation, other methods are to be resorted to and such causes as will suffice to explain the given effect are to be imagined. The Naiyāyika himself is a follower of this rule. When the baked jar appears with a colour different from that of its unbaked state, he imagines a complete destruction of the unbaked jar into its atomic constituents and *re*-production of the jar as a whole out of the atomic constituents through contact with fire. In this case the usual conditions, viz. the potter, the potter's stick, wheel, etc. are all absent and yet a new jar has come into being. The same consideration will apply *mutatis mutandis* to the case of illusion. The illusory object comes into being through other than the ordinary causes of an object.

The Naiyāyika objects that the assumption of the production of an illusory object and the illusory cognition thereof will entail unnecessary multiplication of hypotheses (*kalpanāgaurava*) It is simpler to assume the appearance of a silver real elsewhere in the illusion in question. Thus, while the theory of the apprehension of the false or indefinable entails unnecessary multiplication of assumptions, the Nyāya theory of wrong reference has the merit of parsimony. But the answer to this is that the question of parsimony arises if one is to account for an object apart from the question of its illusoriness or the opposite. But, once it is granted that the object is an illusory object, all questions of parsimony are laid to rest. In other words, once an illusory object is conceded, the question of multiplicity of assumptions does not arise. It is a multiplicity that is based on the solid ground of facts (*phalamukha-gaurava*) and as such is a logically justifiable multiplicity of assumptions. The multiplicity is realized after the production of the effect and not before. Further, in the visual perception of silver, contact of the silver and the organ of vision is a necessary condition. But there is no contact of the eye with the silver that is existent elsewhere in an illusory experience. Again, as we have already seen, the deliverance of the illusory experience contradicts the appearance of a silver that is real elsewhere. Neither the illusion nor its subsequent correction proves an elsewhere silver as the content of the illusion. Nor is there any other evidence in proof of the appearance of such silver. Hence, it follows that illusion has to be accounted for by means of the appearance of an unprecedented (*apūrva*) or indefinable silver as its content.

The Naiyāyika submits in reply that experience does not always bear out the Advaita contention that in no case of an illusory perception is there any possibility of any contact of sense and object. As a matter of fact, sometimes we have simultaneous perception of a piece of silver and a plate of tin, each in the character of the other, the tin plate as silver and a silver piece as a tin plate. Here both the tin plate and the silver are in contact with the visual organ, so that it cannot be said that there is no contact of sense and object in the resulting illusion.

The Advaitin, however, points out that the Naiyāyika misses one important point. The mere fact that sense-object contact is present in the case in question does not prove that it is a generative condition of illusion. Sometimes we make an inference in respect of an object that is actually present to our perceptive organ. But the presence of the object to sense is no cause or condition of our inference. If the object of inference had been the cause of inference, the object would not be a perceived object but an object inferred. Where a cognition is produced by the object of cognition we have perception. In the case in question we infer and do not perceive the object present to our sense. Therefore, the presence of an object to sense is no cause or generative condition of the inference that we make. In the same way in the illusion referred to, both silver and tin plate may be present to sense, but confusion of one as the other, i. e., silver as a tin plate and the tin plate as silver, is not due to any contact between the sense and the object.

The Naiyāyika may, however, rejoin that to the hypothesis of an inferential reasoning being caused by the object of inference, there is an obvious objection. If inference had been caused by the object of inference, inference would lose its distinctive character and become the same as perception. Further, in respect of inference of past, future and distant objects, there is obviously no sense-object contact as its condition. But in the particular case in question, i. e., in the illusion of silver as the tin plate, etc., there is no such counteractive factor which may be regarded as an objection.

The Advaitin points out in reply that there is a counteractive condition and it is an ineluctable hurdle for the Naiyāyika. If the illusory perception had been due to any sense-object contact, then the illusion would cease to be illusion and become a valid perception. According to the Naiyāyika's own admission, in the case of a perceptual judgement the contact of sense with the substantive qualified by an adjective is an excellence that conduces to the validity of the resulting cognition.[1] Therefore if the cognition of tin plate as silver be due to contact of sense with silver, the resulting cognition will be a valid perception, and not an illusion. In fact, it must be noted that for the visual perception of a substance the contact of the substance with the visual sense is the condition. Recollection or disposition left behind by past experience or defect of media, e.g. of sense-organ, etc., does not constitute the contact. Therefore, the Naiyāyika must either concede that there is no illusion in the case in question, but a valid perception through contact between sense and object, or confess that the resulting illusion has nothing to do with contact of sense and silver. In other words, what presents itself in the illusory experience is the object that does not exist in the place in question, i. e., an indefinable object, definable neither as real nor as unreal. The Advaitin holds that this indefinable object of an illusion is a modification of nescience and so is the cognition of this illusory object a function of it. In other words, the cognition of the illusion is no empirical cognition as a mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*). All empirical cognitions are cognitions through a mental mode. But illusory experience is no ordinary cognition in this sense as it does not function as an empirical cognition or as a normal conscious state. We may say that consciousness of the illusory object is no cognitive consciousness, strictly speaking. It is, in the words of Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya, a non-cognitive consciousness[1] of an object that lacks strict empirical reality.

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[1] Sannikarṣo guṇastu, etc.—*Kārikā*—132—*Bhāṣāpariccheda* Pratyakṣaviśeṣaṇavad viśeṣyasannikarṣo guṇaḥ—*Muktāvalī*—*Kārikā* 132.

The Naiyāyika suggests that the object of the illusory experience in question is not silver but a mother-of-pearl. On account of a defect the mother-of-pearl does not appear, but the silver appears instead, and the presence of defect is admitted on all hands as the condition of illusion. This defect produces the wrong reference of knowledge. But the Advaitin goes further and, ignoring all rules of parsimony, not merely asserts an illusory experience as a result of defect but also an illusory object of such experience. The Naiyāyika admits only an illusion in the experience in question, and not a perverted object of experience, and in this respect he claims parsimony as a special merit of his theory.

But the position is hardly tenable. That the silver is the object that appears in the illusion in question is a fact certified by immediate experience. In asserting that it is the mother-of-pearl and not silver that is the object of the illusion, the Naiyāyika is at variance with the immediate deliverance of experience. To say that the object of cognition is something other than that which is actually cognised in the cognition does not make sense. Hence, there is no getting away from the fact that there is an illusory object and not merely the illusory experience of an object. Once an illusory object is shown to be a fact, the question of violation of the law of parsimony does not arise. Nor can it be said that defect can result only in a wrong reference or confused experience and not in any illusory object, as we never find that what causes knowledge also causes the object of knowledge. For the Advaitin points out that it is also never found that the eye and the other organs of sense by themselves are the causes of an illusory experience. How, then, does the Naiyāyika ascribe illusory experiences to the eye and the other organs of sense or their deficiencies? In fact, the Nyāya point of view will lead logically to the denial of all illusions, which is the view of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas. If one is not allowed to assume a cause which is not a *vera causa*, then the Naiyāyika will sail in the same boat as the Prābhākara. As we have already explained, experience is our starting point and all phenomena of experience have to be explained by suitable and sufficient causes or reasons. If no ordinary cause will do we have every right to conceive a cause other than the ordinary or the common. What causes knowledge may not ordinarily cause the object of knowledge. But the illusory object is the fact of experience. Since it cannot be explained by anything else than that which causes the illusion as an experience, the Advaitin is perfectly justified in assuming defect or nescience as the root both of illusory experience and the object of illusion.

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[1] K. C. Bhattacharyya—The false and the subjective—in '*Studies in Philosophy*'—Vol. II.

Further, the Nyāya contention that illusion can be explained as nothing but a cognition of a substrate in a form or character which does not belong to it does not bear examination. Such a view cannot explain the illusory experience in question. The illusory experience is stated in the form 'I saw an illusory object'. When one perceives the illusoriness of an illusion, one expresses oneself in the words 'I had the experience of an illusory object'. If the Naiyāyika should explain such experiences as seeing one object in the form of another and not a false object as the object of illusion, he would be flying in the face of introspective evidence. What introspection reveals is the illusoriness of a substantive silver qualified by silverness and not a substantive mother-of-pearl appearing as qualified by silverness. The Naiyāyika speaks of the falsity of the illusory experience' and not the falsity of the object of experience: But this is obviously not the deliverance of introspection. In fact, the contention of the Naiyāyika amounts to the assertion that the property of silverness is what appears, in the illusory experience, in the substrate of the mother-of-pearl cognised as *this*. But how can a property appear except as incarnate in its proper substrate? Do we ever perceive manhood as such without its concrete embodiment in this or that instance of manhood as this or that man? Do we perceive silverness as an abstract universal without concretization as this or that particular silver? The Naiyāyika makes much of this in the judgement 'this is silver', the *this* being, according to him, the mother-of-pearl in its generic character as something shining. But we may have silver as predicate with *this* as subject in an illusion as the Naiyāyika says, and also silver as subject or substantive with *this* as predicate or qualifying adjective (*idaṃ rajatam, rajatam idam*). There is no fixed rule that in illusion the *this* should always be the subject or substantive. This is why the *Laghucandrikā*[1] mentions the five different superimpositions in the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl. Therefore, it is obvious that where *this* is the predicate and silver the subject, there is no room for the mother-of-pearl functioning as the locus or substantive object of the illusion in question. Moreover, the property of knowledge is common to true as well as false knowing. Therefore, true knowing does not differ from false knowing *quā* knowing. The conclusion thus follows that difference arises from their respective objects, the object of true knowing being the real, and the object of illusion being the false or the illusory. It is because of the falsity of the object that a knowing is a false knowing.

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[1] Gauḍa Brahmānanda, the author of the *Laghucandrikā*, a gloss on Madhusūdana's *Advaitasiddhi*, maintains that there are five different superimpositions in the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl. What is superimposed is silver or *āropya* or the content of superimposition. That on which silver is superimposed is mother-of-pearl appearing as a bare *this*, and this is called *āropa-viṣaya* or the substrate. As per Advaita ontology this generic character of the mother-of-pearl as a shining *this* is *Caitanya* or Consciousness, as delimited by the form of the *this* (*idamāvacchinna Caitanya*). On consciousness quâ *this* are superimposed, the silver, the identity of silver, and silverness, that is the property of the silver in question. Consider again from the side of the mother-of-pearl. The bare *this* lies superimposed on consciousness, and consciousness quâ *this* masquerades as silver. The *thisness* a property of the this in question is also superimposed on the basic consciousness. Thus there are all told five different supersmpositions *three* from the side of the content or *āropya*, the silver, the identity of silver, and silverness, and *two* from the side of the substrate or *viṣaya*, the *this* and the thisness characterising the *this*. (The *Laghucandrikā*, Kumbha Konam Edn, p. 12).

It may be argued, however, that the Advaitin accepts a false silver as the object of the illusion. The question arises whether the silverness of the real silver applies also to the false silver? If it be said that the silverness that is found in the real silver is true also of the false silver in so far as both are called silver, then the Advaita theory becomes only a variant of the Nyāya theory of wrong reference. The Advaita theory, thus formulated, amounts to the assertion that the silverness which is found in the real silver somehow appears also in the false silver, which is not much different from saying that silver real elsewhere is seen in the locus of the illusion. If it be said that the silverness of the real silver does not attach to the false silver, then there cannot be any common character between the true and the false silver that can explain the apprehension of both as being of the nature of silver. Unless there is something identical in the two cases, apprehension of a persistent common character or the use of the same name, silver, in both cases would be inexplicable. It cannot be said that in the real silver we have one silverness and in the illusory silver a quite different silverness, for in that case the word silver ceases to have any fixed meaning.

In answer to the above objection the Advaitin points out that in the illusion 'this is silver', there is generated a mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) which has mother-of-pearl in the form of a bare *this* as its object. On account of the presence of a defect the specific features of the mother-of-pearl *quā* mother-of-pearl are not apprehended. Thereafter, because of the defect the nescience *quā* the stuff of the mother-of-pearl in its specific character becomes transformed into the form of silver as object and in the form of the apprehension of silver masquerading as knowledge of silver. The entire phenomenal world is made of the stuff of nescience, which bifurcates itself into the objective datum and the subjective cognition of it. So both cognition and its content are superimpositions upon Pure Consciousness, the Absolute Brahman, which alone is real. In other words, the ignorance or nescience that prevents the appearance of the mother-of-pearl in its specific character as a mother-of-pearl makes it appear as a mere *this*. Thereafter, the same nescience concretizes and determines itself into a specific silver on the objective side and illusory cognition of silver on the subjective side. In other words, there is a cognitive process apprehending the mother-of-pearl as *this* minus its specific character, and out of this ignorance regarding the specific features of the mother-of-pearl arises an illusory silver as object. This silver is not the object of any epistemic cognitive process strictly speaking, but is an object of a specific mode of nescience bearing upon the mother-of-pearl. The cognitive process having *this* as its object and the non-cognitive experience of the illusory silver are not discriminated because of the presence of the defect. The result is an illusory sense of unity (*ekatvābhimāna*) of the two experiences, the cognitive and the non-cognitive, the epistemic and the extra-epistemic.

A non-cognitive function of nescience (*avidyāvṛtti*) can never have a real thing for its object, and a cognitive process cannot have any illusory thing as its object. And under the circumstances one is justified in supposing two different kinds of experience in every illusion, i. e., a cognitive experience of the real (the mother-of-pearl as the *this*) as its object, and a non-cognitive experience of the illusory silver. And there is no logical incongruity in the supposition of two species of experience, as without such supposition the nature of illusion will be inexplicable. In other words, the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl, when analysed, reveals the following elements. When the mother-of-pearl is perceived as *this*, it is not perceived in its specific character as a mother-of-pearl. Therefore, the percept *this* involves ignorance in respect of other distinguishing characters of the *this* (mother-of-pearl). It is this ignorance or nescience underlying the *this* that modifies itself into the form of a silver. Since silver is a modification of nescience in the form of *this*, it appears as determining the *this*. This is what the illusion involves on the objective side. Corresponding to the objective side, there is also a subjective apprehension of the illusory object thus generated, and it involves the following elements. There is, in the first place, a cognitive process (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) of the *this*, which is the mother-of-pearl minus its specific character. There is thus involved also, besides cognition, non-cognition or nescience in respect of the determinate character of the mother-of-pearl. And this nescience modifies itself into the cognition of illusory silver. In other words, the nescience in respect of mother-of-pearl and the nescience in respect of the apprehension of mother-of-pearl are one and the same nescience, that is subjective ignorance, on the one side, and truncated objectivity, on the other. The result is that the subjective ignorance appears as one with the subjective cognition, i. e., the cognition of *this* appears as one with the cognition of silver, just as the illusory silver on the objective side appears as one with the real mother-of-pearl in its generic character as *this*. This is why two experiences, the cognitive and the non-cognitive, appear as one.

The objection to the view is that, while in the experience of correction, the object *this* and the silver, which gives its determinate character, fall apart and are discriminated as separate things, there is no corresponding discrimination on the subjective side between the apprehension of the *this* and the apprehension of silver. The reply to this is that the condition for apprehending the two objects as separate are not the same as the conditions for the discrimination of the two experiences of the said two objects. Even though the objects may be discriminated and separated in consciousness, it does not follow that there must necessarily be a corresponding discrimination of the experiences of the two objects. As a matter of fact, some amongst the Advaitins maintain that there is no rule that along with the identification of the two objects in an illusory experience (the *this* and the silver) there must be a corresponding identification of the experiences thereof (the consciousness of the *this* and the consciousness of the silver). Even in the absence of two experiencess apprehended as one single experience, there can very well ensue the usual endeavour of the person seeking silver to reach for the object in front of him.

It may be pointed out that the consciousness of the *this* is an object of the non-temporal witnessing intelligence (*sākṣi*). In other words, it is a non-temporal internal intelligence that can certify a temporal mode as a temporal subjective state. And what is the object of such intelligence has no being other than presentation to conciousness (*ajñātasattā*). Its *esse* is its *percipi*. Therefore, there is no room for any unknown element in such cases. How, then, can the Advaitin assert any ignorance underlying a temporal mental mode ?

The Advaitin points out in reply that this is right in so far as it is maintained that a cognitive process, being an object of the timeless eternal intelligence, does not contain any unknown element in it. But it does not mean that there cannot be anything unknown in respect of the *object* of the said cognitive process. In other words, there is a distinction between the cognitive state itself and its objective reference. The cognitive or the subjective state itself may have in it nothing unknown to the pure intelligence of which it is the object. But the same may not be true in respect of the *object* to which the cognitive state refers.

SOME FURTHER REMARKS ON THE FALSITY OF THE COGNITION AND THE FALSITY OF THE OBJECT

It may conduce to clearness if we go into a detailed statement of the two different approaches to the problem of illusion of the older school of Advaitins represented by Padmapāda, the author of the *Pañcapādikā*, and the later school represented by Prakāśātmayati, the author of the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*, Citsukha, the author of the *Tattvapradīpikā*, and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the author of the *Advaita-siddhi*. The only exception among the later Advaitins in this respect is Nṛsiṃhāśrama, the author of the *Advaita-Dīpikā* and the *Vivaraṇabhāvaprakāśikā*, who upholds the older view of Padmapāda, the author of the *Pañcapādikā*.

In the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl, Padmapāda points out, the elements involved are the sense-organ concerned, viz., the eye, residual traces of previous experiences of silver and certain defects. There is contact of the eye with the mother-of-pearl which is apprehended generically as *this* because of defect, and also the resuscitation of memory traces of past experiences of silver because of similarity with the object perceived as a this shining something. As a result, we have the perception of mother-of-pearl in the form of silver in the judgement 'this is silver'. In other words, because of association with defect the sense-organ in contact with the mother-of-pearl does not apprehend it in its distinctive character. The question, however, may be asked if the presence of defect has prevented the sense from perceiving the mother-of-pearl as such, then how is it that it has not also prevented it from apprehending the object in its generic character as a bare *this*. If defect could have prevented the appearance of the specific character, it might also have prevented the appearance of its generic character. The Advaitin points out that the power of a cause can be ascertained only from the effect it produces. How far defect interferes with the apprehension of objects is to be ascertained only from the resulting perception in question. In fact, power is not an object of experience *a priori* or *a posteriori*, and has to be deduced in accordance with its observed effects. Defective sense in this case has the observed effect of preventing the apprehension of the specific character only, and not of the generic character of the object apprehended. Therefore, one is justified in assuming that in accordance with the deliverance of experience the work of defect in this case extends only to interference with the appearance of the specific character, and not with that of the generic character of the object perceived. Whether defect interferes with the appearance of an object in all respects or only in respect of some of its features can be ascertained only from an examination of the resulting experience. Now, just as defect is an interfering factor in the appearance of the specific character, it has also a positive function in exciting the disposition or traces of past experiences. The result is the appearance of a false object or a false silver in the mother-of-pearl because of the resuscitated traces of silver through defect associated with the sense-organ concerned. Because the object of the resulting experience is false (false silver), the experience itself is declared to be a false experience. In other words the falsity of a false experience does not appertain to the experience but to the object of the experience. The experience itself is not false as is shown by the subsequent experience of rejection, which rejects the object of the experience as false, but does not deny the experience itself.[1]

From the above account of the view of the author of the *Pañcapādikā* it is obvious, that according to the older school, which the author represents, an illusory cognition is one single cognition resulting from a mental mode caused by a defective sense-organ. What makes the cognition false is falsity of the object that is cognised. Because the silver perceived is an illusory silver, the perception is declared to be an illusory perception. In its intrinsic nature no cognition is false. This is proved by the knowledge of correction that follows. When we correct the illusion we reject the object as a false object. We do not reject the experience thereof. If illusion involved not merely a false object, but also a false cognition of an object then rejection would be rejection of both the object and of the experience of the object. In other words, the correction would be not merely in the form 'this is not silver' but also in the form 'this silver cognition (in the *this*) is no silver cognition.' But this is not how the experience of correction presents itself. We reject the silver, but do not say that there was no experience of silver. In support of his own position Padmapāda refers to Śaṃkarācāryya, who recognises even dreams *quā* experiences as real, though their objects are false.[2]

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1. Tasya ca doṣotthāpitasaṃskāraviśeṣasahitasāmagrisamutpannajñānasyocitameva śuktigatamithyārajatamālamvanamavabhāsate. Tena mithyālamvanajñānaṃ mithyājñānaṃ, na svatojñānasya mithyātvaṃ bhavati, bādhābhāvāt—The *Pañcapādikā*, pages 196 to 200 (Metropolitan edn)

2. The *Brahmasūtra* - Śaṇkarabhāṣya - Chapter 2, pāda 1, sūtra 11.

It may not be out of place here to distinguish between the Advaita conception of falsity as set forth above and the Nyāya conception of it. The Naiyāyika also uses the term false but he conceives it in a sense quite different from that of the Advaitin. To the Naiyāyika, there is nothing false in the sense of being absolutely unreal. All the different elements of an illusory experience, according to the Naiyāyika, are real —the substrate is real, the superimposed element is real, and the relation holding between the superimposed character and its locus is real elsewhere. Falsity is not due to the falsity of the object of illusion, for no object of experience *ex hypothesi* can be absolutely unreal. Falsity is just a non-coincidence of the subject and the predicate in the illusion. It is the reference of a predicate to a subject which does not accept it. In short, error or falsity is the cognition of one real in the form of another real. In Advaita, the cognition is false because it has a false content, and this false knowledge is due to an incomplete knowledge of the substrate. The subject of an erroneous cognition, according to the Advaitin, is real, the predicate is false, and the error is a coupling of the real with the false, while in Nyāya error is a subjective coupling of one real—with another real.

According to the author of the *Pañcapādikā*, as stated above, the false object which makes the experience thereof a false experience is a transformation of ignorance or nescience relating to the substrate of the illusory object. Defect, as we have said, prevents the appearance of the specific character of the mother-of-pearl. We have seen that defect functions both negatively and positively. It prevents the appearance of the specific character of the mother-of-pearl, and it projects the appearance of silver. But these two aspects are not unrelated. The negative function is nothing but a form of nescience as regards the specific character of the substrate. And it is this ignorance that transforms itself into a presented silver as the object of the illusion. There is thus an objective falsity only, but there is no corresponding subjective falsity, strictly speaking. The nescience as regards a mother-of-pearl becomes an objective illusory silver. It does not become a subjective illusory false experience. This is the view of the older school, and they justify their view by an appeal to the deliverance of the experience of correction that follows. Correction says, that 'this is not silver', and does not say, 'this experience was not silver experience.'

The later Advaitins here join issue with the author of the *Pañcapādikā*. They contend that illusion is not simply an experience of an illusory object. The falsity of the experience is not due merely to the falsity of the object. There is besides the false object a false experience also. In other words, just as we have to admit a coupling of a real and a false object on the objective side, a similar coupling or identification of false and a true experience has to be admitted on the subjective side. This is the view of the author of the *Vivaraṇa* and other Neo-Advaitins. According to them, just as we suppose nescience relating to the mother-of-pearl transforming itself into a false silver as the object of the illusion, so also the nescience relating to the consciousness of the mother-of-pearl as a mere *this* through association with defect and traces of past experiences of silver transforms itself into the consciousness of silver. Thus one and the same nescience appertains to both the object, *this*, and consciousness of the object as *this*. The nescience relating to the *this* becomes transformed into an object and the nescience relating to the consciousness of the *this* takes the form of an illusory consciousness of the object as silver. Hence, according to these later Advaitins, both an illusory silver and an illusory experience of silver are transformations of nescience appertaining to the mother-of-pearl. Because one and the same nescience transforms itself into the object and the subjective experience of the object in the illusion in question, both the object and the experience of the object in the illusion in question are declared to be false. The view of the Neo-Advaitin is thus that the experience of a false object cannot but be false. Just as a false object cannot be the object of a true cognition, so also a real object cannot be the object of a false experience arising from nescience. In other words, in illusion both the experience and the object of experience are false. There is not merely a superimposition of a real on a false object and of a false object on a real object, there is also on the subjective side a corresponding reciprocal superimposition of true and false experiencing. In defence of their theory of two superimpositions—subjective and objective—the Neo-Advaitins point out, that unless a subjective coupling of a true and a false experience is conceded besides a coupling of a real and a false object, it would be impossible to explain certain established facts of experience. For example, we have not merely illusory experience but also subsequent recollection of our illusory experience through the traces left behind by such experience. But if no subjective illusory experience be recognised, as the older school does, later recollection of the illusory would be impossible. If there were no experiences, there would also be no traces left behind by experiences, and, if there were no traces of experiences, there would be no recollection of the experiences, through revival of the traces. This holds both of illusory and veridical experiences. The older school admits an illusory object but no illusory experiences and thus cannot explain the established fact of recollection of our non-veridical experiences. If the object alone were illusory and there were no illusory experience of the object, there would be no illusion, strictly speaking. Of a false object there cannot be any cognitive experience through a usual mental mode. A cognitive process operates through the senses and the other valid sources of knowledge. There cannot be any question of contact of the eye or any other sense-organ with an illusory object. Therefore, the illusory experience must involve some mode other than a modification of the mind. Hence, to explain an illusory experience we have to assume some function of nescience through which the false experience operates.

It may be asked, however, that why should not the mind operate through its ordinary cognitive functions in the apprehension of the illusory object? Why should we assume a function or mode of nescience as an instrument of the experience? The answer is that the illusory object is an apparent object. An apparent object has no existence beyond the duration of its appearance in consciousness. In other words, the apparent object has no independent being or being lasting beyond the consciousness of it. Its *esse* is concomitant with its *percipi*. Such a being cannot be in contact with sense or an object of perception in the ordinary sense. How can it be perceived through a sense-object contact if it has no antecedent being beyond our perception of it? If the perception of it were to be caused by any contact between the sense and the object, it must exist, in the first place, independently of the perception and come in contact with the sense. It is only after such sense-object contact that the perception of it may arise. But according to the very nature of the case it has no existence before the perception of it. A thing, whose existence is concomitant with its perception, cannot be supposed to be perceived through an antecedent sense-object contact. Therefore, it is contended by the Neo-Advaitins that the illusory object is not an object of sense-perception through an ordinary cognitive apparatus. How is it apprehended then? As a construction of nescience it cannot be an object of cognition. It must therefore be conceded that the illusory content is revealed only by the pure timeless consciousness, the witnessing intelligence or *sākṣī*.

But it may be argued that the witnessing intelligence is a timeless consciousness, and a timeless consciousness does not cease in time and leave its residual trace behind. But, unless we admit such traces of illusory experiences, the recollection of past illusory experience through revival of its trace would be inexplicable. Besides how can there be any relation between the pure witnessing intelligence and the silver, made of nescience stuff? The only escape from these difficulties, according to the latter school lies in the admission of a subjective mode of nescience as the intermediary between the Pure Intelligence and the individual experiencer. It is by reflecting itself on this mode of nescience functioning in the individual experiencer that the Pure Intelligence reveals the illusory silver as its object. Because the silver is illusory the experience thereof is an illusory experience, a mode of nescience referring to the illusory object lighted up by the Pure Intelligence. In other words, it is by appropriating or reflecting the intelligence of the witnessing consciousness that the mode of nescience becomes the consciousness of the illusory object. In fact, by itself the psychic mode which is the illusory experience of the illusory silver, being a mode of nescience, is non-intelligent or unconscious. Only by appropriating or reflecting the intelligence of the witnessing consciousness does it become the conscious experience of an illusory object. In other words, the psychic mode lighting up the illusory object is just a figure of speech. The real fact in the case is that the witnessing intelligence as reflected in the psychic mode lights up or reveals the illusory silver as a conscious experience thereof.

Before we conclude we may briefly refer to the three different positions we have discussed above. We may say that the Nyāya view, which reduces the illusoriness of the illusory experience to an illusory cognition as wrong reference, represents the thesis. In other words, for Nyāya the essence of illusion centres in the cognition as distinguished from the object of cognition. Padmapāda, it may be said, represents the antithesis. Illusion, according to him, consists, not in an illusory cognition, but in the illusoriness of the content cognised. The Vivaraṇa school represents a synthesis of the thesis and the antithesis in its view of illusion as consisting in both an illusory experience and an illusory object thereof.

It may not be out of place here to make some further observations of our own on the Advaita standpoint as represented by the Neo-Advaitins. A distinction is made by the Neo-Advaitins, as is obvious from the above account, between an ordinary cognitive experience and an illusory experience. The latter is regarded as occurring through a function of nescience, while the former, i. e., ordinary cognition results from sense-object contact and other accredited sources of knowledge. In other words, while ordinary empirical knowing is through a mode of the internal organ which functions in knowing, illusory experience is through a function of nescience, as it is called. But it may be urged that the internal organ is itself a mode of nescience, and the distinction thus made between a mental mode as functioning in ordinary knowing and a mode of nescience as functioning in illusory experience is thus a distinction without a difference. The

Advaita answer to such a charge will be that we have to recognise, not merely grades of falsity, but also falsity within falsity. Thus the distinction between the falsity of the empirically real and the apparently real is a distinction within the domain of falsity. The former falsity, i. e., falsity which is the empirical reality, is actually observed to possess the capacity to annul the falsity which is apparent. And the latter falsity, is never observed to annul the falsity which is an empirical reality. In fact, the Advaita view of falsity within falsity can be illustrated by reference to dream experience. We may not only dream within a dream, with a dream awakening from a dream dreaming, we may also have a dream correction of a dream illusion by a dream empiricality.

We have so far gone into details about the different theories of the *modus operandi* of illusory experience. Our discourse, however, would be incomplete without a chapter on the nature and essence of falsity, i. e., a definition of falsity as such.

Part Two

FALSITY

WHAT IS FALSITY ?

So far we have been considering a critical analysis of false experience with special reference to its epistemological antecedents. A definition of falsity, however, is a necessary supplement to the enquiry that has preceded, though logically we should have started with a definition of the false as a necessary propaedeutic to our discourse. It has not been possible, however, to comply with the logical requirements, for a precise logical definition of the false presupposes some ideas about its nature and conditions. The present part will deal with the definitions of the false as expounded by Advaita writers, such as Padmapāda, the author of the *Pañcapādikā*, Prakāśātmayati, the author of the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*, Citsukha, the author of the *Tattvapradīpikā*, and other post-Śaṃkarite writers on Advaita.

Some preliminary remarks will not be out of place before we enter into a detailed exposition of the problem. The false is false only as contrasted with the true, and the common-sense view is that the world of waking experience is the reality against which illusion, hallucination and dream stand out as false. The Advaitin, however, extends the concept of falsity to the world of practical experience as well. And the difficulty, therefore, in regard to the Advaita definition of the false is that there is no agreement between the Advaitin and the common-sense realist, such as the Naiyāyika or the Mādhva, as regards the denotation of the false. For the Advaitin it is not merely the content of an illusion that is false, but also the contents of our ordinary waking experience. For the common-sense realist, however, falsity attaches only to some kinds of experience, such as illusion, hallucination and dream and their objects, but not to our normal experience of a physical world and other selves like ourselves. In any dispute between two rival schools of philosophy there must be a common ground in respect of which the opposing points of view can be urged with reason and logic. Where there is no agreement as regards the subject-matter to be defined the question of precise definition as against an apparent one becomes a quest of dubious value. We have the stock example of falsity in the illusion of a mother-of-pearl as silver. This is agreed to by both the Advaitin and his realist opponent representing the common-sense standpoint. The Advaitin, however, extends the denotation of illusion so as to include our normal practical world of things and beings within it. This would appear to be a *prima facie* logical flaw in the Advaita approach to the problem of definition. If we reduce all things to dream stuff, then the distinction between dream and truth ceases to have any meaning. This is obviously a serious objection to the procedure of the Advaitin. But the Advaitin justifies his stand by recognising the Absolute as Truth as distinguished from the world as false appearance. What is necessary, according to the Advaitin, is a rock-bed of truth that will explain the illusory and the false. It is not necessary that the world of practical experience should be this substantial Truth and Reality against which the illusory and the false should be defined.

The definitions of the false that the Advaitin offers thus all are bound up with his proof of the falsity of the world, and the controversy that centres round the question whether the concept of falsity does square with the facts of practical experience of a real world of things and beings. Vyāsatīrtha, a trenchant critic of the Advaita metaphysics, sums up in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, the common-sense view of illusory or the false in eleven different definitions of falsity, and refutes them all from the point of view of Mādhva realism. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in his *Advaitasiddhi*, selects only five of these different definitions and seeks to re-establish them. The rest of the definitions and the Mādhva objections thereto Madhusūdana ignores as either obviously faulty or as being not of sufficient controversial importance or possessed of substantial value. Gauḍa Brahmānanda, the author of the *Laghucandrikā*, a gloss on the *Advaitasiddhi*, refers to five different definitions of the false in a couplet[1] in which he ascribes the first definition to Padmapāda, the second and the third definitions to the author of the *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, the fourth to Citsukhācārya, and the fifth to Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka, the author of the *Nyāyadīpāvāli*. The first definition is 'the false is not the substratum of reality and unreality'.[2] According to the second, 'falsity consists in being eternally absent or non-existent for all the three periods of time in the very locus in which it is experienced as appearing'.[3] The third defines falsity as 'that which is liable to cancellation by knowledge as such'.[4] The fourth defines falsity as being 'the counter-entity or negatum of the absolute negation in the substrate in which it is presented'.[5] And according to the fifth definition 'falsity is other than character of the real'.[6] It is sometimes supposed that these definitions may be arranged in staircase order as ascending from a lower and less perfect to a higher and more perfect standpoint reaching perfection at the fifth as the last step of the staircase. But this is a mistake. The Advaitin considers each of these as a complete and perfect definition of falsity. There is no analogy here between the five different definitions of induction (*Vyāptipañcaka*), as one finds in the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gangeśa Upādhyāya, and the five different definitions of falsity given here. The definitions of induction are indeed in staircase order, and even the last is rejected as being inadequate and unsatisfactory, and as a matter of fact superseded in the ultimate definition (*siddhānta lakṣaṇa*). But the five definitions of falsity as set forth above are all, according to the Advaitin, perfect and logically invulnerable. We propose to consider them serially.

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[1] Ādyaṃ syāt pañcapādyoktaṃ, tato vivaraṇādike
citsukhīyaṃ caturthaṃ syāt, antyam ānandabodhajam
—The *Laghucandrikā*

[2] Sadasattvānadhikaraṇatvam—The *Advaitasiddhi*

[3] Sarvasmin pratipannopādhau traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvam —*ibid*

[4] Jñānanivartyatvam—*ibid*

[5] Svātyantābhāvādhikaraṇa eva pratīyamānatvam—*ibid*

[6] Sadrūpatvābhāva—*ibid*

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST DEFINITION OF FALSITY

The first definition of falsity is given by Padmapāda in the *Pañcapādikā*. He defines the false as not being the substratum of reality and unreality, by which he means its indescribability either as being or as non-being. To this definition the Mādhva realist urges a series of objections. What is this indescribableness either as being or non-being? Is it the negation of non-being qualified by being, i.e., the negation of unreality claiming reality as a predicate[1]? Or is it just the two characters of absolute negation of being and absolute negation of non-being?[2] Or is it the absolute negation of non-being characterised by the absolute negation of being, i.e., is absolute absence of being a determinate property of the nature of the absolute absence of non-being, distinguished by the absolute absence of being as its distinctive character.[3] As regards the first alternative, the Mādhva points out that it entails the fallacy of proving what everybody acknowledges and nobody denies. It only amounts to labouring the obvious. Because, according to the Mādhva, the world of common-sense is a real world, therefore, there is nowhere anything corresponding to unreality with reality as its predicate. In other words, the negation of unreality characterised by reality holds good everywhere. Therefore, in asserting such negation the Advaitin is only trying to prove something which everybody acknowledges and nobody denies. The Advaitin cannot claim any ingenuity in trying to establish an acknowledged fact. And just because no such unreality characterised by reality is experienced anywhere the assertion of the negation of such unreality entails the fallacy of asserting a negation of which the negatum is a creature of the imagination without any analogue in experience and therefore nowhere verifiable.

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[1] Sattvaviśiṣṭāsattvābhāva—The *Advaitasiddhi*—(Bengali Edn., p. 186).

[2] Sattvātyantābhāva - asattvātyantābhāvarūpaṃ dharmadvayam—*ibid.*

[3] Sattvātyantābhāvatve sati asattvātyantābhāvarūpaṃ viśiṣṭam—*ibid.*

The second alternative meaning of the definition is that falsity consists in the absolute negation of being and also the absolute negation of non-being. Vyāsatīrtha points out that this interpretation of the first definition entails the three logical fallacies first of: contradicting the very thing proposed to be proved, (*vyāghāta*) ; secondly, irrelevance (*arthāntara*), i.e., proposing to prove something and actually proving something else ; and, thirdly, trying to prove something which is not to be found in an accredited instance (*sādhya-vaikalya*). Being and non-being are contradictorily related, so that to say that a thing is being is the same as saying that it is not non-being and to say that a thing is non-being is the same as saying that it is not being. Therefore, denial of being entails the affirmation of non-being, and the denial of non-being entails the affirmation of being. Hence, the absolute negation of being is the same as non-being, and the absolute negation of non-being is the same as being. If, therefore, anybody is to assert absolute negation of being, which is the same as asserting absolute non-being, and at the same time to assert absolute negation of non-being, which is the same as asserting being, he will be asserting both being and the absolute negation of being at the same time. He will thus be guilty of a manifest self-contradiction. Therefore, according to this interpretation, falsity, which is proposed to be asserted, will be a self-contradictory absurdity that can neither be intelligibly asserted nor be an actual fact. Further, the Advaitin holds that the Absolute is not characterised by any property and bases his doctrine on the scriptural text 'The Absolute is pure and featureless (or attributeless).[1] Therefore, according to the Advaitin, the Absolute is Being itself and does not possess being as its property. Hence, the Absolute *quā* Being negates both being and non-being as properties. The Absolute as being itself is not characterised either by being or by negation of being as its property. The Mādhva retorts that if negation of being as property and negation of non-being as property can apply to the Absolute, which is *ex hypothesi* devoid of properties, what is the bar to extending the same concept to the world of practical experience? Why not say, the Mādhva goes on, that just as Absolute is Reality itself and therefore devoid of reality and unreality as properties, the world also is reality itself devoid of the reality and unreality as properties thereof? Thus, the Advaita claim to prove the falsity of the world in the sense of the negation of being and the negation of non-being as properties will end in proving that the world is real in the same sense as the Absolute. This is the fallacy of irrelevance (*arthāntara*) or proving something very different from what is proposed to be proved. If one tries to prove that X is a man and ends by showing that X is a clay model of a man, one has committed this fallacy, and failed to prove one's case. Thirdly, in the example of the illusory object, the mother-of-pearl appearing as a piece of silver, the definition as per the second interpretation does not hold. The false, according to the second interpretation, is that which illustrates both negation of being and negation of non-being. We have seen that, where being is not, non-being must hold, and, where non-being is absent being must hold. Hence, denying being we have to affirm non-being, and denying non-being we have to affirm being. Thus both being and non-being cannot be denied at the same time. In the case of the illusory silver in the mother-of-pearl the denial of reality holds, but the denial of unreality does not hold since it is affirmed as unreal. Therefore, the familiar example of the illusion of mother-of-pearl perceived as silver does not illustrate the definition as interpreted according to the second interpretation.

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[1] Kevalo nirguṇaśca

According to the third interpretation, falsity is absolute negation of non-being characterised by absolute negation of being. In the second interpretation we have seen that absolute negation of non-being and absolute negation of being, being contradictorily related, cannot coexist, that is, absolute negation of non-being cannot at the same time be taken to be the absolute negation of being. The same difficulty will arise even if we consider the two negations to constitute a determinate whole, one characterising the other. Let us consider the case of the absolute negation of non-being to be the substantive characterised by the absolute negation of being as its adjectival determination. The case is not improved by asserting one negation as determination of the other. How can absolute negation of non-being be characterised also by the absolute negation of being ? Where non-being is absolutely absent, being is. How can that which is being, as absolute negation of non-being, be at the same time characterised by the absolute negation of being ? Therefore, the fallacy of proving something which contradicts what is proposed to be proved (*vyāghāta*) remains the same as in the second alternative. By proving the absolute negation of non-being the Advaitin has proved the being of the illusory, and cannot claim to have proved also the absolute negation of being in respect of it without contradiction. The fallacy of irrelevance (*arthāntara*) also applies with equal force to this third alternative. Just as the absolute negation of reality as a property may belong to the Absolute as Reality itself, and just as the Absolute as Reality itself is also the contradictory of the false and illusory, one may say the same of the world, too. In other words, one may say the world, like the Absolute, is reality itself. Further, the world as reality itself is a contradictory of the false and the illusory. Hence, in claiming to prove the illusoriness of the world by a suitable definition of the illusory, the Advaitin has established, in fact, the reality of the world. The third objection, viz., the inapplicability of the definition to the familiar example of the illusory silver also applies to this interpretation. While absolute negation of reality, which is the adjective in the third definition, holds in respect of the illusory silver, absolute negation of unreality, which is the substantive in the definition, does not apply to the silver which falsely appears in the mother-of-pearl.

The Advaitin considers the second interpretation of the first definition to be the only tenable one. The first and the third interpretations he rejects. The negation of non-being is obviously being, and to define a false as negation of non-being characterised by being amounts to giving away the whole case of falsity as a category of experience. The same remarks apply to the third alternative. Absolute negation of non-being characterised by absolute negation of being does not make sense. It is an obvious self-contradiction and does not answer to the idea of false. The second interpretation, however, is not open to the objections that have been raised by the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. Falsity, according to this interpretation, is defined in terms of two negations conjunctively, the negation of reality and the negation of unreality. The Mādhva contention is that the negation of reality and the negation of unreality are contradictories of each other and the assertion of their coexistence will entail self-contradiction. But what, according to the Mādhva, can be the ground of such contradiction? Is it because being and non-being are of the nature of reciprocal absence so that where being is, non-being is not, and where non-being is, being is not? Or is it because the being and non-being are pervasive of each other's absence, so that where being is not, non-being is, and where non-being is not, being is? Or is it because being and non-being are pervaded by each other's absence, so that where non-being is, being is not, and where being is, non-being is not? Of these three alternatives the first does not bear examination. The Advaitin does not accept the view that the negation of being is equal to non-being, or the negation of non-being is equal to being. According to the Advaitin being is what is never cancelled in any of the three periods of time, past, present and future. The negation of being in this sense is not non-being. A thing that exists now and will cease to exist sometime later has no eternal being in the sense of being incapable of being negated at any time. It is thus other than being in the Advaita sense of the term, and also not non-being, as it possesses temporal being or being at a certain point of time though lacking in eternity of being. Therefore, negation of being is not incompatible with negation of non-being. In fact, for the Advaitin, absolute non-being means being incapable of being presented as real anywhere[1] at any time. A barren mother, for example, is a contradiction in terms. We nowhere and never have a mother who is barren. This illustrates absolute non-being. Such non-being does not attach to the ordinary objects of experience, such as a pencil or a pen. Nor does being in the Advaita sense of eternal being attach to such empirical objects. In other words, the absolutely unreal is never an object of experience, while the real in the Advaita sense is never a content of a negative judgement. Between these two we have neither the real nor the unreal, i.e., the objects which present themselves and yet are also the contents of a negative judgement. The world, according to the Advaitin, is false in this sense. The illusory silver presents itself and yet is also rejected and negatived. The objects of veridical experience also present themselves but cannot maintain continuing appearance, being negated by the empirical circumstances which caused them to appear. In this respect, i.e., as lacking substantial reality despite presentation in experience, there is not much difference between the apparent and the empirical object of experience. Distinguished from both of these are the Absolute as the eternal Reality, which is never cancelled, and the fictitious, which is never presented in experience. Hence, the objection that falsity conceived as the negation both of reality and of unreality entails self-contradiction does not stand examination.

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[1] Kavacidapi upādhau sattvena pratīyamānatvānadhikaraṇatvam—The *Advaitasiddhi* (edn by M. M. Dr. Yogendranātha) —page 240.

It follows from the above that there is no fallacy of irrelevance (*arthāntara*) as is contended by the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. Since the other of reality, according to the Advaitin, means the other of the eternally existent, and the other of unreality means the other of what is never presented anywhere, the world of practical reality as also illusory in the ordinary sense is other than reality and unreality. It is other than reality as it lacks eternal being, and other than unreality as it is presented in experience. Therefore, the Advaitin has not proved anything except what he proposed to prove, that the illusory and the empirical reality are on a par as characterised by negation of reality as well as unreality.

Nor is the familiar instance of illusory silver a case where the definition fails. The illusory silver is a presented fact in the locus of the mother-of-pearl appearing as a shining somewhat. It is thus not a case of never-nowhere appearing, and is therefore an instance of the absence of the absolute non-being. Nor is it something that maintains itself, because it is rejected and annulled when there is cognition of the specific character of the locus, viz., the mother-of-pearl. Hence, while it presents itself as real as long as the illusion lasts, it vanishes immediately with the experience of correction. Its reality is, then, not everlasting reality, and its being therefore is other than eternal being. Hence, it is also the negation of being in the Advaita sense of the term. It is thus both the negation of absolute being and the negation of absolute non-being. It is therefore a proper illustration of the definition of falsity (as defined by the Advaitin) as other than reality and other than unreality as per the second interpretation of the author of the *Nyāyāmṛta*.

It has been said by the Mādhva that falsity defined according to the second interpretation as negation of being and negation of non-being entails self-contradiction. To negate being, it is urged, is to affirm non-being, and to negate non-being is to affirm being. In asserting negation of being and negation of non-being at the same time as the essence of the illusory, the Advaitin is asserting that the illusory is the negation of being, i.e., non-being, and also the negation of non-being. In other words, he is asserting non-being and negation of non-being of the same object at the same time, which is obviously self-contradictory. In the same way, in asserting negation of non-being he is asserting the being of the illusory object. To assert that the illusory object is also the negation of being is to assert both being and negation of being of the same object at the same time, which is also self-contradictory. The Advaitin, however, in reply points out that there is no fallacy of self-contradiction (*vyāghāta*) in his definition of the false or illusory. The negation of non-being, as has already been shown, is not equivalent to affirmation of being. Negation of non-being applies to all experienced objects, veridical as well as illusory, in so far as they are presented as real though lacking in absolute and eternal reality. The same remarks apply to negation of being, which, according to the Advaitin, means negation of eternal being. Such negation applies to all objects of experience. Hence, the Mādhva contention that negation of being and negation of non-being are contradictorily related, so that both cannot hold of the same object, rests on insufficient analysis of the cencepts of reality and unreality. The unreal is the obviously unreal and cannot be presented in experience. The real is the eternally real and has no analogue in the presented objects of experience, which have only temporal and not eternal being. All empirical objects thus constitute a category other than reality as well as unreality, and represent thus the negation both of reality and unreality.

What the Advaitin has said in respect of the absence of self-contradiction in the definition as negation of being and negation of non-being considered as such applies with equal force if the two, being and non-being, are regarded as pervasive of each other's absence. We have seen that being and non-being are not contradictories of each other, and, therefore, the negation of being and the negation of non-being considered conjunctively do not entail any self-contradiction. For an identical reason the negation of being cannot be regarded as a wider class including non-being as a sub-class, and similarly the negation of non-being cannot be regarded as inclusive of being as its sub-class. If non-being were the same as being negatived in experience, then the negation of being could have been construed as including non-being within it. In the illusory silver there is negation of reality in the sense of being incapable of being cancelled for any time, past, present and future. The Mādhva will call it unreal as the silver is an object of rejection. But the Advaitin maintains that non-being cannot ever be an object of cancellation. For him, the unreal or non-being is what is not presentable at any time in experience such as a barren mother. Such unreality does not belong to the illusory silver, which is, as a matter of fact, a presented content of experience. Hence, the example of illusory silver does not answer to non-being in the sense of including the negation of being as a smaller class under it. If the illusory silver which is an instance of negation of eternal being, were also an instance of non-being, then it would answer to the Mādhva objection that it illustrates non-being as pervasive of the negation of being. But such absolute non-being belongs to a barren mother and other creatures of the imagination which are never presented facts of experience. The illusory silver though illusory is yet a presentation in experience, and is therefore not the absolutely unreal.

Nor does the view that being is pervaded by the negation of non-being and non-being is pervaded by the negation of being entail any self-contradiction. Even though we admit being and non-being to be pervaded by the negation of non-being and negation of being respectively, there is no self-contradiction, for the negation of both may hold in respect of the same thing, which may be illustrated in any empirical object. The Mādhva contention is that both of the negations cannot co-exist in the same substrate because one is pervaded by the negation of the other. The Advaita contention is that no such conclusion actually follows. Horseness, for example, is pervaded by the negation of cowness (a horse not being a cow), and likewise cowness is pervaded by the negation of horseness. But the absence of both cowness and horseness is illustrated in a camel, which is neither a cow nor a horse. The point may also be illustrated by the stock example of the illusory silver. The silver which appears in the illusion and is rejected by correction is obviously a case of the absence of reality as well as that of unreality. It is not unreality, for it appears or presents itself in experience. What appears or presents itself is obviously not what is absolutely unreal, i. e., not an absolute naught. Nor is it, on the other hand, something real, for the deliverance of correction reveals it as being absent later in the very locus in which it appears.

As regards the objection of irrelevance (*arthāntara*) by Vyāsatīrtha, the Advaitin points out that he has not proved anything different from what he has proposed to prove. The Mādhva realist contends that the world may be conceived as being itself though not possessing being as its property, just as the Absolute, though devoid of any property, is Being itself. The Advaitin replies that when the Mādhva realist contends that empirical judgements like 'the jar is', 'the pot is', 'the cloth is' are themselves proof of the experience of the objects of the world as of the nature of being, he is making himself liable to unnecessary multiplication of hypotheses. The Mādhva view, in fact, reduces the world to a plurality of beings, e. g., a table as being, a chair as being, a desk as being, etc. But such multiplicity of beings does not explain the use of the same term 'being' for these different beings. Besides, instead of committing oneself to an unnecessary multiplication of hypotheses, a simpler procedure will be to conceive the different empirical contents as different appearances of one and the same Being, the Absolute Reality. This explains also the consciousness of the being of different contents without accepting the view of separate beings for different objects of experience. In fact, the assumption of perceivable separate beings for the different objects of experience does not admit of any intelligible statement. For example, if X is being, Y is being, Z is being, and X Y and Z are exclusive of each other as separate objects, then X as being is not Y and Y also is not X and Y is not being. In the same way, X also can be shown to be non-being.. The only escape from such contradictions is to suppose that the contents are only appearances in the locus of the Absolute as Pure Being.

Again, the theory of the separate reality (being) of the contents of experience can be refuted by the following consideration. The use of a common term is justifiable only when there is a common or identical experience underlying presented differences. Where the common or identical experience is lacking, the use of one and the same term is not justifiable. The Absolute is reality itself and the use of the term Absolute as an equivalent of reality is justifiable because of the sameness of experience whenever reality is asserted. But the same thing cannot be said of the objects of experience. They are, as a matter of fact, experienced as different in different cases. The experience of a table is not the same as the experience of a chair, though the reality of the chair or of the table is not experienced as different. The contents of experience can be admitted to be real if our experiences thereof show essential identity both in respect of the substantive, the adjective characterising the substantive and the relation between them. If the property presents itself as the same, but the relation of the property to the substrate thereof is not experienced as the same, there is no consciousness of identity. For example, one may live in a house either as a tenant or as its owner. Here the property of living in the house is the same in the two cases, but not so the relation, it being in the one case the relation of ownership, and in the other the relation of tenancy. Hence, though the property is the same, the relations differ in the two cases, and there is consequently no sameness of experience or sameness of expression in language. We say, the first 'lives in his own house' and, the second, 'is a tenant'. In the case of the judgements 'the table is being', 'the desk is being,' etc., if the properties desk, table, etc., be all equated to being, then we shall have different contents (desk, table)equated to one and the same being. This will make the experience of sameness impossible because of the difference of contents which are asserted as being. The Nyāya view that being is *summum genus*, the highest of universals, related to all the individual objects comprised within it by the relation of inherence is also open to the following objection. The Naiyāyika recognises being (*sattā*) inhering by the relation of inherence only in substance, qualities and motions. But since, according to the Naiyāyika, the universal of universals is *ex hypothesi* impossible, the being or the highest universal does not inhere in lower universals. The Naiyāyika, therefore, assumes a different kind of relation in respect of the being of universals. While the substance has being in the sense of being a substrate of the universal of being, i.e., through being inhering in the particular substance by the relation of inherence, the universal has being by the relation of co-inherence or *ekārthasamavāya*. In other words, the universal inheres in the same substrate in which being also inheres, and through this co-inherence in the same substrate the universal is also related to being. In other words, by being related to that which is related to being, the universal acquires being. Thus, while the relation of being to substances, qualities and motions is inherence as such, in the case of universals it is co-inherence in the same substrate. That is to say, the being of substances, qualities and motions is through immediate relation of subsumption under being, while universals have indirect relation to being through inherence in that which is directly subsumed under it. The same remarks apply to particularity (*viśeṣa*) as the ultimate differentia of an eternal substance. Particularity is the uncommon or unique element in an eternal substance. Therefore, particularities in the plural are all unique. A common character of the different particularities, i.e., a universal underlying several particularities will entail contradiction of its very nature as particularity (*rūpahāṇi*). Particularity is the uncommon, and any common character of the uncommon would mean contradiction of its own nature as uncommon. Hence, it cannot be an instance of any universal, and therefore it cannot be related to being as the highest universal by the direct relation of subsumption under it. Its being, thus, is not the inherence of the universal of being in it, but the relation of co-inherence in the same substrate. In other words, particularity has being through inherence in that (eternal substance) which is an instance of the universal of being and in which being inheres by the relation of direct inherence. The relation of inherence, however, is not related to the relata by the relation of inherence. Since there is, according to the Naiyāyika, only one relation of inherence, there can be no universal under which inherence can be subsumed as a particular instance along with other instances. Therefore, being as universal cannot inhere in inherence. Nor can inherence have being in the sense of co-inherence in the same substrate. Hence, it can have being in yet another sense. And the Naiyāyika holds that in the case of inherence its own distinctive character is its being. Hence, though the property of being is the same, yet the relation of this property to the objects which acquire their reality through it is different; substances, qualities and motions being real through being related to them by the relation of inherence; universals and particularities being real through co-inherence in the substrate in which being also inheres; and inherence being real through its own distinctive character. Hence, there is no sameness of experience in different cases. In other words, if the Nyāya view is to be conceded, substances, qualities and motions will have being in one sense, universals and particularities will have being in a different sense, and inherence, again, in a third meaning of the term.

The Advaitin contends that, since in the Absolute as Reality lie all contents of experience in an apparent relation of identity therewith, this apparent or false relation will be the same for all contents and objects of experience. Therefore, there will be no difficulty in the experience of substance, quality, motion, universal, etc., as real (*sat*). Such empirical judgements as 'the jar is' 'the cloth is' 'cowness is', etc., can all be explained from the Advaita point of view through this apparent relation of identity with the Absolute, which is Reality itself. And because of this apparent relation of identity, which is the same for the different objects of experience, the Absolute as Reality presents itself as the common attribute of these different objects. This not only explains the sameness of experience of reality but also has the logical merit of parsimony. To suppose different beings for the different objects of experience obviously entails unnecessary multiplication of assumptions of different kinds of being.

It may be argued, however, that according to the testimony of scripture the Witnessing Intelligence is to be regarded as pure, attributeless, etc.[1] If the authority of scripture can be adduced to prove that the Absolute is Being itself, destitute of all attributes, why should we not adduce the authority of perception which presents us with the being of a jar, a cloth etc., as all different from one another ?

The Advaitin replies that perception and other ordinary sources of knowledge lack ultimate validity, and can establish only empirical reality subserving the conduct of life. Scriptural testimony, on the contrary, has ultimate and Absolute Truth as a source of knowledge. What perception establishes is, thus, true only for the conduct of life, but lacks strict reality. But the authority of scriptures, which proves Absolute as Reality itself, is revelation of Absolute Truth and Reality.

As regards the Mādhva objection that the Advaita interpretation of falsity as absolute negation of being and absolute negation of non-being entails the fallacy of irrelevance (*arthāntara*) or proving something different from what is proposed to be proved, the Advaitin replies as follows. The Mādhva contention is that, just as the Absolute though devoid of properties is declared by scriptures to be Reality itself, in the same way the world of experience though devoid of being and non-being as its properties may yet be reality itself. The Advaitin points out that the Mādhva claim has no evidence in its support. In the case of the Absolute as Reality the authority of scripture is the evidence.[1] But in respect of the world of experience there is no evidencc to prove that it is reality itself like the Absolute. Besides, as has already been shown, the supposition that the world of plurality is real is inconsistent with the experienced identity of being. Hence, there is no difficulty in the proof of the falsity of the world in the sense of the absolute negation of being and the absolute negation of non-being.

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[1] Sākṣī cetā kevalo nirguṇaśca. The *Mu Upaniṣat*.

Having replied to the objections to the Advaita meaning of falsity, as consisting of the two properties of absolute negation of being and absolute negation of non-being, the Advaitin offers another interpretation of the definition. The Advaitin contends that this new definition will leave no room for any objection on the count of irrelevance. His new interpretation is that 'falsity consists in difference from being and difference from non-being'. According to this definition, the two properties of difference from being and diflerence from non-being conjunctively constitute the essence of the false. In the previous definition, the two properties were absolute negation of being and absolute negation of non-being. Here, however, instead of being and non-being as properties, we have difference from that which is and difference from that which is not. In other words, in the previous definition being and non-being were regarded as properties, and the negation of being and the negation of non-being were supposed to constitute conjunctively the essence of the false.

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[1] Revelations as embodied in the Vedas are direclty envisaged by the mystic's pure intuition, uncontaminated by sensuous contents. Hence it is equated with uncontradicted intuition. Reason only assures that it does not violate the Laws of Thought. Scriptural revelation is thus not only uncontradicted by reason, but also does not contradict the latter. An irrational revelation is a contradiction in terms.

In the present interpretation, the Advaitin starts, not with being and non-being as properties, but with that which is and that which is not as the substrates of the properties of being and non-being. And the Advaitin points out that the false is what is other than both what is and what is not. Hence, this interpretation leaves no room for any charge of irrelevance. In the previous definition it was urged that the world might be reality just as is the Absolute though devoid of reality and unreality as its properties. But in saying that the false is what is other than what is and also other than what is not the world cannot be called reality itself just as the Absolute is. If the false is other than what is, and other than what is not, and, if the world can be shown to be false as being other than what is and also as other than what is not, it cannot be held to be reality itself in the same way as the Absolute is. To say that it is other than what is and at the same time to assert that it is reality itself is without doubt self-contradictory. What is meant is that the difference from the real never exists in anything that is real, and this constitutes the absolute difference from that which *is*. In the same way, the difference from what is not, which is never to be found in that which is not, is what constitutes absolute difference from what is not. It follows, therefore, that falsity is the same as difference from the real, which is never to be found in anything that is real, and also difference from the unreal, which never exists in that which is unreal. By thus modifying the meaning of the definition the Advaitin meets in advance all objections of the different schools of opponents. If the Naiyāyika realist should contend that the world is real, the Advaitin may retort that what is real cannot at the same time be different from that which is. If the Mādhva realist, again, should contend that the world is both real and unreal, the Advaita answer is that what is proved to be both other than the real and other than the unreal, cannot be asserted to both real and unreal. Or if the Mādhyamika should contend that the world is pure unreality, the Advaita reply is that it can be proved to be other than what is unreal. Therefore, in none of these cases can it be shown that the Advaitin has committed the fallacy of irrelevance by interpreting the false as other than the real and other than the unreal, and by showing that the definition of falsity as so interpreted will apply to the world as we experience it.

The Mādhva realist however puts forward a different objection to this new interpretation (of the definition of falsity). He points out that whether we consider falsity as per the first interpretation, or as per the modified interepretation as consisting in other than that which is and other than that which is not, there is in either case the fallacy of partial *siddhasādhanatā*. The fallacy of *siddhasādhanatā* arises when one attempts to establish an already established truth. In the above case, part of what is sought to be proved is accepted by all as an established truth, and thus the argument is in part open to this charge. Consider, for example, the above two interpretations. According to the first interpretation, falsity consists in the two properties of absolute negation of being and absolute negation of non-being. And, according to the modified interpretation, it consists in absolute difference from that which is and absolute difference from that which is not. And the Advaitin claims that the world can be shown to be false in either of these two senses. But, if we consider non-being, i.e., the latter part of the first interpretation, it is obvious that the absolute negation of non-being is an established fact in respect of the world, which the Mādhva accepts as real. Similarly when we consider difference from what is not (i.e., the second part of the second interpretation), it is also an admitted fact, according to the Mādhva, that the world is real and therefore other than what is not. Thus, in respect of the first part of these two definitions (i.e., negation of being, and other than what is), the Advaitin may claim to prove something he does not prove. But, as regards the second part of each of these two definitions, he lays himself open to the charge of trying to prove an admitted fact.

In reply, the Advaitin points out that the Mādhva realist here confounds two quite different things. It is one thing to say that A is not, and B is not, and quite a different thing to say that A and B are not. The latter is one single absence (i.e., the assertion of the joint absence of two things) and is never the arithmetical sum of two absences, the absence of A and the absence of B. In other words while in the former we have numerically two absences, in the latter we have one single absence of two things. When the Advaitin says that the false is either the negation of being and non-being or difference from what is and what is not, he is not asserting two negations or two differences. He is, in fact, asserting the conjunctive negation of two things or a conjunctive difference from both what *is* and what *is not*. The Mādhva seems to think that in asserting negation of non-being and difference from the unreal in respect of the world the Advaitin is asserting something accepted on all hands. But this is a mistake. What the Advaitin asserts is negation of non-being or difference from the unreal along with negation of being or difference from the real. In fact, mere negation of non-being or merely being other than the unreal would apply to the Absolute, which is not intended by the Advaitin to be included in the category of the false. Therefore, the Advaitin also adds negation of being or other than the real jointly or along with negation of being or difference from the real. The latter by itself would apply to the barren mother, and other meaningless verbiage without any cognitive import and not merely to the world as a false appearance. It is this illegitimate extension of the meaning that is guarded against by the qualification 'negation of non-being' or 'difference from the unreal'. The world is other than the real and also other than the unreal, and not a fictitious creation of the imagination. Nor is it the same as the Absolute, which is Reality itself. It is in this sense that the definition of falsity applies equally to the illusory silver, and to the world of empirical reality. As both appear as objects of cognition, they are not absolutely imaginary, and, as both are annulled in the ultimate intuition of Reality, they are not real either. This is the sense in which the Advaitin claims the world to be a false appearance. And this is the real import of the Advaitin's first definition of falsity.

We shall now proceed to the second definition of it.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND DEFINITION OF FALSITY

The second definition is the definition of falsity given by Prakāśtāmayati, author of the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*. This definition is given by the author in expounding the Upaniṣadic text 'There is no plurality anywhere'[1]. It lays down that falsity consists in being the negatum of absolute negation, i.e., negation for all the three periods of time, past, present and future of an object in the very locus in which it presents itself in experience[2]. Now, an object that is presented in experience is presented as a substantive qualified by an adjective. In other words, presentation in experience involves presentation of a substantive, an adjective thereof, and the relation that holds between the substantive and the adjective. And these are the import of the words, presentation in experience (*pratipanna*). But the addition of the word locus (*upādhi*) restricts the meaning of the term presented in experience to the substantive or locus of the object which is presented. In other words, the definition boils down to the proposition, 'the false is that which is the object of eternal negation in the very locus in which it is presented'. It may be remarked, however, that the term 'presentation' in experience includes both veridical and non-veridical presentation. But, if the presentation is veridical, then obviously its object cannot be false in the sense of being absent where it is presented, and, if the presentation is non-veridical, then the object

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1. Neha nānāstikiṃcana
2. Pratipannopādhau traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvaṃ vā mithyātvam—The *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa* (Metropolitan edn)—page 33.

is conceded to be absent where it is presented. Thus in the latter case there will be fallacy of trying to prove something which nobody denies. Therefore, to avoid these difficulties the Advaitin speaks of presentation as such apart from all questions of verity or the opposite. In other words, the definition amounts to saying that the false is what stands eternally negated in the very locus in which it presents itself.

In the above definition the term eternal negation (*traikālika abhāva*) in the sense of negation for all the three periods of time past, present and future has been used. Hence, it is the same as absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*). Negation is either logical negation, i.e., assertion of difference, or entitative negation. Logical negation is a denial of the identity of one thing with another. But it is not entitative exclusion. Entitative exclusion (*saṃsargābhāva*) is the denial of one thing in another in some relation other than the relation of identity. The negation which is involved in the false is entitative exclusion, i.e., negation in some relation other than the relation of identity. Such negation is again antecedent negation (*prāgabhāva*), emergent negation (*dhvaṃsābhāva*) or absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*). Antecedent negation is absence of a thing before it comes into being. Obviously, when a thing comes into being its absence ceases. Such absence is thus not eternal negation. Similarly, when a thing ceases to be, its absence emerges. Before such cessation however there was no such absence. Emergent negation, therefore, is also different from eternal negation. Eternal negation (*traikālika abhāva*) is thus neither antecedent negation nor emergent negation but, as eternal negation extending to all the three periods of time, past, present and future, must be the same as absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*). Hence, when the false is defined in terms of eternal negation, what is asserted in respect of it is that variety of entitative exclusion (*saṃsargābhāva*) which is called absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*)[1]. Therefore, we may define the false as that which stands absolutely negated in the sense of being eternally absent in the very locus in which it is presented in experience.

Before we go into a detailed discussion of this second definition some preliminary remarks about the Advaita position are essential in the interest of clearness. What the Advaitin considers to be the essence of an illusory object is its appearance as one with a locus in which it is eternally absent. The illusory silver, for example, appears as one with the mother-of-pearl, presenting itself as a bare shining *this*. The relation is thus the relation of identity or oneness with the locus appearing in its generic character as *this*. It is not a relation of qualification (*saṃsarga*). The *this* appears as a piece of silver, not as a substantive to which silverness belongs as an adjective. This is the first point to be noted in reference to the Advaita position. Secondly, the Advaitin distinguishes between ultimate truth and reality from both practical or empirical reality and apparent reality. The illusory silver, for example, lacks both practical and ultimate reality. It is only apparently real and will not be acceptable in payment of a debt in practical life. As distinguished from apparent reality as well as ultimate Reality the Advaitin mentions practical and empirical reality that attaches to the objects of our normal waking experience. The objects of practical experience last beyond their appearance in experience. Their *esse* is not exhausted in their *percipi*. Besides there is agreement (*saṃvāda*) as regards such objects between the experiences of different percipients. The illusory silver does not last beyond its presentation in experience. Though it is more than the presentation as such, i.e., the presentation is not itself presented, but what is presented, is an object other than the presentation that is presented, its objectivity has no tenure of life beyond the duration of the presentation. Nor is there agreement in the case of an apparent object between the experiences of different experiencers. When I mistake a mother-of-pearl for a piece of silver, other persons are not necessarily subject to the same illusion. This is how the apparent is distinguished from the practically or empirically real. Ultimate Reality is, however, something quite different from both practical and apparent reality. Both these latter are sublated by the experience of truth, while the ultimate truth is never overthrown.

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[1] "The Naiyāyika distinguishes between antecedent, emergent, absolute and reciprocal negations. Antecedent negation is the absence of a thing before it comes into being. For example, the childlessness of the childless man before a child is born to him is a case of antecedent negation. Antecedent negation is without beginning but has an end.............Emergent negation is the negation which emerges through the destruction or cessation of a thing. Emergent negation has a beginning but no end. For example, the man who becomes widower through the death of his wife, is a case of an emergent negation which has a beginning but no end, for though he may marry again, and have another wife he can never have his former wife. Absolute negation is without any qualification or restriction as to time, i.e., negation without either beginning or end in time. For example, the absence of consciousness in a stone or block of wood is a case of absolute negation which holds for all time. Lastly, besides the above three, we have contrariety or disparity which we may call logical or reciprocal negation. Reciprocal negation is the negation of the relation of identity between things and is not the negation of the things themselves. For example, when we say that A is not B we do not negate either A or B, but we simply deny that one can be identical with the other." *Studies in Philosophy and Religion* (Calcutta University Edn.) by Dr S. K. Maitra — Essay on '*Disbelief*'—pages 222 to 223.

The question now arises; What precisely is this eternal negation in the very locus in which an object presents itself? Is it an absolutely real eternal negation, or is it only an empirically real negation, or, lastly, is it only an apparent negation of an object in the very locus in which it is presented?

The Mādhva here urges that none of these three different conceptions of the eternal negation withstands strict examination. An absolutely real negation would mean the giving away of the whole case of strict non-dualism (*advaitahāni*). If an absolutely real negation is conceded, then besides the Absolute as the sole Reality we have this absolutely real negation of all that which is false. We have thus two realities instead of one non-dual Absolute.

Let us now consider the other alternatives. If the eternal negation is to be regarded as no real negation, the negation will be either apparent negation or negation real for empirical purposes. But, if the negation is only an apparent negation, then the object which is negated is not really negated. Hence, according to this view there would be the fallacy of proving the proved from the Mādhva standpoint, and the fallacy of irrelevance from the Advaita. The Mādhva accepts the reality of the world, and, if the negation of the world as false be an apparent negation devoid of ultimate truth, then the reality of the world is in no way jeopardized. In other words, what the Mādhva accepts without question is being thrust upon him as something established by the Advaitin. Further, from the Advaita standpoint the fallacy involved is irrelevance. The Advaitin regards the world as false appearance in the sense that it stands eternally negated in the very locus in which it appears. But, if this eternal negation is only apparent, and no real negation, then the reality and not the falsity of the world is established, and this contradicts the Advaita commitment.

Let us now consider the second alternative, that this eternal negation is an empirically real negation, i.e., real for practical purposes, though not ultimately real. According to the Advaita definition of the empirically real, it is what passes as real for all practical purposes though contradicted by the Absolute Reality. Hence, if the negation of an object in the very locus of its appearance be only an empirically real negation, then the object which is negated cannot have empirical reality. But this does not preclude its possesssing ultimate reality and Truth. Empirically negated, it may still be ultimately real. Therefore, if the Advaitin regards the negation involved in the definition of an illusory object to be an empirically real negation, he will be landed into the fallacy of irrelevance. The world censidered as false in this sense would be only empirically false, and yet may not be devoid of ultimate Truth and Reality, which is quite different from the Advaitin's professed intention.

Further, there will also be manifest contradiction (*bādha*), if the negation be conceived as an empirically real negation. The Advaitin considers the world to be practically or empirically real. To say now that there is empirical negation of the empirically real is obviously self-contradictory. There is also disagreement with scriptural testimony 'there is no plurality anywhere' as regards non-duality. The purport of the text is to declare the absence of the world of experience in the Absolute Reality with which the world presents itself in experience as one. If this absence be only an empirically real absence devoid of ultimate Reality and

Truth, then scriptural testimony must be admitted to have declared something which is not ultimately true and real. Further, if the world be the content of a negation which is only empirically real, it will necessarily acquire absolute significance and truth. Affirmation and negation of the same grade of reality cannot apply simultaneously to the same object. To negate an object only empirically is, therefore, to affirm it ultimately. To say that the world lacks empirical reality is the same as saying that it possesses absolute reality. Against this it may be pointed out that this does not necessarily follow. From the absence of empirical reality of the world, one cannot jump up to its absolute Reality and Truth. There is another possible alternative, viz., apparent reality. The object which is empirically negated may be only an apparent reality. But the answer to this is that this subterfuge is not open to the Advaitin, who rejects the apparent reality of the world of experience. Hence, both apparent and empirical reality being closed to the world of experience as the object of an empirically real negation, it must be conceded to have Absolute Reality and Truth. This is the sum and substance of the Mādhva charge against the second definition of falsity as offered by the Advaitin.[1]

We shall now consider the Advaita reply to the charges of the Mādhva realist. The first objection, that the recognition of eternal negation as an absolutely real negation would mean an overthrow of the Advaita non-dualism cannot withstand examination. The Advaitin may very well point out that this eternal negation as an absolutely real negation of the world is nothing but the Absolute. The Mādhva contention that it is a second reality over and above the Absolute Reality is an unjustifiable assumption. In other words, the eternal negation of all duality and plurality is nothing but the undifferenced Absolute itself, and this is the core and essence of the Advaita conception of a non-dual Absolute. That is to say, this eternal negation as absolutely real is one with the Absolute itself as the eternal negation of all plurality. Nor can it be said that the definition of falsity as that which is the object of an absolutely real eternal negation will not apply to the familiar instance of illusory silver perceived in the locus of a mother-of-pearl. In such a case the eternal negation which defines the silver as illusory is only an empirically real negation. It is an empirically real eternal negation of silver in the substrate of the Absolute consciousness as limited by the *this*. In other words, the empirically real mother-of-pearl as the empirical negation of silver that appears in its locus is what reduces the illusory silver to a false object. This objection, however, does not really apply. In the Absolute consciousness appearing as the *this*, the negation of silver may be taken also as the absolutely real negation, for in the ultimate analysis it is the Absolute as Pure Consciousness that is the substrate both of the empirically real mother-of-pearl, presented as *this*, and of the illusory silver as which the *this* manifests itself. Though consciousness as *this* is only empirically real, consciousness as such, pure and indeterminate, is the Absolute Reality. It is in the uitimate analysis the real substrate of the experience of the illusory. Hence, consciousness as mother-of-pearl appearing as *this* is the empirical negation of the illusory silver, and consciousness as such without any limitation by *this* is the absolutely real negation of the silver that appears. We may, therefore, say that it may be spoken of as an empirically real negation from one point of view, and an absolutely real negation from the ultimate standpoint.

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[1] Traikālikaniṣedhasya tātttvikatve advaitahāneḥ. Prātibhāsikatve siddhasādhanāt. Vyāvahārikatve'pi tasya bādhyatvena arthāntarāt etc.—The *Nyāyāmṛta* (edn by M. M. Dr Yogendranath—appendix to the *Advaitasiddhi* vol. II.)—p. 1.

The Advaitin has thus shown that the negation of the world may be regarded as the same as the Absolute itself as the substratum of the negation, and hence there is no implication of dualism incompatible with the non-dualistic standpoint of the Advaitin. But non-dualism has been shown to be incompatible in a different way. The negatum, i.e., what is negated in a real negation, is also real. This is the accepted rule as regards negation. From this one may infer the reality of the world in the following manner.

> The world is real,
>
> Because it is the negatum of a real negation,
>
> The negatum and the negation must be of the same grade of reality, e.g., the similarity of the illusory silver with the mother-of-pearl has the same reality as the illusory silver itself.[1]

In other words, the resemblance of the illusory silver is determined by the illusory silver itself, and is illusorily apparent like the illusory silver. In the same way, if the negation of the world be regarded as absolutely real, then the world, being the negation of a real negation, will also be absolutely real.

The Advaitin's answer to this objection is as follows. There is, according to him, no invariable relation between sameness of reality and sameness of determin-a tion. If the world be the object of real negation, it does not follow that it must therefore be itself real. There is no rule that negation and that which is negated by it must be of the same grade of reality. Consider the case of the apparent silver. It is negated by the empirically real mother-of-pearl. Here, obviously, the negated silver does not possess the same reality as the mother-of-pearl. Further, the mother-of-pearl is itself an empirical mode of the Absolute Reality. The Absolute as the substrate of this mode is also the absolute negation of silver as which the mother-of-pearl appears in illusion. Here, therefore, we have the apparently real silver, empirically negated by the mother-of-pearl, and ultimately negated by the Absolute Reality as the ultimate substrate of the mother-of-pearl. We have, thus, an apparent reality as object both of empirical negation and an absolue negation at the same time. Therefore, the Mādhva contention that negation and that which is negated by the negation must have the same order of reality is a mere assumption not supported by the facts of experience.[1]

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[1] Prapañcaḥ tāttvikaḥ, tāttvikābhāvanirūpitatvāt, yat yannirūpyaṃ tat tatsamānasattākaṃ, yathā-śuktirajatasādṛśyaṃ śuktirajatsamānasattākam........ ...iti Mādhvaḥ śaṇkate—The *Bālabodhinī* page 409.

The Advaitin next points out that though there can be no valid objection to considering the negation of the world to be an absolutely real negation, we may also consider an empirical negation of the world to be equally faultless from another point of view. The Mādhva realist holds that the object of an absolute negation must be inferior in reality to the negation which negates it. Contrariwise, if the negation is to be considered to be empirically real only, then the world, which is empirically negated, will have to be considered as absolutely real. In other words, the negatum of a negation lacking ultimate Truth and Reality, must *ipso facto* be something other than the unreal or merely empirically real. Since the world is conceded to be other than the apparently real by the Advaitin himself, it must be either empirically real or absolutely real. But, if it be, as the Advaitin contends, an object of an empirical negation, then it cannot itself be empirically real. Hence it follows that the world as empirically negated is neither empirical reality nor apparent reality. Hence it must be Absolute Reality. Against this contention the Advaitin points out that this does not necessarily follow. The rule that a negation and what is negated by the negation must belong to different grades of reality does not square with the facts of experience. The dream world is an apparent world stuffed with apparent objects, yet there may be dream negation of a dream object. The fact that waking experience is a negation of the dream and all its objects does not mean the waking reality, i.e., empirical reality of the dream object that is negated within the dream. Let us consider a concrete case. I dream of perceiving a rope as a snake, and within the dream I correct the dream snake by the dream experience of a dream rope. The illusory dream snake is thus negated by the dream rope. Waking experience is the negation of the entire dream experience. It is thus the negation of a dream rope, which, again, is the negation of a dream snake. Waking experience thus becomes the negation of the negation of a dream snake. Is it, then, the experience of a snake ? Obviously not. In fact, waking experience is a rejection of the dream, of the dream rejection, and also of what is rejected in the dream rejection. Hence, therefore, we have within the dream an apparent rejection of an apparent object. An apparent rejection of an apparent object is thus not necessarily equal to either empirical reality or Absolute Reality. In the same way, an empirically real negation of an empirically real world does not entail the reinstatement of the latter as ultimately real.[1]

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[1] Na ca tāttvikābhāvapratiyoginaḥ prapañcasya tāttvikatvāpattiḥ tāttvikābhāvapratiyogini śuktirajatādau kalpite vyābhicārāt—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgar edn.) pages 87 to 89.

It may be useful here to go into some detail about the different grades of reality and their negative relations to one another. The Mādhva contends that a negation to hold good must possess superior reality to that which it negates. The Advaitin thinks that this rule does not always hold good. A dream negation may negate a dream object as we have seen above, though the negation and the object negated are both apparent. What the Advaitin contends is that a negation to hold good must not be inferior in reality to that which it negates. In other words, it must be co-equal in status with the negatum or superior thereto. In either case the negation will be a valid negation of the object negated and will establish the absence of the latter. Hence, considering the three grades of reality, viz., the absolutely real, which is the Absolute, the world, which is empirically real, but lacks absolute Truth and Reality, and the apparent, which is devoid of both empirical reality and ultimate truth, we shall have the following different kinds of negation.

(i) Where the negatum or object negated is absolutely real and its negation is only empirically or apparently real, we have negation of a grade inferior to the reality of what is negated. This does not mean the real absence of the negatum. (ii) The same is the case where we have apparent negation of an empirically real object. (iii) There is, however, no inferior negation of an apparent object, though an apparent negation of an apparent object may entail the absence of the object that appears. (iv) We have also inferior negation, where negation is only empirical rejection of an absolutely real thing. It does not entail the real absence of the reality that is negated. (v) The same is true of an apparent negation of the empirically real or of the ultimately real. Such negation does not entail the absence of the negatum.

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[1] Yathā svapne āropitasya gajādeḥ svapne āropitena abhâvena āropitagajadīnāṃ mithyātvavyavahāraḥ bhavati, tathā prakṛte 'pi vyāvahārike prapañce prapañcasamānādhikaraṇavyāvahārikaniṣedhapratiyogitvam ādāya mithyātvavyavahāraḥ bhaviṣyati—The *Bālabodhinī* (Adaitasiddhi—vol. II) page 412. *N. B.*— The example of the gloss has been changed. In our exposition we have taken the more popular example of illusory snake in a rope.

As distinguished from the above five kinds, where the negation is inferior in status to what is negated, we have the following different forms of negation, where negation is not inferior in reality to what it negates. In other words, in these forms the negation is either of the same in grade with or superior to what it negates or sublates. These forms are the following, (i) An absolutely or empirically real negation of what is empirically real. (ii) The absolute, empirical or apparent negation of what is apparently real. (iii) There is, however, no negation of an absolute reality either equal in status with or superior to the reality that is negated. (iv) An absolutely real negation of what is either empirically real or merely apparent. (v) An empirically real negation of the empirically or apparently real is also a case of negation not inferior in rank to the negated object. (vi) Lastly, the apparent negation of the apparently real is also a case of negation not inferior in status to the object negated.

The Mādhva, however, raises another objection here. The Advaitin establishes the falsity of the world by an inference based on the objectivity, etc., of the world. By falsity he means the absolute non-existence in the very substrate in which it presents itself. The inference by means of which the Advaitin proves this non-existence or absence is part and parcel of the objective world, which the Advaitin proves as non-existent by the inference in question. As the inference is included in the object that is negated, the inference itself is negated along with the object which the inference negatives. The inference being negatived, the world which the inference negates or proves as non-existent is reinstated thereby. Put in simpler language, the objection is this. The world in spite of its presentation in experience is negated and proved to be non-existent by means of an inference. The inference imports the negation of the world. But the inference itself is part and parcel of the world which is negated. Accordingly, inference as importing the negation of the world amounts to its negation. Therefore, the inference is equal to the negation of the negation of the world. And this means that the inference negatives the negation of the world, which is the same as world affirmation instead of world denial.

In reply, the Advaitin points out that negation of a negation is not always equal to affirmation. We may have a dream negation of a dream object, and waking experience is a negation both of the dream negation and the dream object that is negated by the dream negation. Nobody will say that the waking negation of a dream rejection is equivalent to a waking experience of the objects negated in the dream. In other words, we may have negation of negation, which is negation both of a negation and of its object at the same time. The absence of the absence of a jar, we say, is the jar itself. But this is not always true. In some cases a negation will negate not merely a negation but also the object negated by such negation. The inference that proves the unreality of the world, though involving its own negation along with the world which it negates, does not entail the affirmation of the world as reality.[1]

Again, the Mādhva points out that the negation of the world if regarded as empirically real will deprive the scriptural text 'There is no duality anywhere' of its evidential value and validity. If the negation is only empirically real and lacks ultimate truth, then the scriptural text which is quoted in proof of the unreality of the world of experience would be teaching something lacking ultimate Truth and Validity. In reply to this, the Advaitin points out that the world as other than the Absolute Reality is subject to annulment and is false. And this false world has been declared in its intrinsic character as lacking truth and reality by the scriptural text. The scriptural text does not profess to present the nature of the Absolute but only of the world as a false appearance. There are other texts that declare the nature of Reality or the Absolute. This is a text that is concerned not with Reality but with the nature of appearance and to have declared appearance of appearance does not deprive it of its evidential authority. In other words, it does not profess to describe the nature of timeless Reality not subject to cancellation at any time but only of the nature of that which is in time. In this sense, it is not devoid of evidential authority. For evidence as regards the timeless Reality there are other texts, such as 'That thou art' and 'The Absolute is the timeless Reality which is the Reality of consciousness.'[2]

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[1] Na ca niṣedhasya niṣedhe pratiyogisattvāpattir iti vācyam; ......yatra tu pratiyoginiṣedhayor ubhayorapi niṣedhah tatra na pratiyogisattvam—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasagara edn.) pages 105-106.

[2] Tat tvam asi
Satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma

The Mādhva raises a further objection to the Advaita affirmation of the falsity of the world. In so far as the Advaitin affirms the world to be a false appearance, he means that the world stands eternally negated, i.e., negated for all the three periods of time in the very locus in which it is presented. And in support of this contention the Advaitin offers both scriptural text and inference as evidence. The scriptural text in proof of such falsity is 'There is no plurality anywhere in any context in which it appears.' And the inference which is adduced in proof of the falsity in the above sense is 'The world is a false appearance, because it is objectivity, (i.e., presents itself as an object of experience), of limited extension, and also un-intelligent matter. And the example adduced in proof of a universal relation between falsity and objectivity, limited extension, etc., is the familiar instance of the illusory silver in the locus of a mother-of-pearl. The Mādhva now holds that this eternal negation of the world of experience in the very locus in which it is presented presupposes two things, the negation itself and that which is negated by the negation (*pratiyogī*). Now, it is incumbent on the Advaitin to say in what character the negatum is negated by the negation in question. Is the world negated by the negation, for example, in its intrinsic general character as objective (*dṛśya*), un-intelligent (*jaḍa*), limited extension (*paricchinna*) and also in its intrinsic specific characters as water, air, earth, etc., in the very locus in which it is presented as real ? Or is it negated by the negation, not in its intrinsic character as objective, limited, etc., but

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Na ca atāttvikaniṣedhabodhakatve śruter aprāmānyāpattiḥ, brahmabhinnaṃ prapancaniṣedhādikam atāttvikamityātāttvikatvena bodhayantyāh śruteḥ aprāmānyāsambhavāt—The *Advaitasiddhi* (*Nirnayasāgara edn*) pages 110 to 112.

only as ultimately real ? In other words, the question is what precisely is the determination (*avacchedaka*) that determines the negatum of this eternal negation which constitutes falsity ? The Mādhva points out that the negatum cannot be regarded as negated either in its intrinsic character or as claiming absolute and unsublatable reality. That it cannot be regarded as being negated in its intrinsic character in the locus in which it appears will be obvious from the following considerations. A thing, that does not exist in the locus in which it appears and also does not exist anywhere else, is absolutely non-existent. And the Advaitin himself admits that the absolutely non-existent is nothing but a fictitious creation of the imagination like the barren mother and is incapable of presentation in experience. If earth, for example, does not exist in its intrinsic character as earth in the locus in which it presents itself, and also everywhere else such as ether, water, air, etc., then it is indistinguishable from the absolutely non-existent. And this is nothing but the fictitious or the imaginary, which the Advaitin does not consider to be a possible object of experience. In fact, the Advaitin considers the world to be false though different from the Absolute non-existence, and in proof of this the Mādhva realist urges several considerations which the Advaitin himself accepts. For example, there is scriptural text[1] declaring the origin and destruction of the world, and that which is absolute non-entity has neither beginning nor end in time. It is an unhistorical fiction. Further, the Advaitin accepts causal efficiency (*arthakriyākāritva*) in respect of the world and its objects, and the absolute nonentity quā fiction is incapable of exercising any causal efficiency. Moreover, according to the Advaitin, the world of experience is not unconditioned but is derived from nescience which is as much objective as the primordial matter of Sāṃkhya,[1] Lastly, the Advaitin thinks that the world of experience is cancelled or negated by the final intuition of ultimate Reality and Truth, and an absolute nonentity is not amenable to experience and consequent correction. In short, the Mādhva points out that the world cannot be negated in the locus in which it appears. The reason is that once the origination or appearance of a thing is conceded in a substrate it cannot be asserted as nonentity and so cannot be negated in that very substrate. The world appears in the substrate of Reality and its origination or presentation is a felt fact being based on the testimony of scripture and verdict of experience. And if the Advaitin negates this world in the substrate of Reality wherein it presents itself, he will be flying in the face of opposition and reducing the presentational world of reality to an unpresentable fiction. This issue is entailed by the first of the above two alternatives. Let us now consider the second. If the negation of the world and also the familiar instance of the illusory silver are to be regarded as being negated only in sense of claiming absolute unsublatable reality, the logical fallacies involved in the inference will be an illegitimate reciprocal dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). The ultimate reality, according to the Advaitin, is not susceptible of contradiction at any time, while the empirically real is what is liable to contradiction. Hence, the ultimately real has to be defined as the other of the sublatable or the empirically real, and the empirically real has to be defined as the other of the non-sublatable or the absolutely real. Each, therefore, has to be understood as the other of the other, and this reciprocal dependence is inescapable in the second alternative interpretation of that which is negated.

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[1] Tasmāt vā etasmāt ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ, satyaṃ ca anṛtaṃ ca satyam abhavat.

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[1] The primordial matter (*prakṛti*) of Sāṃkhya is equated with nescience (*avidyā*). The differénce between the *prima facie* conception of *prakṛti* in Sāṃkhya, and Śaṃkara's *avidyā* or *māyā* lies in the fact that matter has been given a co-ordinate status with Spirit (*puruṣa*) in scholastic Sāṃkhya whereas Advaita Vedānta emphasises its non-ultimate character and also the contingency of its evolutes According to Sāṃkhya there is no ontological difference between cause and effect and so cause cannot claim a higher status of reality than effect. The contingency of matter is thus an ineluctable conclusion. It cannot thus be co-ordinate with spirit which does not admit of negation either temporally or ontologically. Śaṃkarācārya posits this primordial unconscious matter as nescience. Matter is opposed to spirit which is consciousness. The unconscious matter characterised as nescience is objective, though it falls short of *ens raalissimum* possessed by consciousness. Nescience or ignorance is admitted by all as an epistemic fact. But Advaita considers it as an ontological principle which not only accounts for subjective error, but also as the objective ground of it as it unfolds itself in the material objective plane of experience, veridical or non-veridical. The historical veridicality of experience differs from non-veridical experience only in degree and not in kind.

The same point may also be explained thus. The Mādhva asks what is after all the object of contradiction out of which the Advaitin makes such enormous capital? The silver appearing in the mother-of-pearl is not regarded as real because it is contradicted by subsequent experience of the substrate of appearance. So, this illusory silver is regarded as possessed of an apparent reality as opposed to empirical or ultimate reality. By the definition of falsity, the false object is that which does not exist in the substrate at any period of time. So, the illusory silver cannot be considered false, since it exists at the time of its appearance. It may be argued that the silver, though it has apparent reality, is not real *per se*. Its reality is not absolute. The negation, therefore, must refer to the real silver as its object which cannot be asserted to exist in the mother-of-pearl at ony division of time. But this real silver, which is the object of negation, is regarded as real on the ground that it is not contradicted, whereas the false is always liable to contradiction. The concept of reality, therefore, consists in its non-contradiction. The false is that which is contradicted ; the real is that which is never contradicted. So, the conception of reality is therefore arrived at by negation of falsity, i.e., by the contradiction of falsity. Consequently, the conception of reality is contingent on that of contradiction, if it be understood as a negative concept, i.e. what is not contradicted. But the falsity is also a negative concept, i.e., as the opposite of uncontradicted. Thus, the concept of reality and falsity is vitiated by the fallacy of the reciprocal dependence or circular reasoning.

Further, it is urged that the definition is to be condemned on the ground of absurdity. It puts a construction on the corrective judgement which is not at all supported by experience. When the illusion is corrected, it is felt that the content, say silver, is not present in the subject, say mother-of-pearl. The silver is felt to be absent as silver and not, as the Advaitin seeks to interpret it, as a real empirical silver. This interpretation will, on the contrary, involve another logical absurdity. The felt silver will remain uncontradicted if the silver negated is believed to be another kind of silver, i.e., empirical silver. This point will be clarified later on.

Again, the position that what is negated is the negatum, not in its intrinsic nature, but only so far as it claims to be ultimately real, is untenable on another ground. It is now asserted that the phenomenal world stands negated, not *per se*, i.e., as it appears but only in so far as it claims to have ultimate reality of the Absolute. In other words, the situation turns out to be a negation of the ultimate Reality in (the locus of) the phenomenal world. The question now crops up ; Does this negation negate the ultimate Reality of the phenomenal world as its integral character or an external determination, i.e., as claiming to be ultimately real? If the first alternative be accepted, then the objection that applies to the negation of the false in its intrinsic character remains the same, and false becomes indistinguishable from absolute non-entity. And if the second alternative be accepted, then the Advaitin will find himself launched on the interminable voyage of an infinite regress. The ultimate reality is negated as per the second alternative not in its intrinsic character, but only in respect of its character of being ultimately real. And even in respect of this the same question may be asked, i.e., the negation of the claim to ultimate reality is a negation of the claim, not in its intrinsic character, but as claiming to be ultimately real. The same may be said of this latter claim, that the negation in respect of this claim is not negation of the claim intrinsically considered but negation of the claim as itself claiming to be ultimately real, and so on without end.[1]

Let us elucidate the issue by the consideration of a concrete case. The silver in the mother-of-pearl cannot be negated on pain of absurdity even as the apparent silver. The appearance is a historical event and as such cannot be declared to be eternally *non est* in the substratum in which it occurs. It is a truism that the apparent silver does not exist in any other space-time context. If it does not exist in its relevant context at the time of its occurrence it will be as good as an absolute nonentity. But this is stoutly denied by the Advaitin. In order to escape this predicament the Advaitin makes real silver the object of correction. Since what appears cannot be contradicted in an eternal reference, and the appearance is denied an existential status, the occasion of its contradiction will never arise. Contradiction is negation, and negation is called in request when there is an occasion for it. But for the appearance negation would be entirely uncalled for.

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[1] Pāramārthikatvasyāpi svarūpeṇa niṣedhe prathamapakṣokta-doṣāpattiḥ (i.e. asattāpattiḥ) atas tasyāpi pāramārthikatvākāreṇa niṣedhe anavasthā syāt—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasagara edn) pages 118—120.

If, however, negation is supposed to refer to the real silver, the eternal negation of it in the mother-of-pearl will not be absurd, since the real silver is not conceded to exist in the mother-of-pearl. But, on scrutiny, it must appear that the negated silver cannot be regarded as the empirically real silver, which is the position of the Naiyāyika. The empirical silver is real in its context and does not appear in the mother-of-pearl, and so the negation of it will involve contradiction of a fact and also irrelevancy. What is negated is the silver that appears. This silver, it is arguable, appears in the character of real silver. The silver in a mother-of-pearl is believed to be real silver and the felt reality of the apparent silver is arrogated by it from the real silver. In other words, the character of reality which belongs to the empirical real is arrogated by the apparent silver. The arrogated reality is experienced in the silver appearing in the mother-of-pearl. So far as the arrogated reality is experienced as a property of the apparent silver it cannot be regarded as intrinsically real. The object of negation in the proposition 'this is not silver' cannot, therefore, be accounted for by arrogation of reality, simply because the arrogated reality experienced as an attribute will be nothing but apparent. And so, the logical justification of falsity will not be possible. The appeal to another real silver or the higher grade of reality of it will make an infinite regress inevitable. The point at issue can be determined by a simple question. The silver appears as real as the empirical silver. That is to say, the reality felt is of the higher order. But it is felt, and it cannot thus be denied *per se*. The apparent reality of the silver is felt as identical with empirical reality. But this felt higher reality cannot be denied on the same ground. What is felt cannot be denied an existential status. At any rate, the world appearance or the illusory silver cannot be asserted to be eternally non-existent, which constitutes falsity. In other words, neither the illusory silver nor the world appearance can be asserted to be false.

In reply to the Mādhva's objections, the Advaitin points out that the world, which, according to the Advaitin, is the object of an eternal negation in the very locus in which it is presented, may be regarded either as the object of this eternal negation in its intrinsic character as a world of empirical reality or as an empirically real world claiming to be ultimately real and true. In none of these alternatives is there any difficulty such as is suggested by the Mādhva realist. The falsity of the world is evidenced by scriptural text and proved by inference, from the marks of objectivity, limited extension and unintelligent materiality, as above set forth. And the example of the illusory silver is equally apposite in the case and not a case of absence of *probandum* (*sādhyavaikalya*), as is urged by the Mādhva. Consider, first, the case of the illusory silver. What is the evidence of experience? When the illusion is corrected by the perception of the real character of the substrate, i.e., of the mother-of-pearl, how is the silver rejected or negatived in actual experience? When we apprehend the illusory silver as such we say this never was, never is, and never will be silver. The object negated is silver, and this is negated in its intrinsic character for all the three periods of time. We do not say that this was silver and now is not. On the contrary, we say that it was not silver even when it appeared as such, and that never is and never will be silver at any time. Therefore, the deliverance of the experience is that silver as such is negated, i.e., silver in its intrinsic character as silver, and not silver as an ultimately real silver. Thus, the instance of the illusory silver is an instance of a silver that is negated in its own locus in its intrinsic character for all the three periods of time. In the same way the evidence of scriptural text 'There is no plurality anywhere' negatives the world of experience in its intrinsic character in the very locus in which it is presented.[1]

Nor can it be argued that the silver that is negated is not silver as such or silver in its intrinsic character but an illusory silver masquerading as an ultimately real silver. Were it so, the object of illusion (apparent silver) and the object of correction (real silver) would be of different facts. It is a truism that correction negatives an illusion in the form in which it appears. If the illusion be in respect of one kind of object, and the correction thereof be the negation of a different kind of object, the correction is no correction at all. For example, if the illusion be the illusion of fire in a mountain, and the correction be the rejection of fire in a kitchen, then the correction is no correction of the illusory mountain fire. It would be absolutely pointless. Hence, if the illusory silver be only an apparent silver, and correction be the negation of the silver of normal veridical experience then there is no point of contact between the illusion and the correction which allegedly corrects the illusion. Moreover, the contention that what is negated in the correction is the silver of veridical experience also contradicts the deliverance of experience. Correction corrects what appears in the illusion. What appears in the illusion is the illusory silver and not the veridical silver. Therefore, correction must also negative, not the empirically real silver, which does not appear in the illusion, but only the illusory or apparent silver which presents itself in it.[1] The contention that correction negates veridical silver obviously stands convicted of irrelevancy.

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[1] Svarūpeṇaiva traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvasya prapañce śuktirūpyecāṅgikārāt. Tathāhi—śuktau rajatbhramānantaram adhiṣṭhānatattvasākṣātkāre rūpyaṃ nāsti nāsīt, na bhaviṣyatīti svarupeṇaiva,...śrutya ca prapañcasya svarupeṇaiva niṣedhapratīteḥ—(The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgar edn.)—page 120 to 121.

It has, again, been urged by the Mādhva that, nothing real is the object of an eternal negation in a particular substrate. In support of this contention the Mādhva cites the instance of the absolutely unreal, such as barren mother. It is not real in any substrate and it also is not, therefore, found to originate or cease to be anywhere. The Mādhva claims that whatever has origination or cessation must be real, and hence cannot be susceptible to contradiction. It is only the unreal that is liable to contradiction. If the world appearance were liable to contradiction, it would be unreal nullity and consequently would not be possessed of origination or cessation. In point of fact, the world has origination, and things of the world also claim to have origin and cessation. They must be conceded to be real, because they are repugnant to contradiction. But this contention of the Mādhva has no logical cogency. There is no necessary concomitance between origination, on the one hand, and absence of contradictedness on the other. It is not a fact that the uncontradicted alone will have the incidents of birth and death. According to the Mādhva, space, ether, time, etc., are eternal verities and stand uncontradicted. If non-contradiction were the necessary concomitant of origination, these verities would have these incidents. But, in spite of standing uncontradicted, they are not liable to origination or decay. So, non-contradiction is not the necessary concomitant of these incidents. It is also not a fact that whatever is not uncontradicted, i.e., whatever is liable to contradiction must be lacking in these characteristics of birth and death. Error and dream are contradicted by subsequent experience, and yet it is undeniable that they have definite origin. So, there is no logical relation between origination and absence of contradictedness. In space origination is not and yet absence of contradiction is. To return to the issue, the reality or unreality of the world is supposed to be entailed by absence of contradiction or contradiction. The world is contradicted by the knowledge of ultimate reality, and on the empirical plane dream and illusion are found to be contradicted by subsequent experience. In other words, the world is only a false show. But, though contradicted, it cannot be contended that the world should not have origin or cessation. Contradiction or non-contradiction has no bearing on the incidents of origination or cessation.

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[1] Na ca tatra laukikaparamārtharajatameva svarūpeṇa niṣedhapratiyogīti—vācyam ; bhramabādhayorvaiyādhikaraṇyāpatteḥ, aprasaktapratiṣedhāpatteśca—*op. cit.* page 121.

But the Mādhva may ask, if absence of contradiction is not the condition of that which originates or ceases, what, then, will be the condition or origination or cessation? The Advaita answer to this question is that the condition of origination or cessation of a thing must be sought in the intrinsic nature of things which are found to possess these characteristics. As a matter of fact, it is only things which are other than the facts existing from the eternal past and have no beginning, that are to be regarded as liable to origination and cessation. The common character of the things other than the beginningless is that they are all objects of possible experience.[1] The Advaitin thinks that there are six different principles that pass as eternal, viz., finite selves, God, pure consciousness, distinction between God and the finite selves, nescience, and the relation between nescience and pure consciousness. The essence of empirical things consists in objectivity or cognisability and is true of all things not excepting the above six. These things are also objects of possible experience, but being existent from eternal past are bereft of birth and death. So, the logical condition of birth and death should be regarded as consisting in the characteristic common to them. It can be propounded that whatever, other than the beginningless verities, is an object of experience must have origination and cessation. Whatever is an object of experience is liable to origination and cessation, and whatever is liable to origination and cessation is an object of experience. The two propositions are convertible without restriction of denotation.[1] That the Mādhva view in this respect is not tenable is also made evident by the scriptural testimony and the deliverance of experience. For example, the scripture speaks of chariots and horses drawing the chariots and of roads on which chariots are drawn as originating in dreams, and the text also speaks of the absence of the chariots, the horses and the roads in their intrinsic character in the very locii in which they appear. And what the scripture testifies to in this respect is also evidenced by the deliverance of experience. Here, therefore, we have temporal contents appearing and disappearing in our dream experience, yet their negation in their intrinsic character is certified both by scripture and experience. In the same way, the illusory silver which appears in an illusion is subject to negation in its intrinsic nature in the very locus in which it appears. This is what is actually evidenced by the deliverance of correction. And in respect of the empirical world and its objects their absolute negation in their intrinsic character in the very locii in which they appear is certified by the scriptural text 'There is no plurality anywhere'.

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[1] Anādibhinnadṛśyatvameva utpattyādimattve prayojakam—The *Bālabodhini* by M. M. Dr Yogendranāth—(The *Advaitasiddhi* Bengali edn.) p. 500.

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[1] Vastusvabhāvādikam anādiṣaṭkabhinnadṛśyatvam eva utpattyādimattvaprayojakaṃ samavyāpakam—*op. cit.* page 500.

The Mādhva now raises a different objection to this interpretation of falsity. The objection seeks to prove that this interpretation of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is unorthodox and unconventional. It contradicts the traditional interpretation of falsity by the ancient teachers of the Advaita school. Prakāśātmayati, the author of the *Vivaraṇa*, definitely asserts that the silver that is negated is the real silver existing in the market or the apparent silver felt to be identical with the real silver. But Madhusūdana Sarasvatī affirms that the silver negated in the mother-of-pearl is an apparent silver. It has no reference to an empirical silver. The latter interpretation is obviously in contradiction with the assertion of Prakāśātman. But there is not a whit of contradiction or incompatibility. It is not true that the ancient teachers affirm that the real silver existing elsewhere is the object of negation. The import of a sentence cannot be understood piecemeal. It is preposterous to suppose that the author of the *Vivaraṇa* uncritically endorses the position of the Naiyāyika realist. It will be apparent from the very definition of falsity propounded by Prakāśātman in the *Vivaraṇa*. The false is that which appears in its relevant substrate as the object of negation. The relevant substratum means the substratum in which it appears. The silver appears as an adjective to the substratum, and this very silver which appears is said to be negated by the corrective judgement. It is obvious that, according to the *Vivaraṇa*, the negated silver is the apparent silver, i.e., the very silver which appears in it.

The empirical silver is not believed by anybody to appear as presented in the mother-of-pearl. The reference to the market silver has a deeper significance. It only means that the apparent silver perceived in the mother-of-pearl is felt as identical with the real silver. If it were not felt as real silver, then nobody would be deluded and hence would not have an incentive to move towards it with the view to acquiring it. This is the only logically consistent interpretation of the text of the *Vivaraṇa*. It is preposterous to suppose that the *Vivaraṇa* could believe that the content of illusion is a real verity existing in another space-time context. The Naiyāyika believes that error lies in the subjective interpretation of contents of illusion which results in a wrong judgement owing to the absence of the predicate in the subject. The endorsement of this theory is suicidal to the fundamental metaphysical position of the Advaitin. The Advaitin would be the last person to affirm that world appearance is real elsewhere and only wrongly attributed to the Absolute Brahman as its substrate. The absurdity of this deduction is writ large on the face of it. The Absolute being the only reality, there will be no other locus in which the world could exist as fact. That this interpretation of the *Vivaraṇa* text is not inspired by the biased attitude of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is borne but by the selfsame interpretation offered by Citsukhācārya in the *Tattvapradīpikā*. Madhusūdana also quotes this authority in confirmation of this position.[1] It seems that Vyāsatīrtha has made

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[1] Asyācaryāvacasaḥ pāramarthikalaukikarajatatādātmyena pratītaṃ prātibhāsikameva rajataṃ pratiyogītyarthaḥ.—The *Advaita-siddhi* (Nirṇaysāgara edn.) page 123-124.

Taduktaṃ Tattvapradīpikāyāṃ—'tasmāt laukikaparamārtha-rajatameva nedaṃ rajataṃ iti niṣedhapratiyogīti pūrvācāryāṇāṃ vācoyuktirapi purovartini rajatārthinaḥ pravṛttidarśanāl laukikaparaan illegitimate capital out of a loose expression of the *Vivaraṇa*. There can be no point of agreement between the Naiyāyika and the Advaitin in respect of the status of the content of illusion. Vyāsatīrtha takes the example of silver-illusion and makes it out that the author of the *Vivaraṇa* made the market silver the negatum of the contradicting judgement or the object of correction. When the illusion is corrected, it is discovered that the real silver was not actually present where it was perceived. So, the analogy of ordinary illusion does not give countenance to the Advaita position of the falsity of the world. The content of illusion is always real. But had he cared to look into the implication of the central thesis he could not have made such an absurd claim. The world appearance is a metaphysical illusion. But it cannot be regarded as real in another context, because this is *ex hypothesi* impossible. The ordinary illusion and cosmic illusion- are not on all fours. The absurdity of the Mādhva contention is too obvious to deserve further elaboration.

The Mādhva contends that there is one common or universal silverness that characterises both the apparent and the empirically real silver. It is this experience of silverness as a character belonging to all silver, apparent as well as empirically real, that explains our practical reaction. And, since our volitional efforts can be successfully explained by the conception of a common silverness appertaining both to the apparent and the real, there is no need of assuming an illusory content masquerading somehow as the empirically real. The Advaita answer

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mārtharajatatvenāparokṣatayā pratītasya kālatraye 'pi laukikaparamārtharajatamidaṃ na bhavatīti niṣedhapratiyogitāmaṇgikṛtya netavyā—*op. cit.* page—124-128.

to this is that the assumption of a common silverness belonging both to the illusory and to the empirically real silver will create insuperable difficulties. If the illusory silver were to possess the same silverness as the ordinary silver, then it ought to serve the same purpose as the silver of normal veridical experience. In the language of Kant, this is to confound the imaginary dollars (with the real ones.) The latter will be acceptable to our creditors, but we cannot pay our debts with imaginary dollars, although the universal dollarness may be supposed to be common to both the imaginary and the real dollars.

The Advaitin claims that it is immaterial for them to choose between the two alternatives set forth above. According to him, there is no logical diffieulty involved, if the false be considered as what is negated in its locus in its intrinsic character. And the same is true if the false is regarded as negated in its locus as claiming to be ultimately real. The Mādhva, however, points out that it is illogical for the Advaitin to assert that both the alternatives are free from logical difficulty. The first alternative leads him into the predicament of equating the false with the absolutely unreal. The second alternative lands him into an illegitimate reciprocal dependence as well as an inadmissible infinite regress. The Advaitin points out in reply that there is no real reciprocal dependence here. If he had defined the false as that which is negated, and the real as the other or opposite of what is negated, there would be reciprocal dependence. But the Absolute real, according to the Advaitin, is what presents itself in an experience which is never sublated by knowledge. The conception of what is non-sublatable applies equally to the Absolute Real and unreal. But the unreal is never a presented fact of experience, while the Absolute Real is both presented and unsublated. This is what distinguishes the Absolute, the ultimately Real, from the fictitious, the utterly unreal. The fictitious is devoid of presentation in experience, while the Absolute is pure presentative consciousness. It is presentation itself, and in this sense may be loosely called a presented fact, which the unreal never is. Since the world of experience lacks ultimate reality in the above sense, being subject to sublation, the consciousness of non-sublation is a property that belongs to a subtrate different from the world of experience. No consciousness of non-sublation can attach to the world of practical experience. In other words, non-sublation is what distinguishes ultimate Reality as pure presentation itself, and the absence of such non-sublation marks out the phenomenal world. The phenomenal world is therefore false in the sense of standing eternally negated in the locus in which it appears, and stands so negated as other than ultimate Reality, the non-sublatable Pure Presentation. In other words, the phenomenal world is false in the sense that it is negated in the locus in which it appears, and in this respect it is other than the Absolute, which is never sublated as a pure presentative consciousness. Since the false is defined as the other of the non-sublated presentation, there is no reciprocal dependence here. The Real is not defined in terms of the false. It is the false that is defined as the other of the unsublatable Pure Presentation or Reality. The fictitious is non-sublatable just as Ultimate Reality is. But it lacks the character of presentation, which Ultimate Reality is. This disposes of the Mādhva objection that the Advaita conception of falsity obliterates the distinction between the false and the unreal. The false is other than the real as that which is sublated though presented, and it is other than the unreal as that which is presented, which the unreal is not, and also as that which is sublated, which the unreal never is. In other words, the unreal can neither be affirmed nor denied, while the false can be expressed in a negative judgement.[1]

Nor does the question of an infinite regress arise if falsity is defined in this way. If the world of objects be denied its ultimacy, the experience itself, being an objective fact included in the world of objects, will be subject to sublation along with the world. Therefore, the world as claiming ultimate reality being negatived, the claim to ultimate reality as part and parcel of the world, which is negated, will be negatived in the same act. The so-called consciousness of the ultimate reality of the world, which is negated, having vanished with the negation of the world in one and the same act, there is no chance of another claim to ultimate realtity rearing its head out of the negation in question to be negated again by another act of negation, leading to the emergence of another similar claim and so on without end.[2]

Another objection raised against the Advaita account of illusion is that it confounds logical negation (*anyonyābhāva*) with entitative exclusion (*atyantābhāva*). When we say 'A' is not B' we do not assert entitative exclusion of 'B' from 'A', but only deny the identity of 'A' and 'B'. When we say the book is not the table, what we deny is the identity of the book and the table. We

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1. Pāramarthikatvaṃ yadi pratipannopādhau traikālikaniṣedha-pratiyogitvarūpabādhyatvasya abhāvarūpaṃ syāt tarhi mithyātva-ghaṭitatvena anyonyāśrayo 'pi syāt. Kintu pāramārthikatvaṃ na uktarūpaṃ.... jñānanivartyamātraviśeṣyakadhir eva pāramārthika-tvam uktam. Tādṛśadhīstu siddhāntimate brahmamātraviṣayiṇī—The *Bālābodhinī*—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Bengali edn) page 504.

2. Pāramārthikatvena dṛśyamātraniṣedhe yadi pāramārthika-tvam aniṣiddhaṃ syāt tadā anavasthādoṣaḥ syādapi, prakṛte tadabhāvāt na anavasthādūṣaṇaśaṃkā. Iti vibhāvanīyam—*op. cit.* page 505.

do not assert the exclusion of the book from the table. The book may be on the table, and its location on the table is quite consistent with the truth of the judgment, 'The book is not the table'. The Advaitin, however, defines the false in terms of absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) in the sense of entitative exclusion for all the three periods of time, past, present and future. A false, according to the Advaitin, is what never was, is or will be in the very locus in which it presents itself. But what is the actual report of consciousness in the correction of the illusory silver? The Advaitin himself maintains that the correction presents itself in the form of the judgement, "This is not silver". It thus presents itself in the form of a judgement asserting logical negation. The judgement, "This is not silver", is a denial of the identity of this and silver. It does not assert the absence of silver in the locus of the *this*. Why, then, should the illusory be defined in terms of entitative exclusion, while, in actual fact, the correction amounts to the assertion of a mere logical negation? There is no ontological relation here. At least, this is not the testimony of correction. Why then should the false be defined as a case of ontological negation though in actual fact, it is nothing but logical negation or opposition?[1] Again, correction expresses itself in the form of logical negation or reciprocal negation as distinguished from entitative exclusion. The difficulty, however, in this case is that in logical or reciprocal negation or affirmation of difference each of the terms between which the negation holds is alternatively both substrate and the negatum. Take the case of the propositson, "A is not B". We may say that here A is the substrate, and B is what is negated therein. But we may also say that B is the substrate and A is negated in B, because the proposition is convertible. But it is otherwise if we say "A has no B" or "There is no B in A". Here A is the substrate and B is what is negated in it, and the proposition is not convertible. Here B cannot be the substrate and A cannot be negated in B. Since in difference or reciprocal negation each of the terms is in turn both substrate and negatum, both the terms must exist, and the negation can only be the denial of the identity between the two terms. Hence, since correction expresses itself in the form of a judgment of reciprocal negation, as, for example, when we say, "This is not silver," the *this* and the silver must both exist, and the correction can only be the denial of identity of *this* and silver as two facts.

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[1] ....Nedaṃ rjatamiti vākyābhilapyapratiter anyonyābhāvaviṣayatvameva—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgara edn) page 130.

Nedam rajatamiti prātyakṣikabādhajñānaṃ, tasyāpi bhedaviṣayakatvaṃ siddhaṃ nedaṃ rajatam iti prātyaksikabādho bhedarūpa eva ity āyātam—The *Bālabodhinī*—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Bengali edn) p. 531.

The Advaitin meets this line of attack in the following way. A proposition is a judgement in its logical aspect as expressed in language. In other words, the proposition is the vehicle through which the meaning of the judgement is expressed. It is expression and the fact conveyed is expressed by the proposition as expression. In some cases, a proposition expresses the speaker's meaning directly. In other cases, the meaning of the speaker has to be gathered by implication as a corollary following from the proposition in which the speaker expresses himself. In the case of the proposition, "This is not silver", though logical or reciprocal negation is the form in which the proposition is expressed, yet entitative exclusion follows as its abstract meaning. The proposition in this case is a direct denial of the identity of *this* and silver. This means that there is entitative exclusion of silverness from the *this*. Silverness being absolutely absent in the *this*, it follows that silver also stands eternally negated in the *this*. The *this* is the empirical mother-of-pearl presented in its generic character as *this*. And in this empirically presented fact silver stands eternally negated. In other words, in the Absolute Reality limited by the form of the empirical mother-of-pearl is the presented *this* in which the silver that appeared stands eternally negated. This is what follows as a corollary of the judgement, "This is not silver." Besides, there is also a further consideration bearing on the point at issue. It is asserted that correction presents itself in the form, "This is not silver." This is not the only form in which the illusion is corrected. Just as we correct the illusion by saying, "This is not silver," we also correct it by saying, "Here is no silver." The latter is correction in the form of an assertion of entitative exclusion, while the former asserts only logical opposition. The former is mediate or indirect assertion of entitative exclusion, while the latter is a direct affirmation of it. Both of these forms are certified by actual experience, and therefore the report of consciousness cannot be adduced against the Advaita definition of falsity in terms of entitative exclusion.[1] Therefore, the Advaita definition of the false does not entail either the admission of an empirical silver real elsewhere as false or any deviation from the Advaita tradition.[2]

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[1] Nedaṃ rajataṃ, nātra rajatam iti dvividhaiva bādhapratītiḥ sarvānubhavasiddhā. Na tu nedaṃ rajatam ityākārikā eva. Nātra rajatam iti vākyābhilapyāyāḥ prātyakaikabādhapratiter atyantābhāvaviṣayakatvam...—The *Bālabodhinī*—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Bengali edn) pp. 532-33.

[2] Ato nāpasiddhānto nānyathākhyāthyāpattir na vā granthavirodha ity anavadyam—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgara edn) pages 131-134.

It may be urged that the false, as defined by the Advaitin, does not admit of any clear distinction from the absolutely unreal. The false is *ex hypothesi* non-existent in the locus in which it appears, and also is not existent anywhere else. The result is that the false is universally non-existent, and what is universally non-existent is a pure fiction or nonentity. There is no ontological difference between the false and non-existent. The realist does not admit the non-existence of a perceived fact in the locus. Uudoubtedly the Mādhva believes that the content of illusion is fiction, and this fiction, though it appears in illusion, cannot claim an objective status. The Advaita contention that the false differs from a fiction because it appears in the illusion does not succeed in securing a better status to the putative false. The Advaitin thinks that a non-entitative fiction is not susceptible of expression. It is not expressible in language. When we use such terms as a square circle, or a barren mother, no object is experienced corresponding to the word used. It is non-expressible nonsense. We have one or other motor sensation when we utter the word, and we also have a certain sensation of sound which we hear, when such words are uttered. Beyond these sensations there is no object or objects as the objective reference of the words used.[1] But this contention of the Advaitin, the Mādhva points out, is obviously self-contradictory. The view that unreal is not expressible by words serves to demarcate it from facts that are expressible, and this should be regarded as its adequate expression and description. Nor can it be said that it is not capable of being cognised. Were it absolutely inconceivable, the difference of the so-called false from the nonentity could not be asserted. Further, the denial of the cognition of the nonentity would be irrelevant. A denial presupposes previous knowledge of it. The very word nonentity expresses a meaning, otherwise it would not have been used at all. It is not nonsensical like abracadabra. The Advaitin cannot get away from admitting the consciousness of the unreal.

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[1] This is what is known as Vikalpavṛtti. It has been defined in the Yoga philosophy as 'Śabdajñānānupāti vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ.'

But such consciousness of the unreal, the Advaitin may reply, need not be presentative consciousness. For the consciousness of a negation the consciousness of the object of negation or the negatum is no doubt necessary, but such an experience of the negatum need not be a presentative experience. The absolutely unreal, such as a square circle, is never a presented fact.. It is incapable of being the object of an immediate experience. The Mādhva, however, points out that this definition of unreality as what cannot be an object of immediate experience will reduce space, or what modern physics calls atoms, electrons, protons, etc., which are unperceivable *per se* and yet no doubt real, to absolute unreality. And, as the Advaitin does not accept the unreality of these, the definition of unreality as set forth above will entail the fallacy of an illegitimate extension of it to objects, obviously not unreal. Therefore, the objection is that the unreality defined as that which cannot be an object of immediate experience remains too wide a definition. The realist thus concludes that his view that the unreal is the same as the false in the sense of that which is eternally negated in the locus in which it appears is to be accepted by the Advaitin.[1]

The Advaitin asserts, in reply to the charges, that, though the false and the utterly unreal are non-existent and objects of eternal negation and in this respect they may seem to be indistinguishable from each other, yet there is a vital difference between them. The unreal is not only non-existent everywhere but is incapable of appearing as real in any locus, while the false is what presents itself in the guise of a real in a locus in which it appears.[1] This is in fact what distinguishes the Advaita view of the false from that of the Buddhist nihilist. According to the Advaitin, before correction neither the illusory silver nor the world of practical experience fails to appear in the guise of the reality of its locus. In fact, the reality of the silver is nothing but a derivative of the reality of the Absolute limited by the form of the empirically real mother-of-pearl, which is its locus. The same is true of the reality of the world of practical experience. It shines by the borrowed reality of Brahman, which is its substrate. For the Buddhist nihilist there is no locus of reality underlying the appearance of things. For him a continuant is nothing but a momentary occurrence, falsely conceived as an enduring real. The reality of the empirical world is nothing but its causal efficiency, and this empirical reality, according to the nihilist, has to be overcome and negated by the realisation of the momentariness of all things. This momentariness has again to be merged into the experience of the indescribability of all things in terms of any of the concepts available in experience. This is realisation of the inapplicability of all logical concepts in regard to the ultimate foundation, if there be any, of the world of experience. In other words, the Buddhist does not concede a solid substrate of reality underlying all appearances as the Advaitin does. Hence, while the Buddhist recognizes the experience of the world as false in the sense of being an experience of an other of the void, i.e., the opposite of the real truth (void), the Advaitin believes the world is false in the sense of appearing in the substrate of the Absolute as Reality and yet not being realised as nothing but the Absolute.[1]

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[1] Nacāparokṣatayā apratīyamānatvaṃ tat ; nityātīndriyeṣv ativyāpteḥ—(The *Advaitasiddhi*, Nirṇayasāgara edn) page 138.

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[1] Sarvatra traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvaṃ yadyapi tucchānirvācyayoḥ sādhāraṇaṃ tathāpi kvacidapyupādhau sattvena pratītyanahrtvam atyantāsattvam—*op. eit.* pages 138-139
vide—*supra* page 226.

In this connection we propose to give a comparison of the metaphysical position of the Advaitin and that of the Buddhist Mādhyamika in order to obviate a natural misunderstanding and confusion, though it may involve a digression. As a matter of historical fact, the Advaita position has been confounded with the Mādhyamika nihilism which does not find any core of reality in the appearance of the world. The Advaitin gives the appearance a sort of ontological status. The world is conceded to have an empirical reality. The Mādhyamika nihilist, though he asserts the world to be an unsubstantial appearance without any foundation, also concedes an empirical reality (*sāṃvṛtika sattā*) to it. So far there seems to be a perfect agreement between the two schools. But there is a vital difference in that the Advaitin asserts a positive background behind the appearance which he thinks to be pure existence, consciousness, and bliss. The nihilist does not feel the necessity of postulating such a positive background as the solid bed-rock of his metaphysics. The world is unreal from top to bottom. The appearance is due to an inherent nescience in the individual subject. The world appearance is private and personal to the individual, though he himself is a creature of nescience. The knowlege of it is totally subjective. But the question as to why this unsubstantial appearance should occur at all, and be envisaged by an individual, is not considered in all its bearings and implications by the Mādhyamika nihilist. The ultimate principle is believed to be pure void, i.e., absolute non-being. Were it so, how could non-being masquerade as being? How could the concept of being and the positive perception of an ontological nothing as real be accounted for? It is impossible to derive being from non-being. Being may accommodate non-being if it is screened and covered by ignorance. Ignorance, again, in its negative aspect as want of knowledge can be understood only in relation to knowledge, just as darkness is understandable as the opposite of light. If absolute non-being and nescience be the ultimate stuff, is it not absurd to account for the emergence of the idea of being and of consciousness from it as its derivative? It is ignored that non-being cannot be understood without relation to being as its background and referent. This is also the case with nescience or ignorance as the negation of consciousness. The Advaitin seizes hold of this fundamental fact and points out the contradiction in the position of the absolute nihilist. 'The denial of everything presupposes consciousness of it.

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[1] Sūnyavādibhiḥ sadadhisthānakabhramānaṅgikāreṇa kvacidapyupādhau sattvena pratītyanarhatvarūpāsadvailakṣaṇyasya śūktirūpye prapañce cānaṅgikārát—*op. cit.* pages 140-150.

Śaṃkarācārya in his commentary on the Bhagavadgītā[1] propounds the criteria of truth and reality, and unreality and falsity in this wise. He prefaces his thesis by the assertion that truth and falsity can be determined only by means of understanding. Truth and reality should be determined as a fact the knowledge of which is continuous and does not suffer lapse. The facts of experience are contingent and are capable of being replaced by knowledge of other facts. Congitions and their contents are observed to vary—they are discontinuous—and there is no contradiction involved in the negation of each and all of them. But each concept, horse, table, etc., is *eo ipso* accompanied by the concept of existence. The horse is known as an existent horse, the table as an existent table. Thus, existence is the invariable centent of cognition. There is no lapse and break in it. Even the knowledge of negation, for instance, of horse, elephant, or the like is intelligible as an instance of existence. Negation is understood only in an existent locus and also with a reference to an existent fact as the negatum. When one asserts that there is no horse, the reality of the horse is presupposed and the negation is understood in some locus. The idea of it occurs in a knowing subject and is felt as real. Thus non-being cannot be understood as a simple absolute concept because it necessarily involves the reference to something other than it. The concept of being, on the other hand, stands in a different position. It is absolute, self-subsistent and self-contained. The cognition of being does not contain a necessary reference to non-being as its opposite. Śaṃkarācārya concludes that being is the irreducible datum of all consciousness and that its contradiction will involve repudiation of an undeniable fact. The Real must, therefore, have being as its inalienable character.

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[1] Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate satah, ubhayorapi dṛṣṭo'ntas tvanayostattvadarśibhiḥ—The *Bhagavadgīta*—Chapter II, verse 16.

This is also the case with consciousness. Absolute negation of consciousness involves self-contradiction. The negation is capable of being posited only if it is warranted by awareness or consciousness of it. In the last resort, the nihilist must halt at some consciousness in pursuit of his nihilistic enquiry. Consciousness is thus undeniable. Cognition of one object may be denied, but it must be replaced by another. Thus pure consciousness must be the ultimate datum. But being and consciousness, though they are apparently different concepts, and expressed by different words, must be identical. Being, if other than consciousness, must be an unconscious fact, and there is no evidence of its existence apart from the consciousness of it. If being were other than consciousness and thus be bereft of evidence, it could not be posited as being. But, if the two are identical, being will be self-evidenced, and conversely consciousness cannot be divorced from being. That would reduce it to non-being or utter unreality. So the two are one ontological principle, though due to limitation of our empirical knowledge, and also of human language, the two concepts and linguistic expressions are requisitioned for expressing this fact. The concept of bliss follows from the impossibility of limitations. It is limitation which causes unhappiness, because that implies a want of freedom. But being and consciousness are necessarily infinite and illimitable. So bliss is a necessary concomitant. The Advaitin again adduces empirical evidence in support of bliss being the character of reality. Everybody loves his own self and this love necessarily entails the fact that it is a state of happiness. Unhappiness is only a negative concept and cannot exist, and has no reality apart from the positive counterpart. Want of unhappiness means positive happiness. The Advaitin starts with this fundamental concept of being-cum-consciousness-cum-bliss as the ultimate principle of subjective experience and objective fact.

It is unfortunate that the Mādhyamika nihilist in his excessive hatred of limitation, i.e., suffering and pain, is impelled to deny the reality of everything. The result must be unrelieved pessimism. Eternal death is held out as the ultimate reward of all our theoretical and practical discipline. This has been called *nirvāṇa*, which is affirmed to be a condition free from all limitation, suffering and pain. The nihilist forgets to take into consideration the fact that *nirvāṇa* as pure negation is logically self-contradictory, because negation is not ontologically or logically conceivable without the affirmation of being as its background and its intrinsic character. This makes a world of difference between Advaita and nihilism. Nihilism makes havoc of truth and error, and good and evil. In a word it makes a holocaust of all values. The values may be relative as they appear in our imperfect existence. But the relative has the absolute as its presupposition. The Upaniṣads declare that it is the infinite plenum of existence and knowledge which constitutes ultimate happiness. This infinite consciousness of existence, consciousness, and bliss is the central core and basis of appearance and the ultimate destination. Nothing is absolutely unreal or painful or ugly. There is always the invariable and inescapable truth and joy and being attached to it. Our life would be unbearable if it were absolutely nonentity or ignorance compact. Of course, the plurality of phenomena is asserted to have relative truth and being. Because of their limitations, temporal and spatial, we have to transcend the tyranny of time and space in order to reach the ultimate perfection, nothing short of which can give eternal satisfaction to an ardent spirit. In this connection it must also be borne in mind that Advaita Vedānta is not acosmism though it denies the ultimacy of cosmic order. All the truth and reality that the phenomenal world is conceived to possess is derived from the Absolute Truth. The world is conceded to have as much reality as all our theoretical and practical interests require. Science, ethics, religion and all that are entailed by them are regarded as possessed of relative value, and so there can be no finality with the results achieved by them. They must find their consummation in the state of existence beyond the contamination of finitude. It is this positive aspect of the Advaita that has eclipsed the appeal of Mādhyamika philosophy in spite of its wonderful ingenuity of dialectic.

It may be pointed out that the definition of the false as the object of an absolute negation having a substrate of reality means in other words that what does not exist in any real locus is false.[1] And if what does not exist in any real locus be the mark of falsity, then space, time and the other ubiquitous and eternal substances of the Naiyāyika realist, having no definite location, will be instances of it.[2] They all stand absolutely negated in every substrate that presents itself as real in experience. But they are eternal verities and as such cannot be false. And, if falsity be compatible with eternal reality, the concept of falsity will lose all meaning and will only prove what is not disputed. Such eternal verities are regarded as non-existent since they have no ultimate cause in which they may inhere or any underlying substance as their support. In a word, they are self-subsistent, and so cannot be regarded like qualities, actions and wholes as dependent for their existence. To obviate this particular difficulty, if the false is defined as

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1. Yāvatsadadhikaraṇakātyantābhāvapratiyogitvaṃ paryavasitam. The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgara edn.) page 150.

Kasminnapi sadadhikaraṇe yan na vartate tan mithyā iti phalitaḥ arthaḥ.—The *Bālabodhinī* (The *Advaitasiddhi* Bengali edn) page 609.

2. Tathāca kevalanvayayatyāntābhāvapratiyogiṣu avṛttiṣu gaganādisu tārkikānāṃ siddhasādhanam—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgara edn) page 150.

that which appears and stands eternally negated in a real locus of its own,[1] the definition will not apply to the self-subsistent entities noted above, but will apply to objects of limited dimension which are supposed to exist in definite parts of the locii. A jar, for example, which exists on the ground by relation of conjunction, cannot be supposed to exist in any other relation ; for example, the jar does not exist on the ground by way of inherence. The jar, again, is supposed to exist in its parts by way of inherence, but not in the relation of conjunction. It may thus be legitimately affirmed that the jar does not exist on the ground by inherence, though it exists there by way of conjunction. It is, thus, existent and non-existent both in the same locus in respect of different relations. Thus, though it comes under the purview of the definition of falsity, it is admitted to be real on all accounts. This difficulty is sought to be solved by amending the definition that the existence and non-existence of a fact to be false is to be understood in respect of one and the same relation and not by way of different relations. But that makes it liable to another objection. For example, if the Advaitin were to say that the false is negated in a real locus in the selfsame relation in which it appears (in the locus in question), the definition would apply to the relation of contact and such other facts as do not qualify objects pervasively.[2] Consider, for example, the case of a monkey sitting on the top branch of a tree. Here there is a relation of conjunction between the monkey and the tree, which is supposed to be a unitive whole. This unitive whole is one self-identical fact, though it is expressed in different parts. The plurality of parts does not make the tree plural. Contact with the whole tree takes place irrespective of the difference of its parts. The monkey's contact with the tree is indisputable, but its absence of contact in another part of the same tree is also an acknowledged fact. The monkey can thus be said to exist and not to exist in the same tree in respect of different parts. The contact of one substance with another is conjunction, which is an external relation. This conjunction must *ex hypothesi* be sectional and partial in character (*avyāpyavṛtti*). It can never be a case of total coincidence which would amount to total merger of one thing with another and thus the two conjoined substances would be reduced to one. The monkey's contact with the tree is an instance of conjunction, which, being sectional, entails its absence in the tree in respect of another part. The definition of falsity will overlap these cases, since the monkey exists and also does not exist in the tree as one whole.

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[1] Yadadhikaraṇaṃ yat sat tanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogiṣu avṛttiṣu tasya mithyātvam etc.—*op. cit.* page 150.

[2] Yena saṃbandhena yad yasyādhikaraṇaṃ tena saṃbandhena tanniṣṭhā'tyantābhāvapratiyogitvamiti vivakṣāyām avyāpyavṛttiṣu saṃyogādiṣu siddhasādhanamiti—*op. cit.* pages 150-151.

The Advaitin suggests in reply that all these objections proceed from misconception and can be easily knocked out. The false is what is negated in the selfsame relation and selfsame character in a locus in which it appears in that relation and in that character. For example, when there is the relation of contact between the monkey and the topmost part of the tree there is no relation at the base. Therefore, if the qualification 'topmost' be added as the character which determines the relation, then the absence of the relation in the lower part is excluded thereby, and the definition of the falsity of the relation will be as follows. The relation of contact between the monkey and tree is false, because the relation which appears with reference to the topmost part of the tree stands eternally negated in the very same topmost part.[1] The objection of the realist has been met on his own terms. But the true position of the Advaitin is that the non-existence of a thing in a locus in which it appears is to be understood in an unrestricted reference. Even in respect of facts which are supposed to exist in the whole of the locus, the non-existence is affirmed by the Advaitin, and this constitutes its falsity. In respect of facts believed to have sectional incidence, they are also false, not only because they do not exist in the part in which they appear, but also because the conception of sectional incidence is illogical. The non-existence of colour and extension in a material body which is qualified by the former will be covered by the definition. The jar has a colour, but this colour is really non-existent according to the Advaitin and thus is really false. As regards the quality which is supposed by the Naiyāyika to have sectional incidence, the Advaitin does not find any difficulty in proving their falsity, because he does not believe in the existence of one whole in different parts. The whole and the part are identical. So there is nothing that can exist partially in one whole. The Advaita point is that the monkey's conjunction with the tree is non-existent in the very part in which it occurs. Its conjunction, therefore, with the tree is only a false appearance.

But this defence of the Advaitin's position is offered only by way of concession. It has been taken for granted that the putative eternals, space, time, etc., are self-subsistent entities and have no locus external to them for their subsistence. But the supposed verities are also accepted as false appearance. The ontological position of the Advaitin in respect of these entities is absolutely the same as with regard to facts of limited extension in space and time. In the Upaniṣads it is asserted that all these supposed elements have an origin from the Absolute owing to the operation of objective nescience subsisting in the Absolute. Although they appear in the Absolute, they have no independent objective existence. The definition of falsity, therefore, is not inapplicable to them. But there are thinkers who do not believe in the infallible veracity of the Upaniṣadic assertion, and the textual evidence is bound to be scouted by them as dogmatic. Madhusūdana is conscious of the weakness of scriptural evidence in so far as its cogency regarding the unbelievers such as the Buddhists, etc., is taken into account. He, therefore, proposes to clinch the dispute by logical arguments. The contention of the realist that the definition would overlap such eternal verities, space, time, individual selves, etc., which are self-subsistent and independent of substantive locus, is based on an uncritical dogma. Space, time, etc., are believed to be eternal because there is no empirical evidence in support of their origin or destruction. It is not felt that space is anywhere annihilated nor is it supposable that space, time, etc., were non-existent before. They, therefore, are not susceptible of an antecedent negation. It is, again, never felt that there is no space and that it will come into existence later. Likewise, it is not perceived that space is non-existent in a locus. So, what is called absolute non-existence is also unpredictable of them for want of perceptual evidence. They are believed to be non-existent in the Absolute Brahman, which is the prius and ultimate locus of all appearances. They are appearances as truly as other objects. But their falsity accruing from their non-existence in the locus of their appearance has yet to be established. Prior to this proof of falsity there is no evidence of their non-existence. Space, time, etc., are not perceptible entities. So, one cannot assert that there is no space or time here. The proof of their falsity in the sense of their absolute non-existence in their own locus is therefore not available on the strength of empirical evidence.

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[1] Yena saṃbandhena yadavacchedena yadadhikaraṇatayā yat pratipannaṃ tena saṃbandhena tadavacchedena tadadhikaraṇakātyantābhāvapratiyogitvaṃ tasya mithyātvam—The *Bālabodhinī* (The *Advaitasiddhi* Bengali edn.) page 616.

It cannot be proved by inference either. Inference without corroborative evidence (*tarka*) of the basic universal proposition cannot have any cogency. If the denial of the proposition could be shown to entail contradiction of fact, inference might have plausibility. But no such contingency can be adduced to follow from the denial. The existence of space, time, etc., is, on the contrary, felt everywhere. And, since their non-existence is not supported by experience, the contention that the definition of falsity would extend to these cases believed to be eternal verities, which would make the definition untenable, has no foundation.

It is, however, not contended that what is imperceptible must be non-existent. It is claimed that fire has no specific gravity like such physical objects, as chair, table, etc., Had it weight, it would have fallen down. At any rate, it is acceptable that fire is not a gravitating object like stone. This must be acceptable under pain of absurdity. But no such absurdity follows from the denial of the realist's proposition that space and time are self-subsistent entities and as such have no locus. The definition of falsity with pointed reference to the locus does not, therefore, apply and they will pass as real entities even in the Advaitin's view. But the contention is unsubstantiated, since no proof can be adduced in support of their self-subsistence which is tantamount to non-existence in any external locus. Being appearance, they subsist in consciousness, and they are eternally negated therein. It follows that they are not self-subsisting eternals, as supposed by the Naiyāyika, and so the charge of overlapping does not hold good.

Again, the contention that a thing can exist in one relation and is non-existent in another relation in the same locus, and is yet real, is also based on uncriticized dogma. The denial, for instance, of the pen on the table in the relation of inherence is based on a hypothetical assumption. No such negation implied by denial can possibly be felt as a fact. When one sees the pen on the table one cannot think of the possibility of its non-existence thereon. When the realist asserts that the pen is non-existent in the relation of inherence, though it is existent by way of conjunction, he only denies the relation of inherence and not the existence of the pen. To take a modern example. When a man retires, it may be said that he has ceased to be the officer concerned. This means the loss of office and not eessation of the man. Similarly, when one says that a pen does not exist by the relation of inherence, he only denies the relation of inherence alone by itself and not the existence of the thing. It is a matter of unsophisticated experience that, when a pen is perceived on the table, it is never perceived to be non-existent thereon. The assertion of the realist that the pen does not exist by way of inherence is only a cumbrous, roundabout, pedantic way of stating the non-existence of the relation. The Naiyāyika realist denies a thing in a relation which does not belong to it. This is called the negation of a thing by means of a relation which holds good of another and does not belong to it (*vyadhikaraṇasaṃbandhāvacchinna-pratiyogitāka abhāva*). The issue becomes simpler if the negation be understood with reference to an attribute belonging to another (*vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinna-pratiyogitāka abhāva*). For instance, the assertion of the

Naiyāyika that colour does not exist in the relation of conjunction means only that the relation of conjunction is not there. Of course, this specific conjunction is to be understood as determined by reference to colour. The determination of conjunction by colour reference (i.e., as belonging to colour) is understood only by reference to a foreign attribute. Conjunction as determined by colour is not a fact. Whatever may be the case, it is simpler and more logical to think that the negation of A in B by reference to a foreign relation amounts to the negation of the relation itself. The assertion that the monkey is in conjunction with the tree on the top and not at the bottom is analyzable into a case of simple negation of conjunction with the bottom and assertion of it in the top. The presence and absence of conjunction cannot be interpreted as predicates of the tree as an indivisible unit. They are asserted in respect of different parts of the locus. It is undeniable that the monkey cannot be said to be non-existent in the locus in which it exists. The definition of falsity, therefore, cannot be proved to apply to what is regarded as real. That all these things are non-existent in spite of their appearance is the contention of the Advaitin which is proved by other arguments.

To sum up. The realist puts forward three objections to the conception of falsity as the non-existence of a thing in the locus in which it appears. The first objection is that space and time, being self-subsistent eternals, are eternally non-existent in a locus in terms of the definition. The Advaitin meets the charge that these putative eternals are not self-subsistent but exist in a locus. Our ordinary experience of space is of the form 'There is space here'. This involves a reference to a locus and, in the ultimate analysis, the locus is consciousness, i.e., Absolute Brahman. Space, etc., are really non-existent in the locus in spite of their appearance therein. So, the application of the definition to space, etc., is intended by the Advaitin. In other words they are false appearances. So, the objection seems pointless. The second objection is that the jar, the pen, etc., exist in the relation of conjunction and do not exist in the relation of inherence in the same locus. On examination, it has been found that this contention is baseless. The non-existence of the pen or of the jar is not cognized in the locus in which it is found to exist. The assertion of the negation of the jar on the ground by inherence *vis-a-vis* the presence of it in the relation of conjunction is impossible. The jar cannot be negated during its presence, and the denial of it by inherence amounts to the denial of the jar's inherence in the locus, and not of existence of the jar. The jar's inherence is a supposal, and it is repelled by the jar's presence. It is the non-existence of the jar's inherence in the locus which is stated by the denial. But such negation does not naturally occur to one's mind, because it is preposterous. A thing can be denied in a place where there is the possibility of its occurrence. But the jar's inherence on the ground is an impossible idea, and so its negation or its affirmation is irrelevant. It may be urged that negation of such impossible cases is necessitated by the idea of contrast with possible instances. The jar is conceived by the Naiyāyika realist to be inherent in its constituent parts, and not in the place where it occurs by way of conjunction. When one asserts that the jar exists on the ground by relation of conjunction, and in its parts by way of inherence, the knowledge of the contrast between the two may warrant the assertion that 'The jar does not exist on the ground by inherence,' though it must exist by conjunction. The negation of the jar by inherence presupposes the ideal supposal of inherence, which is rebutted by the real negation. The cases of negation (of a fact) which is not possible in a locus are based on an act of supposition. The jar is first supposed to be inherent, and then negated in the place when it exists by conjunction. In this way, the jar's negation by a non-existent relation may be defended. But this defence springs from an arbitrary supposition. The negation of the inherent jar is only intelligible as the negation of its inherence. In other words, the negation of an entity by an impossible relation boils down to the negation of the relation, and not of the thing. So, the contention that a thing is non-existent in one relation and existent in another comes under the definition of falsity is absolutely untenable. It is true that the Advaitin asserts the non-existence of the jar in reality in the same relation. The empirical fact that the jar exists by conjunction on the floor is denied by the Advaitin in the ultimate reference. The experience is asserted to be an appearance on the same ground as all objects of cognition are asserted to be not real in spite of their appearance. So, the objection of the Naiyāyika realist voiced by the Mādhva leaves the Advaita position unaffected. The Advaitin's denial of the reality of the jar is not based on difference of relation, but on the impossibility of any real relation.

As regards the third objection, that cases of conjunction are cases of coincidence of existence and non-existence in the same locus, it is not based on a factual appraisal. The coincidence of existence and non-existence by way of conjunction is not even empirically true, apart from the consideration as to whether the tree, for instance, in which the monkey is perched on the top is one whole or not. The consideration that the monkey cannot be said to be existent and non-extent on the top where it is perceived should clinch the issue. The Advaitin's contention of falsity is based on the consideration that the monkey does not exist even on the top in reality. The existence of it on the top is only a false appearance.

But it may be argued that, if the false is what is eternally negated in the very locus in which it presents itself, then a thing and its negation can live together in peace and amity in the same locus. This means that the law of non-contradiction does not apply anywhere in the world, and it follows that the cognition of a thing and the cognition of its absence are not contradictorily related. In other words, the experience of contradiction and resulting correction becomes a meaningless process. The Advaita reply to this is that contradiction holds only between a thing and its negation when both the thing and the negation of it are of the same grade of reality. But, if the thing and the negation thereof belong to different grades of reality, the one is not incompatible with the other. For example, when we have the empirically real negation of a book on a table, the appearance of the book on the table is illusory and not empirically real. Thus, we have an apparent reality living in peace and amity with its empirical negation in the same substrate.[1]

The Advaitin maintains that there is no incompatibility between the empirically real and the apparently real, because the two belong to the different grades of reality. In the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl, when there is correction of the experience of silver what is presented is not silver but a mother-of-pearl. The mother-of-pearl is an empirical reality, and the illusory silver is an apparent one. The Mādhva now

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1. Bhinnasattākayor avirodhe'pi samasattākayor virodhāt
The *Advaitasiddhi*—page 154.
(Nirṇayasāgara edn)

points out that when on the Advaitin's own admission there is no incompatibility between the two the experience of the empirically real mother-of-pearl should not dislodge the experience of the apparently real silver. But this is contrary to what actually happens. The deliverance of experience shows that when the real character of the substrate is discovered the illusory object vanishes altogether.

The Advaita reply to this objection is that this is exactly what is to be expected in the circumstances. The illusory silver is a modification of the nescience relating to the empirically real mother-of-pearl. It is this nescience about the substrate, i.e., the mother-of-pearl, that transforms itself into the false silver with the help of certain defects. With the perception of the real character of the locus, this nescience about the locus, which is the material cause of the illusory object, ceases. With the cessation of the material cause, the effect, i.e., the illusory object, vanishes. Where mollasses though seen as molasses appear as bitter to the tongue on account of excess of bile through a bad liver, the defect (bile), which is the material cause of the bitter taste, continues in spite of an indirect cognition that molasses as molasses should taste sweet. The same is true in the case of the world of experience. It may be inferentially proved to be absent in the very locus in which it appears, but such inferential cognition is very different from realization. It is the intuition of the Absolute, and nothing short of such intution, as the ultimate Reality in all things that cancels the nescience of which the world of experience is a modification. Reasoning produces theoretical knowledge, which falls far short of realization or intuition or *sākṣātkāra*.[1]

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[1] Evamakhaṇḍabrahmasākṣātkārāt pūrvaṃ parokṣabodhena prapañcasya vyāvahārikatvāpahāre'pi pratītir anuvartata eva,

One last objection to this definition has to be considered. We have the scriptural text declaring the Absolute to consist of the characters of reality, intelligence and infinitude.[1] But the Absolute is attributeless. It is reality itself, and reality is not the attribute of the Absolute. How is then the text declaring the Absolute's nature as reality, intelligence, etc., to be reconciled with the Absolute as the attributeless, impersonal essence of reality? The answer is that reality in the above text means the negation of falsity, and negation and the locus of the negation are the same thing. In other words, negation is not any additional character characterizing the locus in respect of which the negation holds. It is just the locus and nothing else. Negation of falsity as truth or reality is thus no additional character characterizing the attributeless Absolute. On the contrary, it is the Absolute itself and nothing else than that.[2] The same holds of other characters attributed to it. For example, self-manifestation or self-enlightenment is nothing but negation of the manifestation or enlightenment by another. In the same way eternality is the negation of temporal limitation ; infinitude is the negation of finitude or limitation in space and completeness is the negation of restriction to special objects. And all these negations are nothing but the Absolute as the locus of such negations. It follows, therefore, that though the Absolute is not a substrate of any positive property, it, as one with

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adhiṣṭhānajñānanivṛttau tu nānuvartiṣyate—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgara edn) page—155

[1] Satyaṃ jñānam anantam

[2] Adhikaraṇātiriktābhāvanabhyupagamena mithyātvābhāvarūpasatyatvasya brahmasvarūpāvirodhāt—*op. cit.* page 156.

the locus of negation of all properties, remains the attributeless, indeterminate or *nirdharmaka* Absolute that It *is*.[1]

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[1] Tathā ca bhāvabhūtadharmānāśrayatve'pi brahmaṇaḥ sarvadharmābhāvarūpatayā na kāpy anupapattir iti sarvam avadātam—*op. cit.* page 157.

CHAPTER VIII

THE THIRD DEFINITION OF FALSITY

According to the third definition the false is what is cancelled by knowledge. This is another definition of the false given by the author of the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*. According to it, the false is what is liable to cancellation by subsequent cognition. Such cancellation is equivalent to the second definition as the object of eternal negation in the locus in which it presents itself.

The Mādhva realist here asks whether this cancellation by knowledge means destruction by knowledge. In fact, what is destroyed by knowledge is not necessarily something false. For example, cognition, pleasure, pain, and other specific qualities of the self have the character of being destroyed by other similar experiences succeeding them. But this destruction or disappearance occasioned by other succeeding psychical events does not entail the falsity of the foregoing experience. Therefore, the false defined as that which is cancelled by knowledge has an illegitimate extension to that which is admittedly not false. The fallacy here is the fallacy of a too wide definition. The term false, in fact, is not used to signify any cognitive experience that is dislodged by a subsequent cognition. And the use of the term 'false' in this sense to cover such a dislodged cognitive experience would be an illegitimate use of the term in a pickwickian sense.[1]

Further, the over-extension is not its only defect, it is also too narrow from another point of view. For example, an earthen jar is an empirically real object, and the Advaitin regards it as false, but the definition fails to cover it. Such a jar can be destroyed by the stroke of a hammer. Here, thus, is a case of a false object that is destroyed not by knowledge but by a hammer stroke. Hence, the definition that the false is that which is destroyed by knowledge does not apply to every case of a false object.[1]

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[1] Yogyavibhuviśeṣaguṇānāṃ svottaravartiviśeṣaguṇanāśytvena uttarajñānanāśye pūrvajñāne jñānanāśyatvarūpamithyātvasattvān mithyātvalakṣaṇasya ativyāptiḥ—The *Bālabodhini* (The *Advaiṭasiddhi* Bengali edn.) page 698.

The definition is liable to another fatal objection. The definition does not apply even to such notorious cases of error as the experience of silver in a mother-of-pearl. The cognition of the mother-of-pearl sets forth that of silver as false, but the definition under review fails to bear this out. The experience of mother-of-pearl does not cancel the reality of silver or of its cognition. The corrective experience at most only testifies that the knowledge of silver is not true. It does not assert that there was no silver or its cognition. The defining character of falsity consists in the absolute non-existence of the datum in the past, present and future. But nobody can gainsay that he had the experience of silver in the past. It follows that neither silver nor its cognition is false in terms of the definition. The experience of silver is preceded by the nescience in respect of the mother-of-pearl, and the nescience disappears with the knowledge of the mother-of-pearl. So, also, the illusion. But, though both nescience and its resultant illusion are corrected by the knowledge of the mother-of-pearl, their reality cannot be denied. Both nescience and illusion are real, but, being cancelled by the knowledge of the mother-of-pearl, they ought to be accounted as false in spite of their reality.

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[1] Jñānena vināpi mudgarapātādinivartye ghaṭādāv avyāptiḥ—*op. cit.* page 698

This is a plain case of unwarranted extension. Nor is it a sound contention that the cognition of the false silver must be false. The Advaitin holds that the cognition of pleasure, pain, etc. which are *ex hypothesi* false is effected by the Witnessing Intelligence, and as such the cognition cannot be asserted to be false.

It has been maintained by the Advaitin that the charge of unwarranted extension to precedent cognition may be parried by the proper interpretation of the corrective cognition. The subsequent cognition does not set aside the preceding cognition in its capacity as cognition, but because it is a psychical event, that is to say, as a specific quality of the self as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. In the definition, the cancelling cognition owes its destructive efficiency to its character as cognition. The illusion is set aside by the corrective cognition *quā* cognition, but not *quā* psychical event. This defence, though successful in one respect, fails to cover several other cases of falsity. We have already shown that it fails to apply to the jar destroyed by the hammer. Again, if one looks closely into the situation, one finds that it is not cognition as such but perceptual cognition of the substratum of illusion which sets aside illusion. Thus, the definition fails to cover the case of the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl, which is set aside only when the mother-of-pearl as substratum is perceptually cognised as alone (not *quā* cognition) real. This vital drawback takes away all the validity from the inference of the falsity of the phenomenal world. The Advaitin seeks to prove the falsity of the phenomenal world on the basis of analogy to the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl. But in terms of the definition the silver cannot be regarded as false lacking in the characteristic feature of the definition of falsity and so the inference of falsity of the world must collapse. The definition again fails to hold good in the ultimate conclusion of the Advaitin that the world order is false, because it is cancelled by the knowledge of the Absolute, which is the ultimate substratum of the world order. The final knowledge of the Absolute is not followed by any other cognition and, therefore, is not liable to destruction. And, even if destruction is conceded to be possible, it will remain unperished because there is no succeeding cognition to operate as the destructive agent.

Nor can the definition be made perfect by an amendment. It has been suggested that the term 'cancelling cognition' should be understood as a species of cognition, and not any and every cognition, and so the previous objection regarding the silver illusion falls down since it is cancelled by perceptual intuition, which is a species of cognition. But this exposes it to another objection. Memory, for instance, is a species of cognition which has mental trace for its cause. This mental trace is left behind by previous experience as its effect. This effect as representative of the occasioning experience is annulled by the memory act. In terms of the definition, the memory trace ought to be regarded as false, being liable to destruction by memory as a species of cognition. This contingency is sought to be avoided by restricting cognition to experience which is defined as a species of cognition other than memory. So, the definition will not overlap memory or the memory trace supposed to be annulled by the former. But this would be a case of over-simplification. There are cases of false memory which are cancelled by true memory showing that the object of false memory is not genuine. This is also a case of error, and the restrictive interpretation of cognition as experience will fail to account for it.

The situation is not improved by the addition of a further qualification. The false is that which is cancelled by an authentic cognition succeeding an illusion. Thus amended, the definition would account for the falsity of the false memory and its object, both being liable to be cancelled by an authentic cognition; but this amendment would expose it to another grave objection. It is not merely the knowledge of truth alone that annuls the false knowledge, but the mental trace left behind by the former also annuls the trace left by the latter. The mental trace of error is also false, but it is annulled, not by cognition, but by another mental trace. The definition evidently breaks down here.

A further amendment has been proposed to obviate the objection. The false is that which is cancelled by a cognition which is competent to cancel its root cause, viz., nescience. The false mental trace is removed by an authentic cognition together with its relevant nescience, which is its constitutive cause. This definition does no doubt register a material improvement, but it is open to a vital objection in that it fails to include the primal ignorance, which is a beginningless entity like the primordial matter of the *Sāṃkhya*. The latter being an uncaused entity, the definition will not apply to it. Furthermore, instead of a cumbrous definition, it can be economically set forth as follows. The false is that which has nescience for its constitutive cause.

In reply to the objections, the Advaitin suggests that the Mādhva has misunderstood the Advaita position completely. There is no harm if falsity be defined as being cancelled by knowledge. In other words, to be falsified by knowledge means the destruction of the thing in its subtle and gross states as objects of cognition. Thus, by the stroke of a hammer we destroy the gross appearance of an object. But the object is not annihilated thereby; it continues in the subtle or potential state.[1] And this state of the object can be negatived only by the knowledge of Absolute Reality behind the appearance. In other words, the physical processes may destroy objects in their outward appearances. It is only intuition of the Absolute that destroys their subtle forms. Therefore, the Mādhva objection that falsity as cancellation by knowledge will not apply to the jar which is *no more* in existence does not withstand closer examination. *Nomoreness* is just non-manifest existence, and is not non-existence. And it is such subtle existence that can be destroyed by knowledge of the Absolute as the real substrate. Therefore, there is no question here of a too wide definition covering cases not intended to be covered.[2]

In other words, the cause and the effect are not ontologically different, and therefore the destruction of the cause automatically entails the destruction of the effect. The plurality of phenomena is the product of nescience, and this nescience is opposed by the knowledge of reality. The relation of opposition may be interpreted as one of the impossibility of the co-presence of two opposites in the same substratum or the destruction of one by the other. The opposition between nescience and knowledge admits of this twofold interpretation. It is a fact that knowledge (science) and nescience are mutually incompatible. In point of reality, nescience and its derivatives are eternally non-existent, and yet they appear. Let us illustrate this by the common example of the illusion of silver in the mother-of-pearl. The silver appears, though it is not really present. Not only this. The cause of the appearance of the silver, namely, the objective nescience is also *non est* ontologically considered. When the mother-of-pearl is known as such, the silver disappears. This disappearance need not be a chronologically subsequent event. The true knowledge only reveals the eternal non-existence of silver in the mother-of-pearl. It may also be interpreted in terms of the causal relation. The silver is the effect or the product of nescience, and when the latter is removed by true knowledge its product disappears in the next moment. As we have shown, the non-existence of the jar produced by the stroke of the hammer is only apparent. The jar destroyed relapses into its causal state. So its disappearance is only apparent and not real. The ultimate disappearance of the jar is effected by the knowledge of the ultimate reality, the Absolute Brahman. So the definition of falsity applies to it and the charge of inapplicability falls down.

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[1] Avasthitiśca dvedhā, svarūpeṇa kāraṇātmanā ca—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirnayasāgara edn) page 160.

[2] Mudgarpātjanyanāśapratiyogitve'pi ghatasya na svasvīyasaṃskārobhayanāśapratiyogitvam ; tādṛśapratiyogitvaṃ tu tattvajñānādhīnām iti na atītaghaṭādau avyāptiḥ—The *Bālabodhini* (The *Advaitasiddhi* Bengali edn) page 720.

The second objection is that a previous cognition is destroyed by a later cognition, and so the definition would apply to it though it is not a case of supersession of a false cognition by a true one. This means that the definition is too wide. This objection proceeds from a misconception of the character of the superseding knowledge. It is knowledge *quā* knowledge which destroys the false cognition and the subject. That one cognition is superseded by another cognition is a psychological law. This holds true not only of the successive cognitions but equally of other mental facts. Thus, a cognition followed by an act of will or desire or pleasure or pain is automatically destroyed by the latter. The previous psychical event is supplanted by the new psychical one. There is opposition between the two, but it is not confined to cognitive acts alone. The destructive capacity of the subsequent mental event is determined by the fact of its being a mental event, i.e., in the epistemology of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist by the character of its being a specific quality of the soul. All mental events, knowing, feeling and willing, and the subtle traces left by them are regarded by this school as specific qualities of the soul, and the subsequent mental event destroys the previous one by dint of causal efficiency. The relation of oppostion, in other words, is a case of causal opposition, the subsequent causing the disappearance of the previous one. It is not a case of logical opposition constituted by incompatibility which holds between nescience and knowledge. Even if the opposition between knowledge and nescience be interpreted as a case of causal opposition, knowledge being regarded as destructive of nescience, the definition of falsity does not extend to the mental phenomena. The opposition of knowledge and nescience is derived from the character of knowledge as knowledge and not as a mental event. So, the two cases are different. Certainly, the Advaitin does not believe in the ultimate reality of mental phenomena, but ontological falsity is not based on the destructive opposition of the subsequent mental phenomenon superseding the previous one.

Again, the Mādhva objection that the definition would reduce an earlier cognition, real *per se*, to a case of destruction by a later cognition is also answered by the above consideration. The later cognition dislodges the earlier only in its grosser form and is incapable of annihilating it in its subtle character. It is only the intuition of the Absolute that annihilates both gross and subtle appearances. In the same way, cancellation by knowledge may hold of space, etc., though such cancellation may appear to be not inconsistent with their reality. In other words, just as the later cognition destroying an earlier cognition does not destroy it altogether and the complete destruction is effected only by the intuition of the Absolute, so also is the case of the cancellation of space by the realisation of the Absolute as reality behind such appearances. Their reality may continue as long as the real substrate is not intuited. The cases of the barren mother and other absurdities cannot be cited as apposite instances. These fictions are non-existent *per se*, and the difference of the false from fiction has been amply demonstrated before. The illusory silver, again, has been cited by the Mādhva as an opposite instance. It was contended that, even when illusion of silver is destroyed by the corrective knowledge of the mother-of-pearl, it is not realised that the silver is also destroyed by it. The correction does not prove the unreality either of the silver or of the ignorance of the mother-of-pearl or even of the illusion. It is felt after the corrective knowledge that there was ignorance of the mother-of-pearl, i.e., it was not realised that it was really the mother-of-pearl. The illusion also is a real past event. So, the corrective knowledge does not prove their non-existence in all the divisions of time. But the appearance of silver as a historical fact does not attest its reality. This is also the case with the ignorance of the mother-of-pearl and also the illusory cognition. Their factual existence as historical incidents is not denied. But this is perfectly compatible with their falsity. The false is not a fiction because the former appears whereas the latter does not. But mere appearance does not constitute the evidence of its reality. The reality is what is incapable of being negated. It is not like phenomena existent on some occasion and non-existent on some other. In a word, existence is eternal. Whatever has not this eternal existence and yet appears as existent is false. All the opposite instances cited by the Mādhva, for example, ignorance and illusion, etc., are occasional events, and hence cannot claim the reality of the Absolute.

The true character of opposition between nescience and knowledge has been further elaborated by the author of the *Vivaraṇa* and Sureśvarācāryya the author of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika*. It is stated in the *Vivaraṇa*[1] that contradiction consists in the disappearance of nescience and its concomitant products, both in their subtle and overt forms, *entailed* by knowledge, i.e., true knowledge. This disappearance here stands for absolute and eternal negation. Nescience is eternally non-existent, and this is made manifest by the true knowledge of the substratum. Entailment in the definition is logical. Knowledge does not effect here the disappearance of a pre-existent nescience by causal efficiency. It only indicates that nescience is eternally non-existent in the substratum, which is in the ultimate analysis the Absolute. It shows that the knowledge and nescience are opposite and they cannot exist together. Nescience, however, is an objective principle just as is the primordial matter of Sāṃkhya. The phenomenal world derives its existence from nescience, and the historical origination and destruction of phenomena take place during the existence of nescience. These occasional occurrences as phenomena were non-existent as such and will be non-existent in the future. In the terminology of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, they are subject to antecedent and emergent negations, but such negation does not stand for logical negation or contradiction by knowledge. The absolute negation of nescience is entailed by the ultimate knowledge of the Absolute in its true character. We have laid stress on the logical character of opposition and shown that the disappearance of nescience means the manifestation of its eternal non-existence. This disappearance of nescience entails the disappearance of the ever-existent phenomena, which are coeval with nescience. For instance, the individual self, God, pure consciousness, distinction between God and the finite selves, nescience and the relation between pure consciousness and nescience are not occasional events. They exist from an undated infinite past and as such cannot be regarded as effects of nescience. The relation between nescience and these principles is not causal, but ontological or logical. They exist so long as nescience exists and must disappear with the disappearance of nescience. The word *nivṛtti* is rendered disappearance by us. *Nivṛtti* is not capable of being understood in terms of causality. Knowledge does not bring about the cessation of nescience but only reveals the eternal non-existence of it, together with its coeval satellites and historical products.

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[1] Ajñānasya svakāryeṇa pravilīnena vartamānena vā saha jñānena nivṛttirbādhaḥ—The *Advaitasiddhi*—(Bengali Edn). P. 731.

That the relation of entailment is to be understood as a logical process is also apparent from the statement of Sureśvarācāryya. He states on the very emergence of the final (saving) knowledge accruing from such texts as 'Thou art that', nescience with its effects is understood to be *non est* in the present, in the past, and in the future.'[1] This shows that nescience is eternally non-existent in spite of its appearance and that of its satellites and products. There is a natural opposition between knowledge and nescience of the same thing. The disappearance of nescience entailed by knowledge may be interpreted both causally and logically. Logical opposition consists in respect of the same substratum. If the opposition be logical, knowledge will not coincide with nescience. This would show that non-existence is eternally present. If entailment be interpreted as causal opposition, then the compresence of knowledge and nescience in the first moment would be possible. Knowledge will destroy nescience as a causal condition, and so the disappearance of nescience will take place in the second moment at the earliest. The compresence of the two opposites in the first moment will not be ruled out. Though the relation has been interpreted both causally and logically by Gauḍa Brahmānanda, it is more in harmony with the Advaita position to say that the non-existence in question is timeless and absolute. This is the obvious meaning of the second definition and the implication of the third.

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[1] Vārtikakṛdbhiśca uktaṃ — "Tattvamasyādi — vākyottha—samyagdhī—janmamātrataḥ avidyā saha kāryeṇa nāsīdasti bhaviṣyati" *op. cit* P. 731.

It has been urged that relation of entailment is a case of causality, and so the disappearance of nescience entailed by knowledge of the ultimate Truth must occur in the subsequent moment and cannot be synchronous. But the Advaitin observes that this objection ignores the possibility of logical opposition. There is no logical difficulty in taking the emergence of knowledge and non-existence as existing together. Non-existence here is eternally present, and so also at the time of the emergence of knowledge. The relation is the same as that between smoke and fire. Fire is prior to smoke and also synchronous with it. The objection therefore does not turn on the issue of compresence of nescience and knowledge. It is relevant only to the relation of entailment, one being regarded as a consequence of the other and therefore dependent on the former. But the implication of dependence in the relation of entailment is understandable in terms of logical possibility. The objection is that the relation of entailment is impossible between two synchronous terms. But this proceeds on the confusion of logical and causal entailment. It has to be admitted even by the

Naiyāyika realist that the relation between antecedent non-existence and its opposite, the emergent product, is not one of entailment. When the jar is produced, it is understood that its antecedent negation is not present. The emergence of the product entails the cessation of the antecedent negation (potentiality). Antecedent negation is nothing but the potentiality of the effect, when the effect is produced, i.e., when the potential becomes the actual, the former must cease to exist. Otherwise the emergence of another effect of the same kind would not be barred out. Thus, there is opposition between antecedent negation (i.e., potentiality) and emergent negation (i.e., actuality). Potentiality and actuality cannot go together. Actuality entails cessation of potentiality. And this cannot be causal, because the two are synchronous. The concept of dependence implied by entailment is logical. We naturally think that when B is entailed by A, B is dependent on A. But this dependence and entailment are not to be interpreted in terms of causality. Entailment is an unanalysable concept (*akhaṇḍopādhi*). The Naiyāyika also endorses a good many unanalysable concepts, for instance, the concepts of adjectiveness and substantiveness. To return to our original issue, the disappearance of nescience entailed by the emergence of knowledge is on a par with the relation of potentiality and actuality. It is also confirmed by experience. When the jar is produced it is felt that the antecedent non-existence of it has come to an end. Likewise, when knowledge arises, it is *eo ipso* felt that ignorance has disappeared.

It has been contended by the Naiyāyika however, that the relation of entailment derives its cogency from causal efficiency. If the emergence of the effect and the cessation of its antecedent negation (i.e., potentiality) be regarded as synchronous, and the effect be the virtual cessation of the antecedent negation, still it will not be apposite to assert the relation of entailment between product and potentiality. It would be better to assert that the material cause of the effect entails the cessation of the antecedent negation exactly as it does the emergence of the product.

Though this objection cannot be disposed of on the strength of perceptual evidence, since the interval of one mathematical instant between the cause and the effect is not amenable to perception, it is ruled out on the evidence of the Upaniṣadic text. The text affirms for the knower of the self, i.e., when a person realizes the true nature of the self, as identical with the Absolute Reality, the appearance of plurality and difference comes to an end. It is not satisfactory to explain the simultaneous occurrence of knowledge and the cessation of plurality as due to the causal condition of knowledge. It will be a case of not only sophistication of the verdict of plain experience but also over-simplification of a logical issue. The Naiyāyika realist seeks to account for the logical entailment by causal relation. But this does not hold good. The sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles. The existence of the three sides entails that of three angles. The two facts exist together, though logically one is understood to be prior to the other. This is a case of logical entailment which is compatible with ontological co-existence. The opposition of knowledge and nescience is a case of logical entailment. This interpretation is supported by the statement of Sureśvara, who affirmed that the cessation of ignorance entails the cessation of the world of plurality, both of which are known to be non-existent in all the three divisions of time. This shows that this is a case of absolute non-existence, which is not a product. The nescience is, as has been observed before, existent without a prior limit (*anādi*). It is coeval with the Absolute until its disappearance is entailed by true knowledge. Such being the case, why has it been stated in the *Vārtika* that nescience does not exist together with its products? The product here should be understood as only an illustration. There are other cases of not-self which, though not products, also disappear with the disappearance of nescience. The beginningless principles barring consciousness also disappear on the emergence of true knowledge. Since these principles are not events, they cannot be strictly interpreted as products. The word 'products', therefore, should be understood to mean all cases of objective appearance (*dṛśyamātra*). But there is a crux which is avoided by the assertion that nescience disappears together with its products. Nescience is an ever-existent fact, and it was never a past or a future event. Pastness and futurity are predicable only of contingent events, which are by their nature limited by time. When Sureśvara affirms that nescience is understood on the dawn of knowledge to have been non-existent before, in the past, in the present, and in the future, these temporal divisions are relevant to occasional events, which are identical with primal nescience. The Advaitin also believes that in the empirical plane the cause and the effect are identical. Accordingly, nescience *quā* past event and *quā* present event and *quā* future event can admit of temporal distinctions. The statement of Sureśvara that nescience disappears with all its products and beginningless satellities is not logically absurd. It is necessary to obviate the misunderstanding that the effects may persist though the cause be defunct.

The disappearance of the future event due to nescience is to be understood in a broad reference. The future event comes into existence if there is an antecedent cause. Knowledge entails the cessation of nescience and the disappearance of nescience entails that of all causal potencies embedded in it. The disappearance of the future events is entailed by the antecedent disappearance of their potential cause, which is entailed by the disappearance of nescience. So the disappearance of the future event is not a case of direct entailment by knowledge. It is consequential to the disappearance of its cause. But, though not direct, the disappearance of its future effect is remotely due to the disappearance of nescience, which is the original cause of all plurality of effects.

The Advaitin has shown that the case of the illusory silver, which is adduced as an instance for proof of the falsity of the world, is an apposite instance and does not entail the absence of the *probandum* (absence of falsity), as is urged by the Mādhva. But it may be pointed out that the objection still stands unrefuted. Some amongst the Advaitins hold that nescience is one. And this single nescience is annulled only by the intuitive realization of the Absolute as the ultimate substrate of the world phenomena. In the illusion of the silver in a mother-of-pearl, it is the nescience in respect of the mother-of-pearl that develops into a false silver, and this nescience is the same as the one all-pervading nescience underlying all false appearances. And, this being so, the illusory silver cannot be supposed to be cancelled by the specific knowledge of the substrate, i.e., the mother-of-pearl, for the intuitive realization of the Absolute as the ultimate substrate is the only corrective. Again, that the silver is cancelled by the knowledge of the Absolute is not known beforehand, i.e., before the inference of the falsity of the world takes place. And under the circumstances the case of the illusory silver in a mother-of-pearl, generally put forward as an example in the inference of the falsity of the world, is thus a pseudo-instance bereft of the definition of falsity. Hence, there is the recurrence of the same old fallacy of the absence of the probandum in the accredited instance of the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl.

But this is an extreme position. The view amounts to the admission that every case of correction of an illusion presupposes the discovery of its real substrate as the Absolute Reality. But this is obviously not in agreement with the deliverance of experience. For the correction of the illusion of silver in a mother-of-pearl, the discovery of the mother-of-pearl as the substrate suffices to dispose of the illusion. One need not go beyond this and realize the mother-of-pearl as itself an illusory superimposition on the Absolute as the undifferenced Reality. The question of the reality or falsity of the mother-of-pearl does not arise in the context. Further, this view leads to the special difficulty that every case of correction of an illusion would amount to the realization of the Absolute as the ultimate substrate and the cancellation of the one all-pervading nescience that underlies all false appearances. And this would mean that every such correction would be freedom, not merely from nescience in regard to any particular object of experience, but also absolute unqualified freedom from the trammels of all kinds of experience. But this is, again, far from what actually happens. One does not attain liberation or absolute freedom as soon as one corrects an ordinary mistake of experience, and becomes free from its misleading influence. Because of these difficulties in their view of the singleness of nescience, some Advaitins hold that it is manifold ; and numerically different, so the different experiences result from different nesciences. According to the latter theory, therefore, the correction of one single illusion does not entail freedom from all illusions. Till there is the discovery of the Absolute as the ultimate substratum of all illusory experiences there is no complete and absolute freedom from the influence of the false and the illusory. The Mādhva objection that the illusory silver is not liable to correction till there is the knowledge of the Absolute as the underlying substrate of the illusory appearances, and that it cannot be cited as an analogous instance in the inference of the falsity of the world in question are hasty conclusions from a misconception of Advaita ontology. We have seen that the Advaitin rejects the doctrine of the singleness of nescience, incompatible as it is with certain obvious facts. And with the rejection of this view of the singleness of nescience the alleged objection of the absence of the *probandum* in the illusory silver seems pointless. In other words, the instance of the falsity of the silver is not a pseudo-instance bereft of the character of falsity, as is urged by the Mādhva realist.

The objection urged by the Mādhva on the basis of one unitary nescience can be met even without having recourse to a plurality of nesciences.[1] The criterion of falsity consists in correction by knowledge. The criterion can be shown to be present in the illusory silver. The original unitary nescience is the primal cause of the phenomenal world. Ordinary illusions are due to defective knowledge, which is induced by some adventitious defect. For instance, the illusion of silver owes its genesis to some defect in the visual apparatus, darkness, distance or the like. There are subjective and objective defects, which occasion these illusions, and they are cancelled by knowledge of the substrate. These defects, subjective or objective, are ultimately derived from the original nescience. But the correction of these errors only entails the correction of the *ad hoc* defects and has no bearing on the primal nescience.

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[1] Vastutastu ekājñānapakṣe'pi dṛṣṭānte śuktirajatādau jñānanivartyatvarūpasādhyasya anumānāntareṇa siddhir bhavati, tathāhi śuktirajataṃ jñānanivartyaṃ, doṣajanyājñānaviṣayatvāt rajjusarpavat.—The *Bālabodhinī* (The *Advaitasiddhi* Bengali edn) page 739.

It was, again, objected that the corrective knowledge does not annul the reality of the object of illusion. But this objection seeks to override the plain deliverance of experience. The illusory silver is felt to disappear immediately on the emergence of the correction, just as the jar is seen to disappear when it is demolished by a hammer stroke. The fact that illusion, together with its object, say silver, disappears on the emergence of knowledge is due to the natural opposition between knowledge and error. Whether this opposition is derived from logical incompatibility or causal efficiency of the destructive agent, knowledge and the like, has been discussed by us. It will suffice to observe that even causal opposition is ultimately reducible to a case of logical opposition indicative of ontological impossibility. It is quite possible to argue that the hammer stroke entails the disappearance of the jar in the very moment of its occurrence. If the hammer stroke is supposed to cause destruction, the disappearance of the jar will take place at least in the second moment. It may be asked, what happens to the jar after it is destroyed ? It can be satisfactorily answered that destruction entails the disappearance of the jar, since there is incompatibility between destruction and the existence of the destroyed. The opposition is ultimately a case of the impossibility of the copresence of the negation and the negatum. Even if this position be conceded, the Advaitin can explain the opposition of knowledge and nescience in terms of causality. Nescience, together with the phenomenal world, disappears immediately after the emergence of knowledge of the ultimate Reality. But the Prābhākara school regards negation as identical with its locus. It has no ontological status apart from the latter. For instance, the destruction of the jar is not anything ontologically different from the potsherds to which it is seen to be reduced by the hammer stroke. But these were the constituents of the jar, and as such cannot be regarded as a consequent effect. There is opposition. The attempt to explain the opposition in terms of causation does not square with the view. Negation as a separate ontological fact is not a matter of undisputed cognition. The hammer stroke is said to induce the disappearance of the jar. Instead of regarding the opposition as consequence of causal efficiency, it is more logical to regard it as a case of ontological or logical incompatibility. The hammer stroke is not found to be followed by the existence of the jar. The two are incompatible. The opposition of knowledge and nescience is exactly on a par. There is no appearance after knowledge. The Advaitin regards this opposition of relation as a coincidence and synchronism. The emergence of knowledge ontologically entails the cessation of nescience and all that it stands for.

Another consequential objection has been raised by the Mādhva from the standpoint of the Naiyāyika. The cessation of appearance takes place either synchronously or as an immediate consequence of true knowledge. Even if it is granted that the plurality of appearanees ceases, the cessation is a fact and will constitute duality. But this objection, even from the standpoint of Naiyāyika, cannot be maintained. The contention is that cessation would continue to persist in the subsequent moment. But true knowledge entails the disappearance of the time-space order. The concept of time has validity only so long as events occur. So the disappearance of the entire world-appearance on the emergence of final knowledge or ultimate Truth also entails *eo ipso* the disappearance of time and space. The question of the continuance of cessation in the subsequent moments is therefore absurd. There is no time, objective or subjective, after the final knowledge. Thus, the concept of falsity as liability to cessation by virtue of the emergence of true knowledge is logically found to be immune from all the objections put forward by the opponent.

Let us address ourselves to other objections of the Mādhva. The definition of falsity as liability to destruction by knowlenge does not extend to the cessation of mental events, such as cognition, pleasure, pain, will, etc., on the emergence of a subsequent mental event. These psychical events no doubt disappear on the emergence of subsequent mental events. Mental events are in a flux, and one mental state is superseded by the subsequent event. But the disappearance is not due to the opposition of knowledge. This opposition of mental events illustrates a psychical law. Whatever is a subsequent psychical event naturally supplants a previous perceptible mental event. In the terminology of the Naiyāyika these mental events are called the specific qualities of the self, and the perceptible qualities are supplanted by the subsequent specific qualities. So the opposition is not what is meant by the Advaitin. Whatever is destroyed by knowledge *quā* knowledge is false. This is not the case with the aforesaid instance.

The question was raised by the Mādhva as to whether the opposition of knowledge is to be understood as a case of opposition by knowledge as such or by a concomitant species of it. The Advaitin now answers that if the second alternative be accepted the concept of falsity as defined will hold good. The opposition between mental facts has been shown to be due to the character of the subsequent psychical event as such, and this subsequent event is not necessarily a cognition. It may be an emotion or volition or a mental trace. Again, the subsequent event need not be a psychical fact. It must be admitted that the previous mental event, which is defined by the Naiyāyika as the perceptible specific quality of the self, is bound to disappear on the emergence of any event, mental or non-mental. Thus, the last mental event on the eve of dreamless sleep or swoon in which no mental event occurs can be satisfactorily explained to disappear owing to the impact of these subsequent states, which cannot be regarded as psychical events.[1]

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[1] But the Naiyāyika may object that even if a non-mental event can bring about this cessation of the previous mental event, this will entail the cessation of calculating cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) in the third moment. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology a mental event persists for two moments and disappears in the third. But this does not hold good in the case of calculating cognition. In the knowledge of arithmetical numbers from *two* onwards, the Naiyāyika lays down the procedure as follows. First, there is the knowledge of each unit, the knowledge of one by one. In the second moment, the knowledge of the two units taking place separately produces the quality of twoness in the units concerned. This twoness is an objeetive determination. In the third moment, there is indeterminate knowledge of twoness. In the fourth moment, the determinate knowledge of the number *two* takes place. The calculating cognition is destroyed by indeterminate cognition occurring in the third moment and the destruction takes place at the fourth moment when the determinate knowledge of the number *two* occurs. The knowledge of the number *two* means the knowledge of two units as *two* i.e., as qualified by the number '2', i.e., the quality of twoness. Even if a non-mental event occurring elsewhere were to cause the cessation of a psychical event, the calculating cognition would be destroyed by the number *two* produced in the units as psychical quality, and the cessation of it, i.e., of the calculating cognition would take place at the third moment. But this objection leaves the Advaitin absolutely unaffected. First of all, it is based on

As regards the destruction of the residual traces of past experience by their resuscitation through the act of memory, the answer is that memory does not necessarily imply destruction of the traces. On the contrary, the evidence of experience is that it strengthens rather than destroys the traces left behind our experience. The Mādhva maintains that memory is a species of knowing, and, if traces of past experience be supposed to be destroyed by it, such traces would be cases of destruction by a form of knowing and thus would come under the definition of falsity. But, as we have seen, memory

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the assumption that the knowledge of the qualifying adjective is the condition of the knowledge of the qualified substantive. In other words the knowledge of the predicate is the condition precedent of the judgment. This psychological rule makes the postulation of indeterminate cognition a logical necessity. The knowledge of the adjectival predicate being antecedent to judgment must be non-judgmental under pain of infinite regress. The adjective, say *redness*, must be known before one can make the judgment 'The pen is red'. This procedure is not regarded as based on a valid assessment by Prabhākara. It is true that we cannot have a perceptual cognition of an adjective cognisable by a different sense from the substantive. One can make the judgement 'A is a scholar' only if he has previous knowledge of his scholarship. But when the adjective, the substantive and also their relation are perceived by the same sense it is unwarranted to suppose that perceptual judgement does not take place at once. The knowledge of negation is always determinate as it involves the knowledge of the relation of the thing negated and the locus at one and the same time. So the rule that the knowledge of the adjective is antecedent to the knowledge of the substantive as qualified by the adjective, i.e., judgement, is neither universal nor necessary.

The Advaitin accordingly does not believe in the persistence of the calculating cognition for three moments. He accepts the Naiyāyika contention that the calculating cognition ceases to exist in the third moment when the arithmetical judgement, 'There are two things' takes place.

does not destroy traces, but, rather, strengthens them, so that the invariable relation between the memory act and the destruction of traces on which the Mādhva rests his case is not materially true, i.e., lacks the support of actual experience.

But the Naiyāyika objects to this answer. Experience leaves behind memory trace as its function and the result is memory. When memory takes place, the trace must be obliterated ; otherwise one memory trace would produce an infinite number of recollections. That the final act produces the intermediate functions is admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka. Vedic sacrifice, which is asserted to bring about residence in heaven as its result, is not found to bring about this outcome immediately after its performance. It is therefore postulated in order to save the authority of the Vedic injunction that the sacrifice produces a religious merit in the soul and that this persists until the occurrence of the result. But the accrual of the reward brings about the cessation of the religious merit ; otherwise, there would be an indefinite extension of the result. Likewise, in the case of memory trace which is a function of original experience, it must be admitted that it ceases as soon as the memory act takes place. But this rule is not regarded as universally valid. At any rate, it breaks down in the case of sense-perception. The sense is regarded as the condition of perception and this happens if there is sense-object contact in between. The intermediate sense-object contact is, according to the definition, the function of the sense. But the sense-object contact does not cease when perception takes place, because one can have a series of continuous repetitive experiences of the same object. Similarly, the memory trace need not necessarily be subject to destruction by the resultant memory act. The further objection that in that case the memory trace would be ineradicable does not hold good, because it may be destroyed by some disease or finally by the knowledge of ultimate Truth, which brings in salvation.

It may be contended that a series of perceptions do not each produce a memory trace, but only produce one strong memory trace and that this makes immediate recollection without effort possible. If the powerful memory trace is supposed to be destroyed by the resultant memory act, there does not arise any difficulty. Thus the definition of falsity would apply to memory trace which is liable to destruction by the memory act. Though this objection is not psychologically valid, the Advaitin does not labour his defence further. The meaning of the definition is propounded in a different way. Liability to destruction by knowledge constitutes falsity. But 'knowledge' here stands for direct intuition, which is a species of the genus 'knowledge'. This interpretation is necessary in view of the fact that indirect knowledge does not suffice to correct all illusions. If an indirect cognition of the locus were sufficient for correcting all illusions about it, then even an indirect cognition of the real character of the substrate would correct a presented false appearance. But in the case of presented falsities we never find that they give way to and vanish through an indirect cognition of the character of the locus. For example, the sun may be known indirectly to be millions of miles away from the earth we inhabit. But this indirect knowledge of its physical proximity from us does not correct the illusion of its visual distance from us when we look at it. The Advaitin replies that by knowledge of the locus, he means not inferential or indirect knowledge of the substratum, but a presentative consciousness or intuition of its real character. Such direct awareness dispels all illusory superimpositions, both direct and indirect. This interpretation disposes of the possible objection regarding certitude which dispels doubt. Certitude, if indirect, would not fall within the range of the definition. So the definition of falsity will not apply to doubt.

We may conclude by observing that none of the objections based on supposed overlapping of the definition do not touch the Advaitin's fundamental position. The Advaitin actually believes that memory trace, doubt, the succeeding mental event, are all false, and so the application of the definition to these cases can be endorsed by him as welcome issues. But the Advaitin's proof of the falsity of these cases does not lie in such easy defence. They are false because they present themselves as opposite of pure consciousness. And they are liable to final cessation only on the emergence of the knowledge of the ultimate Truth. The arguments employed in defence by the Advaitin are inspired by the cognition of the Truth. In philosophy, the Advaitin is under duress to prove his contention by logically cogent arguments. This is the apology of the Advaitin in the elaboration of his thesis. Advaita Vedānta derives its strength not from the textual assertions alone, but definitely from the refutation of the realists' objections which go deep and wide. The fight between the realist and the Advaitin gives the picture of an intellectual tournament in which neither party is willing to give way on easy terms. No quarter is given or received. Ultimately the fight assumes extreme intensity. It is this intellectual duel which gives an interesting subject of study by a modern scholar.

CHAPTER IX

THE FOURTH DEFINITION OF FALSITY

According to the fourth definition, the falsity of a thing consists in its being absolutely absent in the very locus in which it presents itself.[1] This is the definition of false given by Citsukhācārya, author of the *Tattvapradīpikā*.[2] The second definition defines falsity as that which stands eternally negated in the very locus in which it appears. In this definition, the substantive is what stands eternally negated and the rest of the definition is the qualifying clause. In the fourth definition, what appears or presents itself as real is the substantive, and the rest of the definition, i.e., in the very locus in which it is absolutely absent is the qualifying clause. The two definitions thus state the same thing with only a difference of emphasis. As a matter of fact, not merely the fourth and the second, but the first, the second, the third and the fourth definitions are all virtually the same, defining the meaning of falsity from different points of view. Since the second and the fourth definitions are, in fact, the same, the fourth may be objected to by the realist on the same grounds as the second, and the objections may be disposed of also in the same manner as the objections to the second. Therefore, there is no need of going over the same field here again. Despite this, some special objections of the realist may be considered and disposed of *seriatim*.

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[1] Svāśrayaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvaṃ vā mithyātvam —The *Advaitasidhi* (Nirṇayasagara edn) page 182.

[2] Sarveṣāmapi bhāvānāṃ svāśrayatvena sammate. Pratiyogitvamatyantābhāvaṃ prati mṛṣātmatā—The *Tattvapradīpikā*.

One likely objection to this definition is this. The locus with which an object is in contact or in which an object inheres cannot be one characterized by the absolute absence of the object. For example it would be absurd to say that in the selfsame ground, with which a jar is perceived to be in contact, i.e., on which the jar is seen to stand, the jar is absolutely absent. This will be contradicting the evidence of direct experience. What is immediately certified in actual experience cannot be set at naught by a declaration embodied in a scriptural text. The same remarks hold of the case in which a jar is seen to be related by the relation of inherence. The relation between a jar and its constituent two potsherds is that of inherence, and the two halves are therefore conceived to be the constitutive cause of the jar. If, therefore, the two halves in which a jar inheres be at the same time devoid of the jar itself, the two halves will cease to be the constitutive cause of the jar. Here, therefore, the Advaitin is asserting something that will upset all accepted beliefs. It will mean that the Advaita view will land us into the absurdity that the recognised constitutive cause of a thing is no constitutive cause thereof, as the thing is absolutely absent in what we call its constitutive cause. But this will mean that anything may be called the constitutive cause of anything. We may say, for example, that the constitutive cause of an earthen jar is not earth but threads or yarn. If the earthen jar be absent in the earth, and yet the earth could be called its constitutive cause, the earthen jar being similarly absent in the threads of yarn, the threads of yarn may as well be called its constitutive cause.

The Advaitin replies as follows. All things and their absolute absence are in time. Therefore, the things and their absence exist together in time relations. For example, an earthen jar exists in the earth and is absolutely absent in the threads of yarn in the relation of inherence. Thus, existence in the relation of inherence in one kind of material (earth) and absolute non-existence in the same relation in another kind of material (threads of yarn) hold in respect of an earthen jar. Both are facts, and as facts they are in time. In the same way, both existence and non-existence may hold of the jar in the same relation with reference to the same locus. In other words, according to the Advaitin, the experience of a jar in a particular locus is due to superimposition. In so far as the Absolute as reality is falsely identified with the form of the jar, and in so far as the form of the jar gets identified with the Absolute as reality, there is presentation of the jar as real. The reality of the jar is nothing but the reality of the Absolute shining through it. Because of superimposition, the jar, though not real *per se*, appears with the reality borrowed from the Absolute, with which it appears as one. And, since this superimposition has nescience as its cause, as along as the influence of nescience continues the false appearance fails to be apprehended as such. When the nescience is overcome, then the falsity of all empirical objects, such as jar, cloth, etc., is discovered. And this means that they are then intuited to be utterly absent in the very locus in which they are perceived. In fact, the Mādhva contention that the testimony of scripture has no power to overthrow the evidence of immediate experience does not bear examination. Scripture is a record of our spiritual experiences and thus it is more forceful than our ordinary experience of the work-a-day world, and inference which has the support of spiritual experience as recorded in scripture is certainly stronger than ordinary experience and inference based on ordinary experience. This, therefore, disposes of the objection of the realist that existence and non-existence are mutually incompatible.

The realist's objection that this definition will apply not merely to the false but also to the absolutely non-existent and, therefore, is too wide has already been answered in previous discussions. The objection ignores the fact that the illusory is what presents itself as an object of experience, and yet is not such. The absolutely non-existent is never an object of experience.[1]

It may be objected that this view does not square with the scriptural text 'At first there was non-being and out of non-being came forth all that is.'[2] Here the scripture refers to non-being as an object. How then can the absolutely non-existent be described as something which is not an object of experience ? The scripture would not have referred to it if it had not been an object of spiritual experience. The answer is that the text referred to has been misunderstood by the realist. The text does not speak of non-being as if it were something. The text, in fact, is simply the denial of the statement 'At first there was being'. What the statement signifies is not the affirmation of non-being as the original state as if non-being itself were a positive something but the denial that the primary state was a state of being.[3]

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[1] Naca asatyātivyāptiḥ, svātyantābhāvādhikaraṇa eva sattvena pratīyamānatvasya vivakṣitatvāt—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgara edn) pages 189-190.

[2] Tathaika āhuḥ 'asadevedamagre āsit', iti śrutyā asataḥ sattvapratite tatra ativyāpti duṣparihara iti etc.—*op. cit.* page 190.

[3] 'Sadevedamagra āsīt' ityasyārbhasyābhāva eva nañā pratipādyate, na tvasataḥ sattvaṃ, virodhāt—*op. cit.* pages 191-192.

CHAPTER X

THE FIFTH DEFINITION OF FALSITY

The fifth definition defines falsity as difference from the real.[1] This definition has been given by Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka[2] in his *Nyāyadīpāvali*. In elucidation of this definition the author of the *Advaitasiddhi* defines reality as consisting in being established by valid evidence or by a valid source or sources of knowledge.[3] Valid evidence is further defined as that which conduces to knowledge not generated by any kind of defect.[4] In other words, knowledge which is not due to or caused by any defect is valid knowledge. And what causes such valid knowledge is logical evidence (*pramāṇa*). And reality (*sattva*) is what is certified by valid evidence.

It may be pointed out that the cognition of illusory silver is caused by resemblance and other defects, and is not a case of cognition uncaused by defect, and hence it answers to the meaning of falsity as set forth by the Bhaṭṭāraka. But it is otherwise, however, in the case of cognition of ether and other objects of the world of pragmatic experience. The cognition of these objects is not caused by defect, and, therefore, as not being caused by defect, the cognition of these should be cognition of reality. It may be said, however, that the cognition of ether, etc., takes place in and through the mind or internal organ, and the internal organ has nescience as its constitutive cause. Now, an object and its constitutive cause are non-different, and therefore the internal organ is non-different from nescience, which is its constitutive cause and whereof the internal organ is a modification. Since the cognition of ether is a function of this internal organ and since the internal organ is non-different from nescience, the cognition of ether may be regarded as a function of nescience. Therefore, it cannot be said to be not caused by defect and so it cannot be held to be a cognition of reality.

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[1] Sadviviktatvaṃ vā mithyātvam — The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgara edn) page 195.

[2] Ānandabodha flourished about the 11th or 12th century A.D. He is author of the *Nyāyamakaranda*, the *Pramāṇamālā* and the *Nyāyadīpāvalī*.

[3] Sattvaṃ ca pramāṇasiddhatvam — The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgara edn) page 195.

[4] Pramāṇatvaṃ ca doṣāsahakṛtajñānakaraṇatvam—*op. cit.* pages 195-197.

But against this contention it may be pointed out that the knowledge of the Absolute caused by hearing, meditating on the Vedānta text and its meaning is also a function of the internal organ. How, then, can such knowledge be regarded as knowledge of reality? The Advaita answer to this objection is that in the case of a mental mode which is the cognition of the Absolute or Reality the mode as a mode is no doubt the function of the mind and therefore a function of nescience. But it is not a modification of nescience in its character as defect. Nescience functions as defect, not as a constitutive cause or *causa materialis*, but as an excitant cause or *causa efficiens*. The indivisible experience generated by the Advaita text presupposes nescience as its constitutive cause, but it is not due to nescience functioning as defect in the form of an excitant cause. Therefore, the definition of reality as that which is evidenced by knowledge not caused by defect is not inapplicable to the experience of reality caused by the Vedānta text.[1] In other words, knowledge caused by the Vedānta text is valid, because the object which it certifies is not negatived or cancelled. Contrary is the case with the cognition of the world of experience. It is illusory, as the object which it certifies is ultimately overthrown and negatived. And so it is proved that falsity is other than the object of valid cognition caused by evidence not tainted with defect, and hence it is other than reality. The cognitions of ether and other objects of the world are other than those that are objects of cognition not caused by defect, and therefore they all answer to the definition of falsity as set forth above.

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[1] Vedantamahāvākyajanyākhaṇḍākārāntaḥkaraṇavṛtteḥ pariṇāmyupādānatayā avidyājanyatve'pi doṣavidhāya avidyarūpanimitta-

It may be objected, however, that a barren mother and other like absurdities are not objects of cognition, and hence they are also not objects of cognition caused by the absence of defect. Therefore, they come under the definition of falsity. In the same way the Absolute as Reality itself is not an object of cognition, and, therefore, the Absolute is not an object of cognition caused by the absence of defect. Hence, the Absolute will answer to this definition of falsity. In other words, Absolute Reality as well as absolute unreality, is to be included as per this definition under the category of the false. The answer is that here the qualification 'capable of presentation in experience as real' has to be added. Neither the Absolute nor the barren mother nor other such absurdities is ever an object of experience. It is incapable of presentation in experience as real objects. The definition of falsity thus does not apply to them.

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kāraṇajanyatvābhāvāt na doṣājanyajñānāprasiddhiḥ. Nāpi viyadādi-prapañce lakṣaṇāsāṅgatiḥ.—The *Balabodhinī* (The *Advaitasiddhi* Bengali Edn) page 840.

CHAPTER XI

IS FALSITY FALSE ?

The realist believes in the unrepudiable reality of the world. In spite of the fact that it is not conterminus with the Absolute, the world is a real creation of God, and the reality of the individual souls is considered by the realist to be as unconditional and absolute as that of God Himself. In a word, the world of plurality is not a false appearance, and the Absolute is not impersonal. This is the metaphysical background of the Mādhva's unrelenting opposition to the Advaita position of pure monism of pure consciousness as the sole and entire reality. The Advaita position can be maintained only if the plurality of the world order be only a false appearance. Accordingly, it has been observed by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī that the position of non-dualism can be maintained only if dualism is proved to be false. The Advaitin therefore addresses himself to the task of proving the world order to be a false appearance. For this it has been deemed necessary to have a correct appraisal of the nature of falsity and its criterion. The five different definitions of falsity aim at giving this appraisal.

We have discussed five different definitions of falsity before. We shall now consider some further objections of the realist to the conception of falsity. It is to be noted that the realist's argument is directed, not against falsity as such, but against the Advaita concept of falsity with reference to the world of experience. The realist urges that the falsity which has been spoken of so far, and which has been asserted in respect of the world of experience, is either itself false or true, i.e., is either a falsity that is liable to be contradicted or overthrown or a falsity that cannot be contradicted or falsified. If the first alternative be admitted, then the world-falsity is admitted to be itself false, and this amounts to conceding the realist view that the world is not false but true.[1] But this is proving the obvious or saying something which the realist does not dispute.[2] The realist believes that the falsity of the world is an imaginary falsity, and is no real falsity. A further objection to this view is that if the falsity of the world be said to be itself false as the Advaitin says, then the Advaita text proving the falsity of the world will have to be admitted to teach something that is false. This will take away the evidential value of the scriptural text. The unsubstantial (*atattva*) and the false cannot be conveyed by scriptural texts, which teach truth only and never delivers untruth or falsity.[3] A third objection is that, if the falsity of the world be conceived to be itself a false falsity, then by implication the world is proved to be true or real. This may be shown in the form of an inference. The world is true, because its falsity is itself falsified, just as is (falsity of) the self (*ātman*). The invariable relation on which the inference is based is this, if there are two characters which are negatives of each other, or the absence of either of which refers to the presence of the other as its necessary implicate, then one of these being proved false, the other is established as true.[4]

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[1] Uktamithyātvasya mithyātve prapañcasatyatvāpātaḥ, ekasmin dharmiṇi prasaktayor viruddhadharmayoḥ ekamithyātve aparasatyatvaniyamāt—The *Advaitasiddhi* (Nirṇayasāgara edn) page 207.

[2] Ādye jaganniṣṭhamithyātvasya bādhyatvaṃ pūrvapakṣibhir api aṅgikṛtameva iti tādṛśamithyātvasādhane siddhasādhanam—The *Bālabodhini* (The *Advaitasiddhi*, Bengali edn) page 872.

[3] Bādhyabhūtamithyātvāvedakatvena advaitaśruter atattvāvedakatvaṃ ca syāt—*op. cit.* page 872.

[4] Parasparaviraharūpayoḥ parasparavirahavyāpakayor vā ekamithyātve aparasatyatvaniyamasya ātmani dṛṣṭatvena vyāptigrahasambhavāt—*op. cit.* page 873.

Falsity and truth are two such characters, each represents the absence of the other, and the absence of one posits the presence of the other. Consider, for example, the two mutually exclusive characters, truth and falsity. Each is a negation of the other. In the self, the falsity being negated, truth is posited. In the same way, the falsity of the world being falsified or negated, the truth or the reality of it follows as a necessary logical consequence.

So far, one of the alternatives has been considered in regard to the falsity of the world, viz., the alternative that the falsity of the world itself is false. Let us now consider the other alternative, that the falsity of the world is not a false or an unreal falsity, but a true or a real one. This alternative entails the following difficulty. The objectivity or cognizability (*dṛśyatva*) is a mark, which, according to the Advaitin, proves the falsity of the world. If falsity, which is proved by the mark of objectivity, be itself true or real, i.e., a true or real falsity then, objectivity proves reality or truth and not falsity. The mark thus is no mark of falsity, i.e., is not an invariable concomitant of falsity. Just as the falsity of the world is conceded to be real or true falsity in spite of its objectivity, so also the world may be held to be a real or true world despite its objectivity. The realist concludes his polemic against the Advaitin in the form of the following dilemma.

> If the world-falsity be a false falsity, then by inference it follows that the world is real, which contradicts the Advaita non-dualism, and, if the world-falsity be a true or real falsity, then a reality, i.e., in the shape of a real falsity, other than Absolute, the non-dual reality, is established, which also contradicts the non-dualism of the Advaitin ; The world falsity is either a true

or a false falsity ; ∴ There is the contradiction
of Advaita non-dualism in either case.[1]

The Advaitin replies to the above objection as follows. He does not hold the view that the world falsity is itself a true or real falsity, and, therefore, the objections that have been raised on the supposition of this alternative do not touch him at all. He is concerned only with the other alternative and the objections that have been raised on this count. According to this alternative, the falsity of the world is itself a false falsity and the realists' objection crystallized into the contention that falsity being itself falsified necessarily establishes the truth of what is held to be false. This is the sum and substance of the realists' position. The realist here seems guilty of a lamentable confusion between contrary and contradictory oppositions. A is the contradictory of not-A, so that the negation of A proves not-A and that of not-A proves A. But A and B are contrarily opposed. They connot be present together in the same locus. Co-presence is impossible in respect of opposites that are contrarily related. The presence of each repels the other. But co-absence in the same locus is not incompatible in the case of contraries. This is what distinguishes contrary from contradictory opposites. In the case of contradictory opposites, both co-presence and co-absence in the same locus are impossible. The absence of A means the presence of not-A, and the absence of not-A means the presence of A, just as the presence of A implies the absence of not-A, and the presence of not-A means the absence of A. But, in the case of contrary opposites, only co-presence is incompatible. A thing that is 'A' cannot be B. A thing that is B cannot be A. But co-absence is not precluded in the case of contraries. C is neither A nor B, i.e., is a case of co-absence of both A and B. An animal that is a horse cannot be a cow, and an animal that is a cow cannot be a horse. In other words, co-presence of horseness and cowness in the same animal is impossible. But co-absence of both in the same locus is not precluded thereby. An elephant is neither a horse nor a cow, i.e., is a case of co-absence of horseness and cowness. Falsity and truth are incompatible in the sense that one, being present, the other also cannot be co-present. But this repugnance does not extend to their respective absences. The absolutely unreal, for example, is neither true nor false, and therefore the falsification of the false does not necessarily establish truth.[1]

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[1] Prapañcamithyātvasya mithyātve prapañcasatyatvānumānena advaitavyāghātaḥ, evaṃ mithyātvasya satyatve sadantarasvīkāreṇāpi advaitavyākopaḥ—*op. cit.* page 873.

The Mādhva realist, in common with all other realists, does not agree with the Advaitin in respect of the latter's fundamental thesis. The rebuttal of the realist's objection on the basis of a third type of pseudo-reality existing in between the real and the unreal, that is to say, between an absolute existence and an absolute non-existence, a real and a fiction, is regarded by him as an unwarranted postulate. The world appearance is said to have this pseudo-reality. In the scheme of Advaita ontology a pseudo-reality has a definite status though in point of fact it cannot be logically defined either as existent, or as non-existent. The unreal is a fiction and a pure concept, which is not actually confronted by experience or logical thought. The unreal fiction is a concept which does not come within the purview of experience. We shall discuss in the sequel whether unreal fictions, such as a square circle, a barren mother, etc., are unmeaning nonsense or have conceptual individuality, having no objective status. The Advaitin believes, both on the testimony of the Upaniṣadic text and logical considerations, that the Absolute is eternally real and there is no lapse of reality or contradiction in it. The world, on the other hand, is envisaged in experience, and, therefore, cannot be dismissed as an unreal fiction. It also cannot be accorded the reality that is possessed by the Absolute. So, the phenomenal world of reality stands between the Absolute and the fiction. A fiction has no objective existence, whereas the world has. It must, then, be admitted that there are three categories of thought, the Absolute, the fiction, and the indeterminate or logically indeterminable existence of the world. The Mādhva realist stubbornly declines the possibility of an intermediate existent which is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. He contends that the Advaita conception of a pseudo-reality, which appears in experience and is yet not real, is nothing but the assumption that it differs from fictions and Absolute Reality. This defence of the Advaitin will have no significance for those who do not believe in the possibility of fiction as a pure concept. The pseudo-reality is called false by the Advaitin. But from the standpoint of the philosopher, who denies fiction as a concept as opposed to the real, there is no *tertium quid* between the true and the false, and so the true and the false will be contradictorily opposed and the denial of one will entail the affirmation of the reality of the other.

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[1] Tucche śaśaviṣāṇādau satyatvasya mithyātvasya ca abhāvena na satyatvamithyātvayoḥ parasparaviraharūpatvaṃ, na vā parasparavirahavyāpakatvaṃ. Kintu satyatvamithyātvayor gotvāśvatvayorivamviruddhatvamātraṃ bodhyaṃ. Tathā ca na mithyātvasya mīthyātve tasya satyatvam.—The *Balabodhinī* (The *Advaitasiddhi* Bengali edn) page 875.

The Advaitin has contended that absolute truth which is, by its definition, unconditionally repellent of all contradictions and negations belongs only to the Absolute. On the other extreme stand fictions which are absolutely unreal. Between these two there stands the world appearance which has provisional reality. It cannot have ultimate reality because it is relative and riddled with logical difficulties consequential to relativity, which is described as falsity in the terminology of the Advaita Vedānta. Denial of falsity does not entail the acceptance of reality, since the two are not contradictorily opposed. The opposition between the true and the false, though exclusive, is not incompatible with their combined negation in a fiction which is neither true nor false. The absence of truth and falsity in a fiction shows that they are not contradictorily opposed. It has, however, been contended that, even if truth and falsity be instances of opposition by contrariety, their co-presence is not logically warranted. But both of them are predicable of the world. The world is not a fiction, since experience attests its existence.

The Advaitin does not consider that this objection is fatal. There are three types of existence, viz., the Absolute, which is unconditionally repugnant to negation, the empirical reality, which is provisional and is susceptible to affirmation and negation under respective conditions, and the illusory which is found to exist and disappear in the course of normal experience. These three types constitute a hierarchy in which the first has the highest and absolute reality, the second has a lower grade of reality, and the third the lowest. It is quite reasonable that the lower grade has not the higher grade of reality. For instance, illusion has an apparent existence, and its denial in respect of the second grade is quite consistent. So, also, with regard to the world appearance, in respect of which the denial of the highest reality is consistent with possession of the medium type of existence. Truth and falsity have been shown to be contraries, and so the denial of one need not involve the admission of the other. Even if they be regarded as contradictorily opposed, truth and falsity are compatible if they belong to different grades. The empirical reality of the world is not compatible with empirical falsity, because they belong to the same grade. But, though the world is false in that it is wanting in the highest reality, it is true in its own sphere, i.e., it has empirical reality. If in deference to the contention of the Mādhva it is conceded that the world may not possess empirical reality, the lack of it does not entail its total unreality since it has the lowest grade of reality. This is found to be the case with illusory silver, which appears to have as much reality as empirical silver until it is contradicted. The contradiction denies its empirical reality, but not its reality of the third order. So, the contention of the Mādhva that the simultaneous affirmation and denial of the world entail contradiction does not stand examination. The combination of truth and falsity is analogous to the Naiyāyika assertion of conjunction and absence of it in the same substrate. But this analogy is only apparent. Conjunction and absence of it are possessed of the same grade of reality in the Naiyāyika view. This, as we have shown, is not endorsed by the Advaitin. The logical difficulties will not arise if the presence and the absence of a fact are found to belong to different orders of reality.

But this is only a concession. The question as to whether the falsity and reality of the world belong to different grades of reality can be decided by an accepted criterion. The criterion is—where the proof of one constitutes the refutation of the other, both cannot have the same grade of reality but must have different grades. The contradiction of the false silver proves the negation of it. The negation of silver is real empirically, and the silver is shown to have only apparent reality. Let us see if this criterion is applicable to the world. If the proof of the empirical falsity of the world involves the denial of its empirical reality, then the falsity and the reality would belong to different orders. But on deeper consideration it will be found that the empirical falsity of the world is not incompatible with its empirical reality. We have considered the criterion of difference in grades or order of reality. But there is a criterion of the same grade of reality. When two facts are found to be negated by one act of contradiction, the two must have the same grade of reality. This is found to be the case with illusory silver. This illusory silver also appears to be different from the mother-of-pearl. But when the illusory silver is negated its appearance of numerical difference is also overthrown. This shows that the silver and its numerical difference from the mother-of-pearl have the same grade of reality. The world appearance and its falsity are also found to be negated by the realization of the Absolute as the only truth. The world and its falsity, which was intellectually realized by logical assessment and on the authority of scripture, are demolished together by one and the same act. This proves that the two are possessed of the same grade of reality. There is another consideration. The world order has empirical reality no doubt, but its falsity is also an accepted truth. The world and its falsity are conterminous. The falsity is its intrinsic character, and, though it is realized only on the emergence of the final truth, its ontological status is co-extensive with the world. Considered from this point of view, empirical truth and empirical falsity must be accepted as coequal characteristics. The contention of the Mādhva that empirical falsity is incompatible with empirical reality is based on partial observation. The falsity in the sense of the negation of empirical reality does not necessarily entail the degradation of it to the lower level. We have seen the negation of the dream snake by the dream experience of a dream rope, and the negation of both in waking experience does not prove that the negation is necessarily possessed of a higher grade of reality. The dream rope and the dream snake, though felt to be opposed to each other, are proved by waking experience to be equally false and equally true. The falsity and the truth are of the same order. The situation of empirical reality and empirical falsity of the world is entirely analogous. Though apparently the falsity and the consequential negation seem to have a higher grade of reality, the two are found to be of the same order, when both of them are contradicted by the knowledge of the ultimate Truth.

The contention that unreality, i.e., the falsity of the empirical reality, will entail the absolute reality of the world is not tenable, as empirical reality and empirical falsity have been shown to be compatible. The falsity of the illusory silver is shown by the knowledge of the mother-of-pearl. The falsity, being an intrinsic character of the illusory silver, disappears with the silver. The disappearance of falsity does not invest the illusory silver with a higher grade of reality. The falsity, being an intrinsic character of the empirical world, must also be of the empirical order, and this will repel ultimate reality, because the two are incompatible. The empirical falsity will only negate its absolute reality. The relation of opposition does not presuppose that the opposing attribute should be real. It is only necessary that the opposing term should have the same existential status with its substratum. In other words, this attribute should not be falsely ascribed to it and as such liable to be cancelled by the knowledge of the substratum. The character of being the mother-of-pearl is not cancelled by the knowledge of the substratum, i.e., the mother-of-pearl. This character will repel another character incompatible with it. It repels the character of silver. The world is false, and its falsity is not cancelled by the knowledge of the world which is qualified by it. This empirical falsity *quā* character of the empirical world will repel absolute reality, because falsity is incompatible with reality. It has been repeatedly emphasized that falsity and truth are not contradictorily opposed, and so the negation of falsity will not entail the reality of the world. The Mādhva realist always confounds falsity with non-existence and truth with existence. Existence and non-existence are contradictorily opposed, but truth and falsity are not so.

The dilemma raised by the Mādhva is that if the falsity of the false world is real, i.e., is true, i.e., not liable to cancellation, then it would be a parallel real to the Absolute, and the non-dualism would collapse, and, if on the other hand, it is false, that is, liable to be cancelled, then the world will be real. The Advaitin regards the dilemma as a case of sophistry, the class of sophism being one per eternal (*nityasamā jāti*). The Naiyāyika believes that word is impermanent. Now, it may be argued whether this impermanence is permanent or impermanent. If it is impermanent, the attribute impermanence will not exist for all time and will disappear at some time. And when the impermanence disappears and ceases to be its attribute, the word will be permanent. If it be, on the other hand, permanent, the permanence of the attribute will perforce entail the permanence of the substratum, since an attribute cannot exist without any substratum. This dilemma is a case of sophistry. It shows that the proposition 'word is impermanent' is self-contradictory. But the proposition, whether true or false, is not a case of self-contradiction. The dilemma only sophistically evades a controversial issue by cutting the Gordian knot. It denies the proposition itself. This sophistry is merely an evasive trick of the opponent who has no argument of his own.

The dilemma raised by the Mādhva, 'Is the falsity of the false world false or true ?' is exactly a case of this type of sophistry. The horns of a dilemma are so devised as to make the original proposition end in self-contradiction. The Advaitin asserts the proposition 'The world is false and the falsity is also false'. This proposition, instead of being assailed on its merit, is now parried by a dilemma which arises by putting up two incompatible horns. The dilemma raised by the Mādhva is, 'Is falsity false or true ?'. The acceptance of both the horns will end in contradiction of the original proposition. The original proposition is 'The falsity is false'. Now, the Mādhva here raises the dilemma 'Is the falsity false or true ?'. The acceptance of the first alternative is supposed to end in self-contradiction. The false, if false, will not be a true predicate and amount to denial of the proposition. The acceptance of the second horn, i.e., truth of the falsity, will show that there is another truth. In the present case it will undermine the Advaita position that Consciousness is the only truth, since it shows that there is another truth in the shape of falsity.

The Mādhva may argue that the dilemma is not a case of sophistry : the acceptance of the first alternative may end in self-contradiction, but the second alternative does not. It only shows the untenability of the Advaita position of pure monism. It does not land the Mādhva into self-contradiction. But this defence is not admissible. It has been admitted that the acceptance of the first atlernative ends in contradictian. It shows that the proposition 'Falsity is false' cannot be a true proposition. The same result is also found to follow from the second alternative. In the proposition 'falsity is false' the falsity is admittedly an attribute of the world, to be precise, the subject of the proposition, The predicate 'falsity', if real and true in the absolute sense, cannot be affirmed in respect of the subject. Falsity *quā* truth cannot, on the ground of obvious self-contradiction, be the predicate of the subject, false falsity. So, the dilemma raised by the Mādhva is a plain case of sophistry.

The Mādhva realist puts up a defence. Granted the acceptance of both the horns of dilemma ends in the denial of the original proposition and that there is thus perfect symmetry between the present dilemma and the sophistical dilemma raised against the proposition 'Word is impermanent'. But this symmetry does not rob it of its logical value. The essence of sophistry is that it should end in self-contradiction and not only in contradiction of the original proposition. The contradiction of the proposition does not affect the position of the Mādhva. The dilemma only proves that the falsity of the world cannot be maintained as a true estimate of the world. In other words, it only shows that the reality of the world cannot be impugned. The second alternative, i.e., the truth of the falsity, only affects the Advaitin by proving the existence of a second reality.

But this defence is only a specious show. The Mādhva admits that such fictions as a barren mother, a hare's horn, etc., are unreal. A dilemma may be raised ; is the unreality of a fiction real or unreal ? If it is unreal, the original proposition 'Fiction is unreal', cannot stand. If it is real, it cannot pertain to the fiction, because an unreal cannot be real. The dilemma in both its horns ends in showing that the proposition is nonsensensical. The Mādhva will certainly rebut it on the ground of its sophistical character. The same is the case with his dilemma raised against the Advaita position.

The Mādhva may reply that the dilemma does not affect him because he believes in the reality of the world and the acceptance of either alternative ends in the proof of his position. But this line of defence may also be adopted by the Mīmāṃsaka, who holds that word is a permanent entity. He may argue that the dilemma is not a case of sophistry because it ends in showing the untenability of the proposition 'The word is impermanent'. It does not affect him; on the contrary, it confirms his own theory. But this line of defence is not acceptable in logical code. The position cannot be so easily and cheaply refuted. It is incumbent on the rival philosophers to put forward substantial arguments against the opposite thesis and until this is done the adoption of such sophistry will be of no avail. It is ruled out of court by the logical code of debate. Logic has a code of ethics, and sophistry is always an offence against this ethical code.

Let us conclude this discourse by recording some pertinent reflections. The postulation of a pseudo-real between the real and the unreal by the Advaitin is not a makeshift or stratagem to bolster a favourite theory or dogma. It is logically enforced by the examination of the reality of the world. The Mādhva believes in the eternal reality of God and the like. Secondly, he believes in an unreal fiction. Thirdly, he believes in the world order, which, according to him, is real though impermanent. Now, the reality of this impermanent cannot be of the same order as that of the eternal. It must be said that though real it falls short of the highest order of reality. The Advaitin also affirms that impermanent reals have not the same kind of reality as the Absolute has. He, therefore, places them on a lower level than the Absolute but higher than the fiction. This is what he means by the falsity of the world. Falsity and relative reality are the same thing. As regards the contention of the Naiyāyika that fictions are not logically possible, it will suffice to observe that this very denial of fiction presupposes its possibility. A logical impossible is not inconceivable. We can have the notion of a fiction and deny it of reality and also reality of it. The Advaitin's postulation of three categories, the Real, the empirical or pseudo-real, and the absolutely unreal, is not an *ad hoc* creation of his intellect in the interest of his metaphysical position.[1]

The Advaita postulation of three grades of reality is enforced by logical necessity. The illusory silver cannot be dismissed as a fiction. Since a fiction is endorsed by neither experience nor logical thought, it is at best a pure concept which is *eo ipso* felt to be a nonentity. Though felt, it is purely a subjective idea known to be non-existent as an objective fact. So, the illusory silver cannot be equated with it. The Mādhva seeks to prove the identity of the false and the fiction which stands self-refuted. The empirical real is put in a class lower than the Absolute and higher than the fiction, and this is necessitated by an examination of the character of objective facts experienced by us. The Advaitin asserts that these two grades of reality, the empirical and the apparent, fall short of the *ens realissimum*, and an unbiased examination of these types of reality encountered in experience tends to show that the Advaita position, however unpalatable it may appear to our realistic bias, has the support of rigid logic. It is a pity that realists have sought to prove it as of a perverted intellect. One has to refute idealism and monism with seriousness and due respect. A cheap refutal of the Advaita position, or idealism, is not a commendable procedure. It must, however, be admitted that the Mādhva realist has offered the most powerful criticism of Advaita Vedānta and it is surmisable that but for Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and his followers the Advaita philosophy would have lost all credit and prestige as a philosophical system, though it might have found shelter in a theologian's uncriticized faith. In other words, Advaitism would have been a religious creed, and not a philosophy. Madhusūdana has proved that it is not only a religious creed but a philosophy as well. Religion without the sanction of philosophy would only degenerate into dogmatism. Due credit should be given to Madhusūdana that he has rescued Advaita from the charge of uncritical dogmatism.

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[1] The problem of the status of fiction has of late engaged the attention of western scholars. Bertrand Russell in his *Principles Of Mathematics* (page 427) accords a being to fiction. Fiction is thought of and whatever is thought of has a place in the scheme of being. Urmson also explains Russell's position and says that a round square has some sort of existence (*Philosophical Analysis* pages 22-23). The position was anticipated long ago by Indian realists when they argued for the consciousness of fictions, as they are very often referred to in our discourse. The Advaitin anticipates this line of argument but he refuses to acquiesce in the swollen superfluities of realism, since fictions are mental constructions *eo ipso* felt as unreal. To hypostatize all concepts springs from an attitude of exaggeration.

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